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THE KUOMINTANG AND THE FUTURE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

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By
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INTRODUCTION

FEW people realize how long the Chinese Revolution has already lasted. Since the definite formation of the Shing Chung Hwei (China Revival Society) by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1894 organized revolution in China has had a continuous history running to the present time; and Dr. Sun said in his will in 1925: "I have devoted forty years to the work of the Nationalist Revolution." Compared with some other revolutions in recent history, as the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution seemed an endless thing. But that is only a superficial view of it. The Russian revolutionists will inform the inquirers that they have had one hundred years of preparation for their revolution before it finally succeeded. After all, a revolution is only one of the many kinds of human undertakings, but is one in which more intelligence and power are required than in other cases. A revolution is but a fundamental reconstruction of the society on newer and better social and economic theories than those in vogue in the old society that it seeks to supplant. The building of a new society is to mankind what the building of a new nest is to the crow, as all living creatures must build what they desire. Building involves thought, plan, energy and power. In the building of a new society how much more effort and time are required than in the construction of a railway or a battleship? In other words, it involves principles and a certain amount of time to translate them into realities. Besides, nearly everything can be constructed according to type, and in the process of construction man utilizes his past experience, his charts, and his books. But where is the standardized revolution? It is true that man does utilize a certain amount of the experience of past revolutions in history, but it is only a limited amount, and the set of conditions existing in a nation during any particular revolution is unique. The uniqueness of the set or combination

of conditions arises not only from the material factors but also from the psychological and historical factors. Hence the analogy between static building of things and dynamic reconstruction of society breaks down at this point. Every revolution has to formulate its own principles, to forge its own instruments, and to work out its own salvation ; therefore its process is long and its task arduous. The Chinese Revolution is no exception to this remark, and the time and labour involved will only be in proportion to the degree of success in which it is able to transform the old society into a new one.

In this connection it may be useful to emphasize once again that a revolution is not a rebellion or insurrection, and that it aims at not merely a change of Government but a fundamental reconstruction of society in its economic and social aspects. If people understand the Chinese Revolution to mean merely a change of Government, then China already has had a few. But that was not the acceptance of the word in the writings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was the leader of the Revolution and the founder of the Kuomintang.[1] Although he is dead to-day, his spirit remains the guiding hand in the unfinished task that he left behind. It is fortunate for the Chinese Revolution that Dr. Sun left to the Chinese people his writings, which serve as the principles, the theory and ideology of the Chinese Nationalist Movement under the Kuomintang. What a pity it is that these books of Dr. Sun are not carefully read and understood by those in China who called themselves his followers, but who always render him lip-service at critical moments ! To-day one of his cardinal policies was openly flouted by these Judases as out of date, and the other policies were consequently so vitiated of their vitality and spirit as to deprive them of all revolutionary force, as will be shown in the following chapters. Large numbers of people are doubting whether the ship of the Chinese Revolu-

[1] The Kuomintang in Chinese means the party of the people, or, better, the Nationalist Party, to correspond with the Nationalist Movement and the Nationalist Government. It is not, however, "nationalistic" in the narrow sense.

tion will not be steered to the rocks by these mutinous oarsmen of the Kuomintang. Inside the country as well as outside of it there reigns such an amount of confusion of ideas regarding the aims of the Chinese Revolution and the principles of the Kuomintang that it is of primary importance to-day to restate its principles and to trace them in their historical and practical aspects to their origins. Of all the enemies of human progress, the greatest is the confusion of ideas, because it obstructs views and paralyses action and destroys the collective will of any large organization such as the Kuomintang. To save the Chinese Revolution it is necessary to save the party first, and to save the party it is necessary to clear this confusion of ideas of the present situation of the Kuomintang. The principal object of presenting this volume, brief as it is, is an attempt to furnish those interested in the Chinese Nationalist Movement with certain basic facts to serve them as criteria to judge the present political situation in China and to open a vista as to the future of the Chinese Revolution.

In the method of presentation, it has been thought advisable to follow certain natural lines suggested by the desire of showing vital connection of the various phases of the Nationalist Movement as a whole. Thus the first four chapters treat of the history, the principles of the party, and its organization and work. The next three chapters dwell on the three cardinal policies formulated by Dr. Sun for the guidance of the Chinese Revolution. These three policies form in reality a trinity united by certain guiding principles. The last two chapters deal with the present party situation and the future outlook of the Chinese Revolution.

T. C. WOO.

BERLIN,
December 1927.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Mr. T. C. Woo was born in 1893 in Shasi, three hundred miles above Hankow, in the valley of the Yang-tsze. He was educated at Boone University, Wuchang, after which, in 1917, on a Hupeh Government Scholarship, he went to America, where he took degrees as Bachelor of Arts in the University of Illinois and as Master of Arts in the University of Harvard. In 1922 he attended the Washington Conference as a Chinese Students' Representative. He then spent a year in Europe, returning to China in 1924. From 1924 to 1926 he was teaching in the Universities of Kaifeng (Honan) and Wuchang. He joined the Kuomintang in 1926, and in the autumn ot that year entered the Nationalist Foreign Office under Mr. Eugene Chen. He moved with the Foreign Office when the Nationalists advanced to the Yang-tsze, and was Mr. Chen's assistant during the negotiation of the Hankow agreement in the spring of 1927. After the split in the Kuomintang later in that year and the seizure of dominating influence in it by the military leaders, Mr. Woo, together with Madame Sun Yat-sen, Mr. Chen and others who were unwilling either to lose their heads on behalf of a Communism in which they did not believe or to lend their countenance to what they considered a travesty of the principles to which the Kuomintang was committed, escaped to Russia. From Moscow Mr. Woo moved to Berlin and subsequently to Paris, where he is now a research student at the Sorbonne.

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The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORY OF THE KUOMINTANG TO 1924

In the history of the Kuomintang the year 1924 occupies a position of unique importance. It was in this year that the reorganization of the party took place. This reorganization gave the party its present form and made it markedly different from what it was before that date as far as party organization and form of party government were concerned. While the principles of the party remain the same as before, they are made more articulate and to reach far wider among the masses of the people. The party as a whole is made more effective as a fighting weapon in the politics of China, and this effectiveness comes from the reorganization. So to understand the Kuomintang of to-day one needs to understand the underlying motives for the reorganization and the causes which render it a necessity. But one cannot appreciate these without getting acquainted with the broad lines of the party's history before that date. In the following paragraphs it is intended to give a sketch of the party's history before 1924, bringing out the salient points contained therein and giving particular emphasis to the background of the times. Of course, one cannot understand the party's history at all without referring to the political and economic situation of China and abroad during the period under consideration.

A natural division of the party's history before 1924 into two periods suggests itself. It is to take the year 1911, the year when the Chinese Republic was established, as the point of division; the first period ran from the year when the forces of Chinese Revolution joined in a definite organization for the first time,

i.e. 1894 to the year 1911. It is not from considering convenience alone that 1911 was chosen as the point of division. There are other reasons of greater importance. For one thing, the character of the problems facing the party after 1911 was different from those before that date. Before 1911 the party was a secret political organization. The name Kuomintang had not come into existence, and among the Chinese people it was known only as the Revolutionary Party. It was branded by the then reigning Government as the rebels' party. It was concerned chiefly with two things : the preaching of the gospel of revolution and the planning of the overthrow of the Manchu Government. Disconnected and sporadic actions against the Government were the outstanding events of the party during this period. The results of these actions were disastrous in so far as a great number of those taking part were killed, and these were the flower of the party at that time. But in so far as the people were made to understand the significance of the revolution, the result was of tremendous importance to the party. It was only by this means of shedding its own blood that the party was able to drive home to the people the idea of revolution and to win more adherents.

After 1911 the problems that confronted the party were of a different order. The party had just overthrown the Manchu Government and emerged as a political party working in broad daylight. At that time we began to hear the name of Kuomintang used to designate the party. It began immediately to use all efforts in an attempt to put their principles into effect. It had adopted the Provisional Constitution, and was looking forward to the framing of a new one. The problems that were facing it concerned things of political and economic reconstruction of China, and party platforms were for the first time framed in regard to domestic and foreign policies. In short, it assumed at that time the form of a party in a European State with a loose organization. Besides, at this time it had other political parties in the field to deal with. To the Kuomintang itself this period

was unsatisfactory, not only on account of having suffered defeat in the hands of Yuan Shih-kai, but also because it had not achieved a fraction of its political programme. To the great dismay of its members this period, instead of its principles and aims being realized, saw the greatest amount of chaos and disorder in the contemporary history of China. It was a period of intermittent civil wars and the most gloomy time since the establishment of the Republic. The party itself had in the meantime undergone many severe trials, and felt itself uncertain, not with regard to its position and principles, but with regard to the steps it ought to take to meet the situation. In addition, the international situation had by this time completely changed, and differed fundamentally from the first period. Germany as a world Power was eliminated, but of greater importance to the Far East and to the party itself was the success of the Russian Revolution and the advent of Soviet Russia as a new Power of quite a different order from the imperial Russia. These events went to show that the second period, 1911–24, of the party's history under consideration was sufficiently different from the first, in character, in significance as well as in interest to us, as to make it stand apart from that period.

Let us begin the history of the party during the period 1894–1911 with a consideration of the political and economic conditions of the time, both abroad and at home. To this consideration a clue may be found in the contrast between this period and the period after in the number of international wars in the Far East. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894, the Boxer war of 1900, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, all occurred within this period, 1894–1911. In these wars China was either involved or directly the cause. In the period 1911–24 there was no international war in the Far East for which China was the direct cause. The Japanese fought in Kiaochow and in Siberia during the World War, but only as a sideshow of the principal spectacle in Europe. From this contrast some idea may be gleaned that the rise of the Kuomintang went hand in hand with the wave of

foreign invasion on the integrity and sovereignty of China is not a matter of accidental coincidence. We may drive the fact home once for all that the Kuomintang had its inception and first growth in the thickest of foreign wars on China. This fact is of vital importance to the understanding of the Kuomintang. If this fact is well remembered we shall be able to explain the Kuomintang of to-day, and to appreciate its lines of action and its policies with regard to domestic and international affairs.

Broadly speaking, this was the period of international wars in the Far East for the plundering of China. Taiwan was taken by Japan in 1895, Kiaochow by Germany in 1898, Weihaiwei by England and Port Arthur by Russia in the same year. In 1895 Japan forced China to recognize the independence of Korea, which was formally annexed by Japan in 1910. Of course, these territorial losses did not tell the whole story of foreign aggression on China. There were the enormous indemnities to be paid and the granting of special privileges and concessions, including the control of the customs. These privileges made the foreign Powers economically the master of China. The foreign Powers wrangled over the division of the spoils but found it impossible to make such a division that would be thought satisfactory to themselves. Some of them went to war, as Japan and Russia in 1904, to settle by force what they could not settle peacefully. This war was a signal of warning to the competing nations that some formula must be devised to deal with the rich plum lest they should destroy themselves in a great conflagration before the fruit reached their mouths. It was in these circumstances that the "Open Door" policy of 1899 of the United States of America arrived at the most opportune time. To put it in a nutshell, that policy provided to "pool" what the Great Powers could not possibly divide without destruction to themselves. For prospective privileges they created what were known as the "spheres of influence." The Yangtsze Valley was considered to belong to England, South China to France, and North China to Russia. In short, this was the period when

the foreign Powers showed the greatest activity to get what they could from China, and in European diplomatic language China had become merely a geographical name. Of course, this picture of China's calamities was not confined to this period. China's troubles did not begin in 1894; they had begun much earlier. Hongkong was ceded to England by the Treaty of Nanking as early as 1842, which was also the beginning of a fixed rate of customs duties. The treaties of Tientsin in 1857 and of Peking in 1860 gave further privileges to England and France. But nevertheless it is true that China's economic and political position, as far as international treaties were able to fix her, was largely decided during the subsequent period 1894–1911.

What, then, was happening in the domestic affairs of China in the meanwhile ? The Manchu Government had become thoroughly corrupt and decrepit, and was totally unable to resist the foreign invasion. In nearly every armed encounter with the foreign Powers China was humbled, and after each defeat she sought to retrieve her losses and recover her prestige by a new war with some other Power, only to find herself defeated again. She sank deeper and deeper, and from the position of fame and respect she descended to the low plane of international derision and ridicule. She was held as the patent example of a nation which was unable to stand on its own feet. She was called the "sick man of the Far East," whose days were already numbered. But each new defeat served to shock her and wake up the people to the necessity of putting a stop to this state of affairs. Dissatisfaction was felt on every side, and leading scholars began to ponder over the situation. The defeat of China by Japan in 1894 was perhaps the greatest shock to her; the army was completely routed and the navy wellnigh annihilated. The shock was the greater because the people in power in the Government thought Japan too insignificant to be taken seriously. The people were really alarmed, and thought China was really in danger and she must be saved. But how? A few leading scholars petitioned the Government to reform; the

notable among these were Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chih-chao, the latter being a disciple of the former. One of them is still living. Their basic principles were the teachings of Confucius, and their plan to save China was to adapt the applied science and practical arts of the West to the need of the country. In 1895 Kang Yu-wei wrote his famous petition to the Emperor "to reform and save" China. He organized several academic societies, and published magazines to advocate his views. He and his followers were called at that time the "Reform Party." They were promoted at once to high positions in the Government, and proceeded to carry out what was called the "new policy." But the only result was to hasten a *coup d'état*, in which the Emperor was imprisoned and the Empress Dowager came to power. Kang Yu-wei and some of his followers escaped abroad and some others were arrested and killed by the Government.

The Empress Dowager at once reversed the engine of government and put a stop to the so-called "reform policy." Things began to assume the old appearance again, and went from bad to worse. However, the incapacity of the Manchu Government to deal with the situation and stop the foreign invasion became daily more apparent. The people had lost confidence in the Manchu Government, but did not know what to do. Any expedient which would repulse this foreign invasion would be sure to catch their imagination. Hence the popularity of the Boxers of 1900, whose aim was to "uphold the Government and crush the foreigner," spread far and wide as soon as they declared war on the foreigners. Whatever may be said of the folly and stupidity of these Boxers, their movement was essentially a patriotic one, due to the consciousness of a large section of the population of the imminence of China's downfall. But defects in method and in organization caused their speedy destruction. Because the Manchu Government showed equal folly and stupidity in openly siding with and aiding the Boxers, the responsibility of the crushing defeat and national

humiliation that ensued was quite properly laid at the door of the Government. The defeat and humiliation of China in the hands of the foreign Powers shook what little confidence in the Government was left in the minds of the people. To a certain extent the Manchu Government was aware of the gravity of the situation, and it tried to conciliate the people by promising various reforms. The chief among these promises was that of giving a constitution of a limited monarchy in 1907 based on the principles of constitutional monarchies of Europe and Japan. In 1908 an imperial decree set nine years as the period of preparation for the constitution, at the end of which the promise was to materialize. This was the last attempt of the Manchu Government to win back the people, but it was already too late.

Bearing in mind these circumstances, we shall understand how the revolutionary movement was started and why it spread so fast. The Manchu Government was hopeless. Reform was tried, but was frustrated by the hopeless Government. It could not help China and prevented others from helping her. It was evident that there was only one way out: that was by getting rid of the Manchu Government first. That was the inspiration, the logic and the strength of the Chinese Revolution. As early as 1885, after China's defeat by France, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, had thought of such an alternative of revolution, as he had seen clearly what others had not the courage to see, that revolution was unavoidable. But it was not until the year 1894, when war was declared between China and Japan, that Dr. Sun thought the opportunity had arrived for a formal organization for the purpose of revolution. He went to Honolulu, where he organized the Shing Chung Hwei (China Revival Society). He had only a handful of followers, and these included his relatives and his brother, who was willing to support him with all his wealth. The aim of the Society was "to unite the patriotic Chinese people, to cultivate the arts of wealth and power, for the purpose of reviving China and securing her

unity." These were the apparent objects, but the real aim was to plot the overthrow of the Manchu Government. This Society was supported financially by the overseas Chinese merchants ; thus they had become identified with the revolution from the very beginning. In 1895 Dr. Sun made his first attempt against the Government by force of arms. He and his followers secretly shipped a quantity of arms from Hongkong to Canton with the intention of storming the city. But the arms were discovered and seized, and a large number of his followers were arrested and killed. Realizing that he must get more followers and popularize his views, Dr. Sun went to America and England in 1896. It was during his sojourn in London that he was kidnapped by the Chinese Legation there, and narrowly escaped death by the intervention of the British Foreign Office. From 1896 to 1898 Dr. Sun stayed in Europe, studying the political and economic conditions ; the result of these studies he later embodied in the basic principles of the Kuomintang. In the meantime his followers were active in Hongkong and Japan winning more adherents for another armed attack on the Government. Several newspapers were published to advocate the views of the Society. In 1900, when the Boxers were active in North China, Dr. Sun's followers made another attempt, but again it failed. This was the attack on Waichow, in the east of Canton. These immature armed attempts had one wholesome effect : it served to arouse the people to the necessity of revolution. After every attempt more people joined the Society, and a better foundation was paved for future action. In the meantime there were other unsuccessful attempts, in Hunan and elsewhere. These failures were necessary trials to test the strength of the Society and to find out better methods for the future. In 1905 Dr. Sun went to Europe again, and organized meetings in Bruxelles, Berlin and Paris to preach his doctrines to the Chinese students and merchants there. He proclaimed to them his doctrines of racial unity, of popular sovereignty, and of social economy. These are now the basic principles of the

Kuomintang of to-day. He also explained his theory of government by the division of the powers into five departments instead of the popular division into three. The new division added the power of examination and that of impeachment. In these meetings many students were won over to the work of revolution. In the same year a large conference was held by Dr. Sun in Tokyo. This meeting marked the ending of the Society and the founding of a new one after it went through a reorganization.

Several remarks may be made regarding the career of the Shing Chung Hwei, which lasted a full decade and ended in 1905 with the conference of Tokyo. Firstly, this Society was the embryo from which the Kuomintang had sprung up. This was the first organized body for the purpose of revolution in China. Secondly, the Society derived its financial support mainly from the overseas Chinese merchants, who identified themselves from the very beginning with the revolution and were Dr. Sun's warm supporters throughout his life-time. Thirdly, a large number of Chinese students abroad had joined the Society, who were the directing intellectual force of the party. Fourthly, we may say that the work done at this time was more of preparatory propaganda nature. It did no real harm to the Government. The people were very gradually won over to its cause. Revolutionary literature was smuggled into China and was rapidly circulated. The party was out for the overthrow of the Manchu Government, not as an end in itself, but as a means to stop the foreign invasion in order to save China. These men were out for the unconditional overthrow of the Government, which was regarded as the obstacle to China's salvation.

In the autumn of 1905 Dr. Sun held a great conference in Tokyo. This conference was of tremendous importance in the history of the party. It was in this conference that the revolutionary party was extended and new policies were adopted which determined the course of action for the party for the

next few years. These next few years were the critical period of the party, if one remembers that it was only six years before 1911, when the Manchu Government was overthrown. Those who attended the conference consisted chiefly of students. Nearly every one of the eighteen provinces of China proper was represented, with the exception of Kansu, which had no student abroad at that time. It was at once decided to reorganize the party, and the name of Tung Ming Hwei (Revolutionary Alliance) was adopted for the new society. Several hundred people joined the Tung Ming Hwei. Besides there were several other revolutionary organizations which were now affiliated with the Tung Ming Hwei. It formulated six articles as its fundamental principles, namely :

1. To overthrow the present wicked Government.
2. To establish a republican form of government.
3. To maintain the peace of the world.
4. To nationalize the land.
5. To promote the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan.
6. To ask the other countries to support the work of reform.

These declarations foreshadowed the kind of work that the party took upon its shoulders in the future. It aimed not only at the overthrow of the Manchu Government, but also at the political reconstruction on democratic and advanced social principles. There was as yet no detailed programmes ; they had to come up later. In one of the declarations the party exhorted its members in this language :

"Our position to-day is different from what it was formerly. Besides overthrowing the Manchus and recovering China, there are the problems of the form of government and the economy of the people. Although these problems are complicated, we must possess the unifying spirit, namely liberty, equality, and universal love. So the revolution of to-day is by the people, while formerly it was done by the hero. The essence of revolution by the people lies in the fact that all the people possess the spirit of liberty, equality, and universal love, and all share the responsibility of revolution. The military Government is but its organ."

Many useful things had been learned in the years previous to the Tokyo Conference of 1905. One of these was the need of more intensive and more extensive propaganda. Owing to the increased effectiveness of propaganda after 1905 the membership of the party grew greatly, and in China itself there were more than ten thousand. Public opinion had already changed from distrust to sympathy and support toward the party. Those who joined were mostly patriotic students and scholars; also by this time there were a large number of students studying military science in Tokyo who had joined the party. These men went back to China and prepared to get hold of the army while in the service of the Government. Everything was ready to strike a more decisive blow at the Government. So from 1905 to 1911 nearly every year witnessed one or more armed uprisings against the Government. Many were very bloody affairs, lasting for many days. There were uprisings in Hunan, in Kwangtung, in Yunnan, in Anhui, and in nearly every direction in China. The governors were terrified, after many of them were assassinated. An attempt was made on the life of the Regent, but was unsuccessful. The Government in the meanwhile embarked on a policy of sharp retaliation on the members of the party whenever they were caught. Their high-handed policy rather hastened than retarded the inevitable. By this time the influence of the party had penetrated the army, and many army commanders were secretly working for the overthrow of the Government. In nearly every province the party had planted its own men. The fatal moment at last arrived on October 10, 1911, when the party carried out a successful uprising in Wuchang. The Government found most of its troops were not reliable. The province of Hunan was the first to join the revolutionary army in Wuchang. In a short time fifteen provinces out of eighteen joined the revolution. This settled the fate of the Manchu Government, which abdicated accordingly. The revolutionary party established its temporary capital in Nanking and framed the Provisional Constitution.

It proclaimed a republic as the government for China, and elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen the first President of the Republic of China.

In the words of Dr. Sun, two things were achieved by the revolution of 1911:

> "Firstly, it effaced the shame of more than two hundred and sixty years' standing, rendering races in China equal, and abolishing once for all the aspect of inter-racial friction and exploitation; secondly, it wiped out the trace of monarchy, which was more than four thousand years old, thus making democracy to begin from now."

The party succeeded in the first and preliminary part of its work to save China. The Manchu Government was overthrown because it stood in the way of the work which was necessary to check foreign invasion and to save the country. With the Manchu Government out of the way, the party looked forward to put into effect what it thought to be the best political programme. But in this it soon found itself sadly disappointed. In the history of the next period it will be clear whence comes this disappointment and how the party weathered the situation.

The next period under consideration runs from 1911 to 1924 —that is, from the overthrow of the Manchu Government to the reorganization of the Kuomintang. This period was perhaps the most unfortunate one for the country as well as for the party, which was now known as the Kuomintang. For the country, it witnessed two attempts to restore the monarchy, once in 1915 and again in 1917. Although neither of these attempts succeeded, they were events of an alarming nature to the new republic that had just been established. It was unfortunate for the party, for that was the period during which the party was driven not only from political power but also from the country during a considerable length of time. It was a period of struggle for the party against the old forces that had not been eradicated with the overthrow of the Manchu Government. In March 1912 Dr. Sun resigned the Presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-kai in the hope that although Yuan might not be

able to bring the country to the road of a completely new life, but it was hoped that with proper help and proper checks on his mandarin outlook, it would be able to gradually lead the nation to progress. Especially was Dr. Sun convinced that with proper development of the social and economic conditions the political development of the country would be made easier. Indeed, he was confirmed in his view that any political development was impossible unless accompanied by social and economic development. Therefore he resigned from the Presidency to which he was elected a short time ago by the Provisional Congress at Nanking in order to devote himself to the task of economic reconstruction. He saw that the first task in the economic reconstruction was the construction of a sufficient mileage of railways in the country, and he immediately advocated the construction of a system of national trunk lines amounting to approximately two hundred thousand miles within a certain period of time and with the assistance of capital from abroad. The correctness of his view and the importance of the railway were amply borne out by the events that have transpired since that time, for it was not only an economic necessity, but politically a railway system of sufficient mileage in proportion to the size of the country would have meant a better chance for the unification of the country. Unfortunately Dr. Sun had no opportunity to realize this grand project, for very soon he found that he had to fight the monarchical ambitions of Yuan Shih-kai.

In the meantime Yuan Shih-kai found himself more firmly settled in the Presidential chair, and he began his series of plots against the Republic with a view to found a new dynasty for himself on the ruins of the Manchu dynasty that had just been overthrown. He dissolved the National Congress, he drove away the members of the Kuomintang, and he overthrew the Provisional Constitution of the Republic. That Provisional Constitution was the only instrument in which the republican form of government was guaranteed to the people, and Yuan Shih-kai had himself sworn allegiance to it when he became

President. In October of 1913 Yuan Shih-kai made himself President for life ; that was the first overt step to the restoration of monarchy for himself. In the winter of 1915 Yuan Shih-kai declared himself Emperor, although it lasted less than three months. When the imperial ambition of Yuan Shih-kai was known, the Kuomintang started an expedition against him from Middle Yangtsze, but it was soon crushed by him, and the members of the Kuomintang had to flee to Japan. Thus the country was cleared of the Kuomintang and reaction reigned supreme until the death of Yuan Shih-kai in the summer of 1916. So from 1913 to 1916 the Kuomintang was engaged in the struggle against the monarchical project of Yuan Shih-kai. The spirit of the party was perhaps at the lowest. Many members had come to believe that the party would never rise again, and that the hope was gone for ever for the reconstruction of China. It was in those circumstances of despair for many members of the party that the spirit of Dr. Sun rallied the scattered members, strengthened the wavering elements, and planted hope in the hearts of everyone as he had always done in critical moments. In 1914 the Kuomintang went through a process of minor reorganization and its name was changed from the Kuomintang into the Revolutionary Party of China, which name it retained until its fundamental reorganization in 1924, when it was changed back into the Kuomintang again. For clarity of view the following brief dates are given showing the process of transformation of the party from the time of its inception :

Year.	*Name of party adopted.*
1894 .	The Shing Chung Hwei (China Revival Society).
1905 .	The Tung Ming Hwei (Revolutionary Alliance).
1911 .	The Kuomintang.
1914 .	The Revolutionary Party of China.
1924 .	The Kuomintang of China.

Into these brief dates are crowded the events of the party that were closely connected with the changing phases of

fortune that the country went through, and each served as a landmark for the political development in the recent history of China.

From the autumn of 1917 to the time of reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 the sphere of action of the party was confined in the south, mainly in the province of Kwangtung, with the city of Canton as its centre. When Yuan Shih-kai died in the summer of 1916, and the Provisional Constitution was restored, that was only the beginning of trouble for China and not the end. For as events later showed, Yuan Shih-kai represented a type of mind in the older order of society, and although he died, the system and the philosophy of which he was the representative remained. Very soon the system reappeared in the persons of a host of others who have by turn captured the political power by the force of arms. It was the northern militarism which followed in the steps of Yuan Shih-kai. The Provisional Constitution was no sooner restored than it was endangered again, and the party took upon itself the responsibility of protection to this constitution. Imperfect as the constitution was, it was the only instrument of government in which the Republic was embodied. In the autumn of 1917 the members of the Kuomintang who had served in the National Congress went down to Canton and there set up a Government. From that time on there appeared the phenomenon of incessant strifes among the militarists in the north, with changing fortunes attending to each of them by turn. In the south preparations were being made to send an expedition to the north, which resulted in the expedition in 1922. But the expedition was frustrated in the middle by the rebellion in the summer which resulted in Dr. Sun's departure from Canton for a short period. That was the case when Dr. Sun held the rebels at bay in Canton with one single gunboat for fifty days. Very soon Dr. Sun returned to Canton and there began a series of preparations for the future of the party. By this time there had arisen new events in the world as well as at home, which pointed

out that a new era had arrived in the history of the party, as we shall see in the following chapters. The period 1911–24 was for the party as a whole one of new orientation and transformation. When the party emerged in 1924 from this period of defeat and struggle, it was the same old party but with a new spirit.

CHAPTER II

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE KUOMINTANG

THE year 1924 will always be remembered in the Kuomintang as an epoch-making year in its history. It marked the beginning of a new era for the party. It is the turning-point from defeat and eclipse to revival and political ascendency, as events in the following years have justified us to say. It may be the beginning of the unification of China and the ending of the welter of chaos and civil strifes that have lately shaken the country from end to end. Since its inception the Kuomintang has undergone many changes, of which none was comparable in importance to the one that is under our consideration. To understand the Kuomintang of to-day one must begin with the work of reorganization in 1924. What, then, were the underlying causes that prompted the leaders of the party to take such a step? To answer this question one must understand the defects that were characteristic of the work of the party between 1911 and 1924. Of these defects we may mention two which affected the party profoundly during this period. The first was that the party rested mainly on an individualistic basis; the second was that the party relied upon the armed forces that were not its own. These two causes combined to produce the great defeat in 1913 that nearly destroyed the party itself.

Let us consider the first defect, the individualistic basis of the party. It did not originate in this period, but was inherited from the preceding period, 1894–1911. It had been the strength of the party for all the while before the overthrow of the Manchu Government in 1911. The young men who had joined the revolutionary party while studying abroad were each fired with enthusiasm that amounted to religious fervour, and each went to the country to do his bit, some taking part in armed

uprisings, while others attempted single-handed to kill the high officials of the Manchu Government. It was fighting in small groups, and it had the advantage of simultaneous risings over the great area of the country. It took the courage out of the Government, who never realized how great the strength of the enemy was. That was its advantage. But after the Manchu Government was overthrown, and the party came to face another set of enemies, the same method of individualistic action, which had proved of great advantage formerly, became a source of great handicap. The situation had changed; the problems had changed; the enemies of the party had multiplied. Within the ranks of the party the men began to entertain differences of opinion, because the circumstances had changed, and they failed to agree on common action. When their leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, advised immediate action, they would think otherwise. And they also disagreed among themselves. So when emergency arose, opportunities were lost due to disagreements and delays. When they came to regret their refusal to listen to the advice of their chief, it was already a belated repentance. A letter from one of his followers, Cheng Chih-mei, to another, Hwang Hsing, both being well-known leaders of the party, will illustrate the conditions that existed in the party during the period 1911–24. He said:

> "But the word that Dr. Sun inclines towards the idealistic having taken hold of our mind makes it difficult for his principles to be put into effect. Even to-day there are people who hold this opinion against him. But in the evidence of past events, should we attribute the great defeat of our party to the ideals of Dr. Sun, or rather to our misunderstanding of such ideals as wrong and our opposition? Because formerly we thought his ideals were wrong, and this caused our defeat, so to-day we should not lightly take his opinions as idealistic and refuse obedience, thereby giving ground for regret in the future."

In this letter the author enumerated five instances in which disagreements and delay caused "right to be defeated by force and assured victory to be frustrated by money." Referring

to his painful experience, Dr. Sun said in an address to the Reorganization Conference in 1924:

"This is what is called individual fighting, without organization and without discipline. Therefore the party has achieved no result for the last thirteen years, although the Manchu has been overthrown. In this our revolution must still be counted as a failure."

Again he said:

"Although our revolution has had several successes, they were successes of the strenuous efforts of the army. The work of revolution has not been accomplished. This is because the party itself is not consolidated, so the members of the party all refused to obey its orders. Each is a government to himself."

Since this was the state of affairs in the party, it was small wonder that a divided party found it difficult to raise its head against its enemies, who were strong and numerous.

We now come to consider the second defect of the party during the period 1911–24, namely the reliance of the party upon the army that was not its own. This amounts to say that the party had no army of its own. That was a fact, for the strength of the revolutionary party that went to work for the overthrow of the Manchu Government consisted of a group of young students; its followers at home were also chiefly recruited from young men and students. They were the intellectual leaders of the movement; they alone first saw the necessity of revolution, and they alone dared to run the risk. On the other hand, the forces of the Manchu Government were numerically out of all proportion to the handful of men under the banners of the party. In the matter of equipment there was no comparison between the two. So the party adopted the method of approaching the army of the Manchu Government, and secretly preached the revolutionary doctrines to its soldiers. The result was like wild-fire, which destroyed the Manchu Government in a short time. But here again the party must take the disadvantages of an instrument which it had borrowed from its enemy for the latter's destruction. For although the

enemy was destroyed, the instrument was not, and was likely to be used to destroy the party itself. That was exactly what happened in 1911. It was the soldiers of the garrison stationed in Wuchang that fired the first shot of the revolution on that fatal day, the tenth, in October of 1911. It was the soldiers in the different provinces that responded to the uprising in Wuchang. So the soldiers made a short shrift of their master, the Manchu Government. The revolution had furnished the leaven, which the situation of the time had caused to ferment quickly to work the miracle of a revolution. To-day people are still wondering at its marvellously quick success and at its astonishing small blood-shedding. That was all due to the very ingenious short-cut through the army. But the seed of revolution was not deeply sown, and after the success of the revolution, the army as quickly forgot that it was once the instrument of a sacred purpose. The army was gradually drawn away by politicians for their own gains and for the destruction of the party.

From another angle, the years following the unsuccessful attempt of Yuan Shih-kai to make himself Emperor till the present day was a period of civil war in China, and it is not ended yet. The seed of the civil war was found in the army which was left over from the revolution of 1911. In this civil war, or rather in this series of civil strifes, generals and politicians have grown like mushrooms. In their mutually destructive warfares the civil and economic life of the country has little chance to survive. Literally speaking, trade was only able to carry on in the short intervals of temporary truce. To add fuel to the fire, some foreign Powers, who are interested in the ascendency of some particular generals, have not abstained from unfriendly acts of making loans or supplying ammunition to them, thus prolonging and intensifying the struggle. To cope with the situation, the Kuomintang has found itself quite powerless, due to the simple fact that the party had no army of its own. The Russian Revolution had

met more menacing enemies, but it weathered the storm successfully because it had a dependable Red Army—an army of its own creation. Various expedients have been suggested as remedies to end the chaotic conditions of the country, as the organization of the country on a federal basis, the policy of unifying the country by force, etc. Some of these have proceeded from the lips of these very generals who were responsible for the present deplorable situation, for the purpose of legalizing and perpetualizing a situation most profitable to themselves. "Formerly, when the revolutionary party overthrew the Manchu Government, it did away with the big Emperor. When the big Emperor was gone there were grown a host of small Emperors. These small Emperors were as despotic as usual, and, compared with the big Emperor, were more tyrannical." The Kuomintang of this period was out-numbered and out-manœuvred by these "small Emperors," against whom there was no chance of success when the party was empty-handed in the matter of an armed force. It was a situation of political realities, and it must be met as such. Unfortunately, the leaders of the party were not alive to political realities at an early hour, and they had to learn them from the bitter experience in the years from 1911 to 1924.

There are, of course, other defects which, though of a nature detrimental to the efficiency of the work of any party in the long run, were not of an urgent character in the short period under consideration. Allusion may be made to the lack of an effective method of publicity or propaganda. This was also recognized by the leaders of the party, and remedies have been provided by the Reorganization Conference. But the last two defects were the fundamental causes of its defeat ; and they may be united under one heading, that is, the defective organization of the party. The Kuomintang has a mission to fulfil; its leaders understood that mission from the very beginning, but it lacked the effective means for the fulfilment of that purpose. That means was found in a compact party

organization and strict party discipline. Considering the fact that it was not a party in the time of peace, but one working under the extraordinary circumstances of a revolution, the necessity of an effective organization must be in the nature of things the condition of its very existence. It ought to possess more, and not less, solidarity among its members; it ought to have more cohesion and unity. But these qualities the Kuomintang between 1911 and 1924 did not possess. The traditional political parties of Europe and America, working in the ordinary time of peace, possess far more solidarity and compactness of organization than the Kuomintang of that period. Compared with their method of party control over the members, their caucuses, their speaking and acting as one man, the haphazard fashion in which the Kuomintang met its problems looked quite immature. To this one factor more than anything else we must attribute the great defeat of the party. It was to remedy this fatal and fundamental error that the Reorganization Conference was called in 1924.

The conference was formally opened in Canton on January 20, 1924, with representatives from the various provincial headquarters and a member from Outer Mongolia in addition to the members of the central organization in Canton. It was made as completely representative as possible of the central organization and its branches. In the opening address Dr. Sun Yat-sen briefly surveyed the reasons for calling the conference. Because of the importance of this speech in the party's history, the following passages are quoted :

"During the past thirteen years we have learned many kinds of experience in politics and discovered many methods. We are aware of the fact that although China as a nation is in a bad condition, and that its prospects to-day are worse than what they were formerly, we know that there is still a way out for China and that there is still a chance for sound reconstruction. For thirty years the Revolutionary Party has been urged on by conscience, disregarding all consequences in undertaking the work of revolution. But after the revolution was accomplished, we were at a loss as to the methods we should use for

reconstruction. But now we have found the methods. It is for the purpose of presenting these methods for your consideration and adoption that we have assembled our comrades from the different provinces to Canton in this conference. Before this conference was opened we had already organized a Central Executive Committee *pro tempore*, and in it preparations have been made for a long time. Beginning from to-day, we shall bring up these prepared methods daily in succession. We ask you all to study and to support these methods. After you have obtained these methods, we ask you to bring them home to be put into practice. As to the sources of these new methods, they are only determined upon after my careful study, comparison of, and reference to the many kinds of methods of revolution adopted either before or after its success by countries who have achieved revolution either before or after us. They are not free from imperfections, so it is necessary still to hold this conference, asking you all to study them. After your study, we ask you to support them, to put them in practice in different places, and to build up the country by united mind and united strength. There are two things in connection with the reorganization of the Kuomintang this time. Firstly, it is to reorganize the Kuomintang, making it again a powerful and organized political party; secondly, it is to use the power of the political party to reconstruct the country. So the business of the reorganization of the Kuomintang this time is, firstly, the problem of the reorganization of the Kuomintang, and secondly, the problem of the reconstruction of the country. . . .

"Besides the two things of the reorganization of the party and the reconstruction of the country, there is another thing which we want to call your attention to. It is that the reason for the lack of solidarity in our party in former days was not because of any enemy using great power to destroy us ; it was entirely due to the fact that we destroyed ourselves; it was because the mind and discernment were too immature, often engendering senseless misunderstandings. Therefore the power of solidarity of the whole party was very much scattered, and this caused the Revolution to fail. Hereafter we must be united and of one mind. We want to offer our own wisdom and ability to the party. We are not to use our own wisdom and ability for individuals, but for the party. All of us shall be united, for party and for country, with one aim and with one step. It is only in this way that we can achieve success. There is one thing of the greatest importance in a political party, that is, all members of the party must possess spiritual unity. In order that all the members may be united spiritually, the first thing is to sacrifice freedom, the second is to offer ability. If the individual can sacrifice his freedom, then the whole party will have freedom. If the individual can offer his ability, then the whole party will possess ability. It is only after the party

as a whole has possessed freedom and ability that it is able to shoulder the great work of revolution, to reconstruct the country. The past failures of the party were due to the fact that while the individual member had freedom, the party as a whole had none, and that while the individual member had ability, the party as a whole was powerless. Herein lies exactly the failure of the Kuomintang of China. Our reorganization to-day is to get rid of this shortcoming.

"In opening to-day the National Conference of delegates of our party, I hope the delegates will offer their ability and the ability that exists in the different localities to the party, forming thereby one great power for the reconstruction of the country. The success is assured, and we shall have it within this year. The conference to-day is the first of its kind since the establishment of the Republic of China. It is a great glory in the future history of this Republic. I hope you will use all your efforts and within these ten days you will bring everything we ought to do to a successful end."

The conference proceeded to deliberate on the important projects that were laid before it. It never took upon itself a greater responsibility, inasmuch as the future of the party and the destiny of the country verily hung on its decisions. It very wisely followed the advices of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in the course of its sessions passed two vitally important resolutions which affected the future of the party profoundly. They were: (1) The Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang; (2) the General Constitution of the Kuomintang. There were other resolutions passed, such as those on party discipline, on the customs questions; but compared with the first two they were of minor consequence. These two resolutions firmly laid the new foundation of the only political party that has achieved a glorious record in overthrowing a despotic Government, and is to build a stronger structure on this new basis for the purpose of its future work.

The Declaration was in its nature a pronouncement on the present conditions of the country, a concise re-statement of the basic principles of the party, and an enumeration of its domestic and foreign policies that it thought to be the minimum party platform to be put into effect in the immediate future. Accordingly the body of the Declaration was divided into three

sections, namely: (1) "The Present Conditions of China"; (2) "The Principles of Kuomintang"; (3) "The Platform of Kuomintang."

In "The Present Condition of China" the party reiterated its conviction that the aim of the Revolution " was not merely the overthrow of the Manchu Government, but the reconstruction of China after its downfall. The reconstruction of China must follow the tendency of the time; it must proceed, in the racial aspect, from the dictatorship of one race to the union in equality of the several races; in the political aspect from a dictatorial system to the system of popular sovereignty; and in the economic aspect, from handcraft production to capitalistic production. Following this procedure, we shall be able to make the half-colonial China an independent nation, standing proudly in the world." After stating the aim of the Revolution, it went on to trace the causes of the past failure to the compromise with the reactionaries, who had worked hand in hand with the foreign Powers for their mutual benefit. It is noteworthy that the word "imperialism" appeared for the first time in the official declaration of Kuomintang, when it said that "such a compromise is in reality an indirect compromise with imperialism," and that

> "the so-called Government of the Republic, being under the control of the militarists, is utilized by them to court the favours of the Powers for the purpose of consolidating their own positions. And the Powers utilize this opportunity, and furnished by loans their war chests, rendering the civil war in China recurrent without ending, while they seized rights and privileges and occupied their respective spheres of influence. Judging from this point, we know that the civil war in China is helping the Powers, who, finding their interests conflicted in China, utilized the militarists to kill the people for their purpose."

This terse statement represented the recognition of the party that foreign countries played an important part in the present disorder of China. It has come to be a dominant feature in the party platform of to-day. We shall understand why the cry to revise the unequal treaties is raised to such a high pitch just

at the present day. This sentiment was more strongly voiced in the Declaration of the Second National Congress held in 1925. If we understand the position of Kuomintang in this Declaration, we shall see that the policy of the party is a double-edged one. It aims at the two spheres of domestic and foreign affairs at the same time. In reality these two things must be solved in conjunction in China.

In "The Principles of Kuomintang" the party simply restated in very brief terms the three doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in regard to the construction of a democratic society. These were the doctrine of racial unity, the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and the doctrine of people's livelihood. It declared that so far the Revolution has accomplished one of these basic doctrines—namely the racial unity—but the two other doctrines are as yet not put into practice. In the doctrine of popular sovereignty it advocated Government by direct popular control, advocating initiative, referendum, and recall, under the theory of constitution of Dr. Sun dividing the powers of government into five instead of three branches. For in addition to the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, he added the powers of examination and impeachment. A fuller view of this theory of constitution will be gathered in the next chapter. For the time being we shall content ourselves by observing that the form of government now in force under the Kuomintang was only a transitional one, while the principle of popular sovereignty is the ultimate goal. In the doctrine of people's livelihood it emphasized its two principal points, namely (1) the equalization of land, and (2) the regulation of capital. It pointed out that in as far as the great majority of the population of China are farmers, and that many of them are mere tenants, it is the duty of the nation to furnish them with land. As to the regulation of capital, the party saw in it the best means of doing away with the evils of capitalism. Capital as such is not to be condemned but encouraged, but it is the uncontrolled play of capital that is to be guarded against.

Capitalism in the modern sense has not yet grown up in China, and the Kuomintang is taking a preventive method before its development rather than a curative one after its evils have appeared. It intends to nationalize the industries and public utilities that are best run under State management, and to encourage State-owned capital. It emphasized the interest of the farmers and workers.

In "The Platform of Kuomintang" as appeared in this Declaration, the party enumerated what it thought to be the urgently needed reforms to be put into effect in the immediate future. These were not exclusive, and merely represented the minimum demand for the present. It included six items in its foreign policy and fifteen items in its domestic policy. The principal note of the foreign policy is the abrogation of all unequal treaties and the substitution of new ones based on equality. It declared that "all unequal treaties, such as foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, foreign control of customs, and all the political rights exercised by foreigners in China to the detriment of her sovereignty, ought to be cancelled, and new treaties based on mutual equality and mutual respect for sovereignty are to be contracted." (See Appendix C.)

In its domestic policy the platform emphasized the necessity of providing measures for the protection of the interests of the farmers and workers, such as farm laws and laws for the bettering of workers' conditions, for the promotion of woman's position, for guaranteeing freedom of association and of the Press. In general it included in its scope what was thought to be the necessary elements for the social welfare of the community in its scope, in addition to the principles for the organization of the Central and Provincial Governments. It pronounced the principle that the division of powers between Central and Provincial Governments should be along the line of equilibrium, those best dealt with by the Central Government should be left to it, while those activities best served by the local authorities would be put under the control of Provincial

Governments. It is neither to incline towards centralization nor towards decentralization. There are other political provisions dealing with various matters of the domestic policy.

Inasmuch as these items represent the concrete proposals of the Kuomintang regarding domestic and foreign policies, they have a value not only as an illustration of its principles, but also as a better indication of its position than the abstract principles. These proposals and the fundamental principles shall merit a more detailed treatment in the following chapters in order to show how they are related to China's conditions and how the foreign and domestic policies are related to one another.

Perhaps the real pioneering work of the conference was found in the adoption of the General Constitution of the Kuomintang, for the principles and the platform were not new, but found a re-statement in the Declaration of this conference, while the General Constitution was the first of its kind in the party's history. We may properly accredit the success of the conference to the maturity of opinion among the rank and file of the members to the necessity of such a reorganization. The General Constitution was passed with scarcely a dissentient vote. It was subsequently amended in some minor points in the second annual National Congress in 1926, but its general character was not changed. The organization of the party as provided for under this General Constitution was a closely graduated government with the central organ as its head and the local units as its basis. These central and local organizations are united in a system, so that the whole party is able to move as a whole. This provided a machine for effective party work, and put the basis not on the individual, but on their collective organization. It also emphasized the importance of obedience of members to party orders, and prohibits them from speaking or acting against party instructions. What this conference gave to the party was not any addition to its principles, but a new method, or a new weapon to do its work. In the closing address

at the adjournment of the conference Dr. Sun advised the members to fight as the soldiers would. He chose for his topic, "The struggles of party members are similar to struggles of soldiers." In it he asked the members to unite and act as one man, and particularly to pay attention to the Declaration with its platform as the concurrent opinion of the party to which members as such should not take exception until it was modified according to the proper procedure. He said:

> "Formerly a member decided and acted alone on what he thought was right, causing the spirit of the party to be much distracted and the work of revolution to fail. From now on, in order to make the work of revolution a success, we must act in union and consolidate the spirit."

What, then, are the fundamental principles underlying the work of revolution and what effectiveness has the party derived from this reorganization? These will be discussed in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER III

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE KUOMINTANG

By way of introduction to a statement of the fundamental principles of the Kuomintang it is perhaps not out of place to mention something about the environment in which it has grown up and developed. First, they are mainly the personal contributions of the founder of the party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They may thus be denoted under the name of "Sunyatsenism," if such an invention is permissible. Although Dr. Sun had many co-workers who in intellectual attainments were perhaps his equals, he alone was responsible for their formulation and their development to their present form. Many a time he told his followers that his principles represented the result of many years of labour. The fearless way in which he propounded his theories on social and political questions were characteristic of himself. During his lifetime Dr. Sun was a most indefatigable reader. He read on all subjects, and the range of his knowledge often surprised his friends. Being trained in the profession of medicine, Dr. Sun showed a special interest in the scientific progress of the day. Towards the later years of his life Dr. Sun would have people read to him when he was too fatigued to read himself. His views regarding many questions were original. He had no respect for tradition either in philosophy of life or on social and political questions. He acknowledged no authority except that of reasoning. So in the realm of thought just as in the field of action he was an iconoclast. But he did not stop there; he put a new theory in its place. For instance, the traditional Chinese philosophy regarding the comparative value of knowing and doing has always been that it is easy to know but difficult to do. Dr. Sun, however, exposed the fallacy, and observed

that the relationship between the two ought to be reversed, and that it is easy to do but difficult to know. We shall find no difficulty to know why these two views were at variance, for the old view represented the empirical school of thought, while Dr. Sun's view represented the scientific school. Dr. Sun held that if you really know how, you will be able to do it, and that if you cannot do it, it is because you do not know it sufficiently. This is only one example. Throughout his political and social theories such originality was very apparent. He told us that while he was touring Europe, America and Japan before 1911, to preach revolution, he utilized the spare moments for study and making first-hand observations. During that time he travelled round the world every two years on the average. He was thus perhaps the best-travelled and best-read person, and he knew the world situation very well. But to say that these principles represented mainly his personal contributions did not mean that he was dogmatic in his ways and thought ; on the other hand, he always showed great respect for the opinions of others. He liked meetings in which questions were brought up and discussed between the friends.

Secondly, these fundamental principles were revolutionary in the realm of Chinese thought. Long before the Revolution of 1911, when Dr. Sun assembled several hundred students in Tokyo in 1905 in a big conference, the occasion for the formation of the Tung Ming Hwei which was responsible for the Revolution, the main outline of these principles had already been formulated. To these students he expounded these principles and those of the French Revolution in that both were principles of revolution in thought as well as in action ; both represented a breach with the thoughts that were current in the existing society. If the French thought of revolution gained acceptance and materialization only by slow degrees, might it not be a consolation to the Kuomintang to know that its principles, being in sharp opposition to the traditional thought in China, will take time to fructify into tangible results?

This is one explanation of the unsatisfactory result of the Chinese Revolution so far. But we may go a step farther and observe that, while in France the principles of revolution were prepared by a host of eminent writers, and the period of political confusion was preceeded by an age of unprecedented literary brilliance, the Chinese Revolution did not have the advantage of its ground prepared beforehand by great forerunners, except the solitary figure of Dr. Sun, who preached and acted at the same time. The traditional political thought at that time was monarchy, and the best that the great writers of that time would give to the people of China was at best a limited and constitutional monarchy based on the English type. Dr. Sun not only did not have some forerunner to prepare the ground for him, but also had a strong enemy in this group of men who advocated a reformed monarchy in opposition to his principles. It was easier to improve upon and reform what was already there than invent something entirely new. The quarrel between republicanism and monarchism had witnessed some sharp battles in the Press in those days. Dr. Sun said:

"The years between 1895 to 1900 were the most difficult time in the progress of revolution. Since I have failed, the hold in China, my personal work, the position of further operations, and the foundation of revolution built during more than ten years, have all disappeared. Propaganda overseas was without any effect. Just at this time there grew up the pro-monarchist party, which worked for the enemy. Its opposition to revolution and to republicanism was greater than the Manchu Government. At this time the prospect of revolution was dark beyond comparison, and nearly all hope was lost."

Thirdly, we may say something about the sources of these principles. Throughout his writings and speeches Dr. Sun scarcely made any quotations from any particular authors. He made references from time to time to the great writers of the West as illustrations to the topics under consideration. He mentioned such men as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Henry George, Marx, etc., but these more often by way of criticism and comparison than for the adoption of their views. That these

great writers had great influence on him goes without saying. The reading of these great authors has provided material for his critical thought. Their influence was sometimes positive and sometimes negative. But he always emerged with his own conclusions, bearing in mind always the conditions and realities of his own country. That Marx had great influence on him was evident, but he would not have China adopt Marxism, thinking that China was not fitting for its application. In his treatise on the popular economy or the people's livelihood he mentioned at great length the inconsistencies of Marxism, and pointed out the places where the predictions of Marx has failed to correspond with the actualities of the modern economic world. So it is difficult to say which of these Western writers had the most profound influence. Perhaps there was none. He drew equally and copiously from all sources, and after going through his criticism, it was always his own product that was presented.

It is still more difficult to say what great Chinese thinkers had the greatest power on him. Being himself a great Chinese scholar, and knowing the Chinese history and literature very well, Dr. Sun made allusions to them from time to time. But he was not in the habit of picking up the doctrine of any great author for discussion. Perhaps their power over him was mainly negative, in affording a ground for his attack on the existing social order, although he showed great respect for these thinkers of his native land. His work was to overthrow the then existing Government, and he found no support from the philosophers whose views had been adopted to support a regime that he intended to overthrow. To popularize the work of revolution he needed to have an intellectual basis. It is evident that this new intellectual basis of his must go contrariwise to the old one. As we all know, he was a revolutionist in thought as well as in action. He could not have the latter without first achieving the former. In China he was called the founder of the Republic and the father of the country, yet little do we realize his rôle as a pioneer in the realm of thought in China.

When he stated his principles for the first time, there was yet no glimpse of the literary efflorescence and the great fermentation of thought that we witness in the China of to-day. The new literary movement, called the renaissance of Chinese thought, was a matter of recent years. In the early years of the Revolution people had not imagined the present intellectual activity to be possible. The only notable books at that time which were regarded as advanced were such as translations of *The Spirit of Laws* and Spencer's *Sociology*. But some of these had already appeared in Europe more than a hundred years ago. To-day the most advanced social theories are discussed in China, and the Chinese students in the field of thought on social questions are more advanced than their fellow-students in America and many European countries. This fact must be very evident to any foreign traveller who has made the comparison. How much do the writers and students of to-day owe to the principles of the Kuomintang it is not necessary to say, but the broad fact remains that it was Dr. Sun who had done the pioneering work in the realm of thought, as he was the first man in Chinese history to establish a republican form of Government.

The fundamental principles of the Kuomintang may be divided into two sets, the one dealing with the basic principles of social reconstruction and the other with the constitutional theory of Government. The former consists of three doctrines, namely, of racial unity, of popular sovereignty, and of social economy or people's livelihood. These three are jointly designated under the name of the three people's doctrines, or "Sanminism." [1] A complete exposition of Sanminism may be found in Dr. Sun's volume of lectures entitled *Sanminism*, which is a substitution for his written work destroyed in a fire in Canton in 1922, when his whole library, together with all manuscripts, was burned up. The book, *Sanminism*, consisted of sixteen lectures, six on each of the doctrines of racial unity

[1] "San" means three, "Min" means the people in Chinese.

and popular sovereignty and four on social economy. Let us first see what are the chief connotations contained in each of the three doctrines.

1. The Doctrine of Racial Unity.—As far as the Revolution of 1911 was concerned this doctrine was the chief weapon of the revolutionists used against the Manchu Government. It was a sharp wedge driven between the Manchus and the Chinese, and was the corner-stone of the theory of revolution preached in the early years. There were at that time a host of revolutionary writers who daily inculcated in the minds of the Chinese people the racial distinction between the governing and the governed classes. These men published dailies and pamphlets on the central thesis of racial distinction ; they exposed the corruptions and degenerate conditions of the Manchu royal household and of the Manchu officials in order to destroy the respect of the people for the Government. That was the one point on which they concentrated their energy ; it was the point on which the Revolution of 1911 depended. The success or failure of the movement relied on whether or not the revolutionary leaders were able to bring home to the people the idea of racial unity or solidarity of the Chinese. Dr. Sun in one of his speeches, referring to the failure of the Taiping Movement (1858–64) against the Manchus, remarked:

"In 1911 the Chinese know how to support themselves, so the throne of the Manchus was overturned at one push, while in the time of the Taiping Movement they did not know it, so its leader was not able to overthrow the Manchus during his lifetime. Why the Chinese did not support themselves was because the Chinese of the whole country did not know the distinction between the Manchus and the Chinese. . . . Long before the uprising in Wuchang of 1911 our Revolutionary Party had discovered this doctrine of racial unity, and all the intellectuals broadcasted it to the whole country, from one to ten, from ten to a hundred, all pushing forward as one man, until later everybody knows that in order to revive the Chinese race we must first get rid of the Manchus. Therefore, after the Revolution of 1911 was started, none went to the rescue of the Manchus. . . ."

So the Revolution of 1911 was essentially racial in character, and it left the other political and economic problems of reconstruction practically untouched.

Although the doctrine of racial unity was the most effective weapon in bringing about the downfall of the Manchu Government, its whole significance is not limited to that work. It has a much wider meaning. The Chinese Revolution in its narrower sense may be said to have been accomplished in 1911, but in its wider sense the Republic is not yet a realized fact, and it must go on. We may say that the doctrine of racial unity has two aspects, the one as the basis for the Revolution of 1911 and the other is the world aspect, concerned with the relationship of the Chinese with the other races of the world. It is in this world aspect that this doctrine is related to the future of China.

According to Dr. Sun, there are several necessary things in the formation of a race, namely the same blood, the same language, the same religion, and the same customs. Judging from this standard, the Chinese race is as homogeneous a race as any other of the world. But the sense of racial unity was lost in the early years of the Manchu dynasty, due to the attempts of the Manchu Government to destroy this racial spirit in order to strengthen their own position. It was necessary to revive this racial spirit not only for the purpose of fighting against the Manchu Government, but also for relieving the pressure of foreign nations on China, which was, from one point of view, the pressure of other races against the Chinese. The danger of this pressure came from three sources, according to Dr. Sun. It came from (*a*) the natural cause, (*b*) the political pressure, (*c*) the economic pressure. The first cause is the natural multiplication of population; the second and third causes are the artificial, inasmuch as they arise from the political and economic development of the present age. In their comparative strength the last two are the more powerful, the last being the most powerful, while the first cause is slow in its operation, although in the end its effect is as great as the last two.

(*a*) *The Natural Cause.*—Comparing the relative rate of growth of the different nations of the world during the last hundred years, Dr. Sun found that the population of the United States has increased by ten-fold, England three-fold, Japan three-fold, Germany two-and-a-half-fold, France one-fourth-fold, Russia four-fold, while that of China has remained practically stationary. The reputed estimate of the Chinese population is four hundred million, but that was the figure given out by the census nearly two hundred years ago. The rapid increase of the foreign nations is due to the development of science, the progress of medicine and hygienic methods, while the lack of these causes of increase in China has made her population practically unchanged. If this unequal growth is to continue for another hundred years, the discrepancy and comparative strength between the Chinese and other races would be more alarming. From this numerical factor alone the Chinese race, which is already in danger now, would be over-swamped at the end of another hundred years. This is the natural process which worked in history for the rise and the fall of many races. The overpowering of China by many races of far superior numerical strength in the future would spell the extermination of the Chinese, and Dr. Sun warned his people of the mistake of complacency with which his fellow-citizens have regarded their own race as possessing the ability to absorb alien races. This was a fatal mistake, for the races heretofore absorbed were those whose members were far below us. This natural process is at worst a slow one, but there are other causes which are of a much more urgent character, namely the political pressure and the economic pressure.

(*b*) *The Political Pressure.*—If the Chinese race is to suffer from the operation of natural process alone, she might hope to maintain herself for another hundred years, but if she is to suffer from political and economic pressures in addition to the pressure of the natural process she cannot hope to survive for more than ten years. So the next ten years will be the most

critical period in the history of the Chinese race. There is a hope for her survival if China can within this period devise means to get rid of the political and economic pressures. If not, China is doomed. The position of the Chinese race is in great danger. The political pressure of foreign nations on China has been going on for nearly a hundred years. Before that time China was a powerful country, and the surrounding countries joining her territory paid tributes to her; but from that time on, territory after territory was torn from her on all sides. Not only were the dependencies lost to her, but some parts of China proper were taken away. The whole story was a familiar recital of the territorial losses, until in the time of the Chino-Japanese war of 1894 the cry was raised for the partition of China. At that time the foreign Powers thought China was unable to reassert herself, but it was only by the success of the Revolution of 1911 that the idea of partition of China was finally knocked out from the minds of the Powers. Looking at it from the standpoint of the Powers, it was a continuation of their policy of territorial acquisition that turned the whole continent of Africa into a vast set of colonial empires belonging to the various Powers. The same policy carried to Asia has destroyed the enormous and proud empire of India and many a small country, enslaving hundreds of millions of people. That tide finally reached China, and threatened her existence. It threatened, in short, to change the whole map of Asia. In the meantime, owing to mutual jealousies, some of them had gone to war, just as they had done in Europe, on account of the division of the spoils being regarded as unequal among themselves. So the process sometimes threatened their own existence, especially when the object of their cupidity was such a rich country as China, possessing resources without measure. So they turned to another tactic.

(*c*) *The Economic Pressure.*—The method of political pressure was at best a very clumsy one when the Powers proceeded to cut each other's throat in an attempt to secure the lion's share

for themselves. Furthermore, the modern conception of a colonial empire is different from that of the ancient times. A piece of territory, large or small, is valued chiefly according to its economic value. That which possesses rich resources—rubber, minerals, oil, etc.—will be considered as a very valuable acquisition to the mother country; that which offers an extensive market to the home products offers unlimited opportunity for exploitation to the capitalists of the mother country. Thus India is valued chiefly as a customer of the British cotton and other goods, and Africa is chiefly valued as a producer of raw materials for manufacturers. Modern countries do not keep dependencies and colonies for show as the Indian chiefs do with elephants and jewels. If other methods than political possession can offer the same opportunity of economic exploitation in a weak neighbouring country, the process of economic penetration would certainly be more preferable. Hence the dominating note of the foreign Powers in their collective treachery of China has been "equal opportunity" for all nations. In all their dealings concerning China this has been their working formula. Unless one understands the realities of the working of the formula of "equal opportunities," one accustomed to think in terms of trade as mutually beneficial to both parties might easily be led to conclude that the foreign Powers are at the same time conferring inestimable benefits on China; but, as a matter of fact, the benefits that accrue go to themselves, while China always comes out as the loser. Because the foreigner in China is in every sense enjoying privileges that are denied to the Chinese in virtue of the unequal treaties, he is above the native citizen legally and economically in the latter's own country. That explains the welcome that is accorded by the Powers to such a doctrine as "the open door," for the door is kept open for the benefit of outsiders to the detriment of the house-owner. In the Washington Conference the same note of equal opportunity for all was upheld, and the Powers asked China to open the door still wider.

Economic pressure has yet another advantage over political pressure. It is that the pressure when applied is not perceived by the sufferer, and thus avoids his opposition. If the Powers persist in their rifle and gunboat policy, they would meet with the resistance of the Chinese, and an armed resistance would entail consequences and risks whose ultimate results no one can tell beforehand. It might lead to a situation where they would be involved to kill themselves. That is why they call a weak country the danger to world peace, for it would lead the strong nations to fight among themselves. With China's vast man-power and vast materials capable to be used in war, the Powers have been jealously watching to prevent any one from getting an undue share of them. If China finds herself over-pressed, she would probably choose the lesser of the two evils and ally herself with some one Power to fight the others. This is a dread which haunts the statesmen of the Powers like nightmares, and explains why they have taken such great dislike for Russia, fearing that the latter country might be the most likely to get to such a superior position in China. But if the Powers abstain from using the political pressure at their disposal, they would not need to entertain this fear at all.

But economic pressure remains the more powerful instrument of the two. This is due to the existence of the unequal treaties, conferring on the Powers and their nationals rights and privileges that are denied to the Chinese. Thus foreign trade flourished at the great expense of the budding native manufacturers. The foreign manufacturers, possessing better technique and equipment, protected by the unholy treaties and utilizing the cheap labour of China, are daily nipping the young industries of the Chinese in the bud. Dr. Sun has calculated that from the operation of the unequal treaties a sum of about twelve hundred million dollars is lost yearly to China. This represents what would be called improper and illegal profits, due to such treaties, and that but for these they would have been saved. This sum does not represent the amount that one would have

to pay in the course of the annual trade on an equal basis; it is, so to speak, the overcharge that can otherwise be avoided. It is an entirely unnecessary loss, due to the faulty and unnatural system that has arisen from the operation of these treaties. This huge sum, when analysed, comes from such sources as excess of exports over imports, profit of foreign banks in China, increased shipping rate, exemptions from taxes, land rent and increment in land, special trade privileges, speculation and others. A large part of this huge sum of twelve hundred million dollars could be saved for China, had there been no such "leakage" through the operation of the treaties that give China no rights but obligations. This annual drain is increasing year by year, and the worst of it is that under these conditions there is no chance for home industries to grow up, and China will thus remain a poor country. It is in this light that Dr. Sun considered the economic pressure to be detrimental to the future existence of the nation.

While the doctrine of racial unity was of value in bringing about the downfall of the Manchus in that it presented the point of cleavage between the ruling and the oppressed races in the clearest light to the people of China, its usefulness does not stop there, for in the opinion of Dr. Sun this doctrine should possess two values for the future of China, namely, to serve as an instrument for China's existence as a nation and to serve as the way to cosmopolitanism. He explained that, in order to attain to power and wealth, China must follow the road of racial unity. It is the nations which have already attained their position of power and wealth and which have subject races under their control that preach a theory of pseudo-equality between races while maintaining their own undisputed positions. For China to advocate such a doctrine is suicidal. He used a comic illustration of a labourer who hid a lottery ticket in his bamboo pole, and who, upon finding that his was the lucky number, threw his pole into the river in the midst of his excitement; but having thrown away his

pole, he did not have the wherewithal to obtain his fortune which was already within sight. He said the pole represents the doctrine of racial unity. Throw away this doctrine, you throw away the instrument to national power and wealth.

It is only after China has attained independence, power and wealth that she is able to advocate the theory of cosmopolitanism. That is the only way. He criticized those students who thought that the doctrine of racial unity was narrow-minded by reminding them of the man who threw away his bamboo pole, and said that their idea would lead to China's destruction. Dr. Sun was strongly in favour of world peace and world unity, but in his opinion that was only possible through setting one's own house in order first. He said: "To-day we want to revive the lost spirit of racial unity of China, using the strength of her four hundred million people to redress the wrongs from which humanity is suffering. That is our duty."

The doctrine of racial unity is of even greater importance to China in the world situation of to-day. The races of the world to-day are divided between two classes, the oppressing class and the oppressed class. Of the world's population of fifteen million, the great majority of twelve million and a half is under the oppression of the minority of two million and a half. The oppressed races must unite themselves to fight against the oppressing class. It is in its essence a class war, but is not limited to national boundaries. It was not the aim of China to coerce other weaker races when she becomes strong herself; it is her duty to help the weaker races to obtain liberation from their present yoke. So China's task for the present is first to become strong herself and to unite her strength with that of the other races to obtain world freedom.

2. The Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty.—The meaning of this term as used by the Kuomintang differs in no way from its acceptance in Europe and America. But Dr. Sun's conception in regard to its origin was not the classical one as

contained in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, which declared that "Men are born and remain equal in rights." He conceived popular sovereignty as derived from historical evolution. He said: "But from the view of historical evolution, popular sovereignty is not derived from Nature, but is created by the situation of the time and the movement of currents. So from evolutionary history, there is no such fact of popular sovereignty as was expounded by Rousseau." Although Rousseau's theory did not possess the basis in facts, it found acceptance because the facts of the time were matured for such. Referring to Rousseau again, Dr. Sun said: "Although his words are in contradiction to historical evolution, the political conditions of that time have already furnished the facts. Because the facts were there, so his wrongly deduced words were nevertheless welcome by man. But when we come to consider Rousseau's original idea of promoting popular sovereignty, we shall recognize it still more as a great contribution in politics for all time."

Such being Dr. Sun's views regarding the pioneer work of Rousseau in modern history, we shall understand that his own idea was that popular sovereignty represented only the last stage of human development in the history of politics. According to Dr. Sun there were four stages. The first stage was when primitive man and beast struggled and the power used was physical force. In the second stage man contended against the elements —that is, Nature—and in this stage theocracy prevailed. The struggles of the third stage were those between man and man, country and country, race and race, and in these struggles the power of the king was invoked. Now we have reached the fourth stage, in which the struggle is between the people and the king, the good man against the bad man, right against might. This is the age of popular sovereignty. In his opinion the march of popular sovereignty is irresistible, and its ultimate triumph is sure, although it may suffer reverses from time to time in the hands of reactionary forces. The twentieth

century is the century of popular sovereignty, and any nation that goes contrary to its current is sure to meet disastrous fate.

Dr. Sun knew well the arguments of those men, both at home and abroad, who thought that China was yet unripe for a democratic Government; but he said these men did not know the history of the Chinese people, whose forefathers two thousand years ago had already enunciated this doctrine. For precisely the same reasons advanced by his opponents, Dr. Sun saw that a democratic Government is the best that would suit China's present conditions. Here he advanced another reason for his advocacy of popular sovereignty. This reason was perhaps the more urgent and weighty considering its practical value and consequences. It is that democracy would be the best antidote against the revival of monarchy and the chaos and strife that attend the founding of every dynasty in China; for in the history of China, as in those of some other countries, the hero and the king played a great part. At some unusual time of crisis someone rose to the top and played the hero; the hero then became king. This hero-king business played as long a rôle as more than two thousand years of China's monarchical history, and much suffering among the people and unnecessarily prolonged chaos and disorder resulted when several heroes struggled for the possession of power. Dr. Sun cited the instance of the Taiping Movement (1858–64), and said that its failure was due to mutual jealousy and mutual destruction among the leaders, each of whom struggled against the others to become king. He said: "So in the Chinese Revolution we have determined to choose the system of popular sovereignty, first to follow the currents of the world, and secondly to shorten the civil war at home." His contention has been well borne by the facts that have developed since the founding of the Chinese Republic. First came Yuan Shih-kai, who made his notorious attempt to make himself Emperor, supported not only by his own henchmen, but also by some distinguished

foreign scholars, who had made a wrong diagnosis of the history and temperament of the Chinese people. Then came another abortive attempt to overthrow the Chinese Republic when the Manchu boy-Emperor tried to regain the throne. We who write after the death of the leader of Kuomintang have found occasion to appreciate that his judgments in regard to the great historical decisions were seldom wrong. Aside from all rhetorical niceties whether China is fitted for a democratic Government or not, this argument in favour of popular sovereignty, based on the facts and actual conditions of the country, ought to be conclusive for all who still entertain any doubt regarding this subject. If there are any who still have doubt, they are mighty few, for several unsuccessful attempts to create an Emperor for China have disastrously failed and blighted the hope of the remnants of monarchists in China. We have every reason to feel confident that, whatever its future and vicissitudes, democracy as a form of government has come to be firmly established in China. How to make it a fact as well as a name is the task that the Kuomintang and those supporting its principles will have to struggle to accomplish. In summing up his opinions on this matter Dr. Sun said: "If everyone harbours the idea of becoming a king, then first comrades will fight against comrades, and secondly fellow-countrymen will fight against themselves. If fighting and struggling continues year in and year out, there will be no ending to the suffering of the people. It was always the case in Chinese history that a period of good government was followed by one of disorder. During the disorder it was always a struggle for the throne. In foreign countries it sometimes happened that there was fighting for religion and for freedom. But what was fought for during the several thousand years in Chinese history was the problem of kingship. We of the Revolutionary Party, from the very beginning of the creation of the party, have stood for republicanism, doing away with the king, in order to avoid fighting in the future. Now that the militarists in general dare not aspire

to be kings or nobles, it is certainly an advance on the struggles in history."

What are his methods for putting the idea of popular sovereignty into effect in China? In this connection it is interesting to notice what he thought of the working of the popular government in the West. He thought that democracies in Europe and America have not solved their problems. With the exception of Switzerland, the people have only gained one power, that is the power of election. Evidently this single power is not sufficient to fully express the authority of the people. Furthermore, the Governments of the various countries are distracted by the contention for power between the people and the Government. The people, while wishing the Government to be strong, are afraid of giving it too much power and making it too strong. So the working of popular sovereignty is nearly everywhere paralysed by the insufficient expression of the power of the people and by the contradictory tug-of-war between the Government and the people. He laid special emphasis on that in solving the problem of popular sovereignty; we must not merely follow the footsteps of Europe and America, but must also find out our own ways. He held that the people's authority should not be limited to that of election alone; they must also exercise the other powers that promise to give democracy a fuller and wider scope. In this direction he thought the Swiss and American example is the best that is possible in the present day. Whether the Swiss and American schemes would eventually solve all the problems for democracy remains to be seen. He said: "Recently the people of Switzerland possesses the powers of initiative and referendum in addition to the power of election. . . . Recently the people of the newly opened States in the north-west of the United States have obtained one more power than the Swiss, that of recall. . . . So many people of America now possess four powers, the powers of election, initiative, referendum and recall. These four powers have been practised in some north-western States of America

with much good result. Later they may be extended perhaps to the whole of the United States, and perhaps to the whole world. If the world wants popular sovereignty in its full sense, it must follow the American example to use the four kinds of powers." But he added that "these direct popular powers have arisen only during the last scores of years, so it (popular sovereignty) remains still a great question that cannot be solved to-day."

One of the most serious charges against democratic government is that it is not efficient. Evidences from the experience of too-frequent elections and the working of checks and balances in Government authority presents a case that is hard to refute. The Government cannot be efficient without being strong, and if it is too strong, it is likely to encroach on the rights of the people. This presents a struggle between the elected Government and the electorate which in theory ought not to exist. Dr. Sun found that there is a way out of this dilemma, only we must first change our usual notion about government in general. It is to divide government into two parts, one of which is concerned with authority or power and the other with ability, one with the source of all power and the other with the carrying into effect what is commanded by that authority. In other words, he divided the affairs of the State into two departments, the electorate and the Government. The electorate possesses the power and the Government possesses the ability to carry out the mandates from the electorate. He said : "The attitude of the people towards government must be changed. It is to make a distinction between power and ability." This division involves two things, one is that the people possessing the four kinds of powers of election, initiative, referendum, and recall must be able to use their authority as they will. They must be able to withdraw the power delegated to the Government as well as to hand it out, while at the present the people in the various countries are under limitation of many kinds from such withdrawal. So they are afraid to give the Government too much power. Now, if the

people can have absolute freedom in regard to the exercise of their power, they need not have any fear to delegate to the Government as much power as it wants, for, like a machine, the people can have perfect control over its operation. In a metaphor Dr. Sun illustrated his theory by pointing out: "Although the motive power of Government emanates from the people, after issuing the motive power it is necessary to be able to withdraw it at will. The people dare only use a Government of such small power. As to a Government of so many tens of thousands of 'horse-power,' the people dare not use it because they are not able to control it. The people of Europe and America to-day are afraid of strong and powerful Governments. It is like the factories of former days, which were afraid of machinery of too great horse-power. . . ."

In the second place, this division involves a Government carried on by specialists. Dr. Sun could not have emphasized more strongly than he did the necessity of expert service in government. By experts he meant men of ability, and including the technical specialists necessary for carrying on work requiring such men. He said: "The driver of a motor-car is one who has ability but no power. The owner has no ability but he has power. This owner, who possesses power, ought to depend on the specialist, who has ability, to drive the car for him. The great affairs of the Republic follow also the same principle. The citizen is the master, and is the possessor of power. The Government is the specialist, and is the possessor of ability. . . . So we may regard all the officials of the Republic as drivers irrespective of their positions, from the President to the Premier and the Secretaries of State. Provided they have ability and are loyal to the affairs of the State, we ought to entrust the great power of the State to them, permitting them to act freely, and not to restrict their actions. Then the nation will have progress, and rapid progress. Otherwise, if the people want to do everything themselves, or, having engaged the specialists, to restrict their every action and to allow them no liberty, then we can

hardly expect the State to improve, and improvement, if any, must be very slow." This idea, to be sure, is not new; we have found that the more progressive writers on politics nowadays have come to recognize more and more the importance of specialists in Government service. This idea finds greater force every day in the attempts in America and elsewhere, especially in the great municipalities, to improve and secure an efficient administration. The business method in Government is gaining more currency in view of the fact that the modern Government undertakes to supply the people with an amount and a variety of services which were unimaginable one hundred or even fifty years ago. It would be impossible for the people to participate in the carrying out of these services, so their duty and proper sphere had best be confined to superintending and watching the Government, provided that they have the real power to control the Government. In this connection we may notice that Dr. Sun raised the power of examination to equality with the other four powers in his theory of the five-power constitution. This power of examination is for recruiting officials for the Government service. The four powers include the three traditional legislative, executive, and judicial powers found in nearly all modern constitutions, and the power of impeachment. It will be interesting to reproduce here Dr. Sun's chart showing the relation between the people and the Government:



From the above chart it is clear that an efficient and strong Government is not incompatible with democracy, and provided the people are really the masters, and possessors of political

power, they have no fear for a strong Government. The people having in their possession the four powers necessary to register and express their wishes are the real masters of the Republic. So the doctrine of popular sovereignty may become a fact instead of a pure name.

3. The Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty and the Theory of the Five-Power Constitution.—By the term of five-power constitution is meant that instead of following the classical division of governmental powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial, it is proposed to divide it into five, namely, in addition to the three powers there are added the power of impeachment and the power of examination, to stand on an equal plane with the other three. This theory of constitution is calculated to harmonize with the operation of the four powers of the people under the doctrine of sovereignty as proposed by Dr. Sun. Although this theory of a five-power constitution did not gain recognition in the Provisional Constitution of 1912 drawn up in Nanking while Dr. Sun was President, he thought the omission was a great mistake. While the defects are well known of the three-division constitution, typified by the American Constitution, where the theory of checks and balances are pushed to its logical extreme, the classical division is still to-day the prevailing type in constitution-making. We have seen that the purpose of a democratic Government working under Dr. Sun's doctrine and scheme of popular sovereignty is not to furnish checks and balances, but to secure efficient administration, with the necessity of such inter-departmental checks and balances removed by giving the people the full and prompt control of power. So it serves no purpose to follow the theory of Montesquieu, which in the blocking effects of the three departments to each other is inconsistent with efficient administration.

But this is not all. Dr. Sun informed us that in devising the five-power constitution for China he took into consideration not only the actual requirements of the country, but also the

history of China. The two powers he added were those of impeachment and examination. In Chinese history there were about the person of the Emperor certain officials of high rank and great dignity whose duties were to criticize the conduct of the Emperor and to impeach all officials of the country who had failed in duty. Although these high officials were appointed by the Emperor, their authority was supposed to be, and in many instances actually were, independent of him. They were free to criticize and impeach all persons in the kingdom ; they were the symbol of freedom of speech in the ancient monarchy ; they were the barometer of its rise or decline according to the way they exercised their duties. From some points of view these officials might be said to represent the degree of maturity to which the act of monarchical government in China has developed. In a modern constitution the power of impeachment is reserved to the legislative department in the case of higher officials, and the process is clumsy; and in the case of minor officials this power is sometimes exercised by the administrative courts. Under the five-power constitution the process of impeachment is unified under one special department, thus relieving the legislative department of an amount of business which, strictly speaking, does not belong to it.

The power of impeachment is concerned with removing the unfit officials, while the finding and choosing of good and able servants of the Government is to be concentrated in the Department of Examination. In all countries there is a certain amount of examination for certain grades of civil service—the method of examination is really extending in many countries—but in China this has been the time-honoured practice of many centuries. Dr. Sun thought this valuable tradition ought to be preserved in the constitution for the Republic—in fact, one of the great problems of any Government is to find the proper men for the proper places. So Dr. Sun said : "In the future, in the employment and administration of the State, all the public servants must pass examinations."

Another chart of Dr. Sun (see page 69) will illustrate clearly the working of the constitution and its relationship with other spheres of the State.

A few remarks may be made here regarding the principle of local government. It is in the local government that direct popular sovereignty will be expressed in using the four powers of initiative, recall, referendum, and election. How the details will work out will depend on the programme of constitution of local government to be elaborated in the process of the general political reconstruction of China. But this will be the principle to be observed. As to the relation of the National Congress to the National Government, the principle is sufficiently different from the usual relation in a parliamentary Government. It will be explained in the next chapter on "Party Organization and Party Work."

4. The Doctrine of Popular Economy.—This doctrine is also called that of people's livelihood. It constitutes the economic principles on which the future democratic society of China will be based. Of the three doctrines of Dr. Sun, one cannot assign any comparative importance to any particular one, but one may say that if such an assignment is to be made, the doctrine of people's livelihood ought to occupy a very prominent place in one's thought, for it is the most urgent problem in the hands of the Kuomintang, which has the salvation of China as its aim. While the doctrine of racial unity and the doctrine of popular sovereignty will be applied and translated into political facts, yet these cannot meet with success unless the doctrine of people's livelihood is put into effect satisfactorily. The latter is really a condition of the former, inasmuch as the political and social institutions of a nation are very largely conditioned by its economic conditions and facts. Politically and socially it is impossible for China as for any other country to be a real democracy when economically she is not such. Witness the actual conditions of the industrial nations of to-day, England and America especially; one can


National Congress
Central Government
Impeachment
Judicial
Executive
Legislative
Examination
Others
Finance
Interior
Foreign
Others
Provincial Government
District Government based on Direct Sovereignty
Initiative
Recall
Referendum
Election
Electorate to National Congress, one representative from each district

see that political democracy is largely negatived by economic inequality of their citizens. In this light we may say that the degree of success that attends the national movement of revolution engendered and headed by the Kuomintang will depend upon the measure in which it is able to put the doctrine of people's livelihood into effect.

The doctrine of people's livelihood is one with which the Kuomintang seeks to meet the economic problem of China. Elsewhere the aftermath of the industrial revolution has made economic conditions unequal among the various classes of society. However, China has one advantage over many other nations in that she is not yet industrialized, and the evil effects of modern industrialism have not made great headway in the Chinese society, so that if steps are taken in advance to guard against them, it is possible for her to avoid the pits where other nations have fallen. Dr. Sun said:

"The problem of the people's livelihood is to-day becoming the moving currents in every country of the world. Tracing the origin of this problem, it has only arisen a little more than one hundred years ago. Why is there such a problem in the present age? It is, in short, that during the last few scores of years the material civilization of the various countries has made great progress, industry has developed greatly, and the productive power of man has suddenly increased—in fact, it is due to mechanical invention. . . ."

Again he said:

"Therefore, after the invention of machinery, a great change is produced in the productive power of the world. This great change is that the place of human labour is taken by machinery. Those who possess machinery take away the money of those who do not."

The social and economic problems of Europe and America have had many different advocates urging different methods for their solution. The diversity of opinion on the methods is as great as divergence in regard to the point of view respecting these problems. It will not be out of place to state here, before proceeding to state the proposals of the Kuomintang, wherein Dr. Sun's ideas coincide or agree with and wherein they

differ from the notable exponents of European socialism, especially Karl Marx. That Dr. Sun found the ultimate aim of these men and of himself is the same may be proved when he said :

> "We may say that it is the livelihood of the people, the existence of the society, the means of living of the citizen, and the life of the masses. I now use the term 'people's livelihood' to discuss the greatest problem that has arisen in the foreign countries during the last more than one hundred years—that is, the social problem."

If one takes a superficial view of this statement one is likely to be greatly mistaken ; for although Dr. Sun had great sympathy for the thoughts and methods of social reform of the great European thinkers, he had his own views.

Before setting out to outline Dr. Sun's theory regarding economic reconstruction, it may be well to say a few words on his attitude toward the theory of socialism in the European sense, and especially the Marxian theory. He had great admiration and respect for the great contribution of Karl Marx toward creating the school of scientific socialism, but he found that he could not agree with Marx. He enumerated instances in which the contentions of Marx have been disproved by the history that came after him. He said : "So the law of social progress lies in man's seeking for existence. This is the principle of social progress. The class struggle is not the cause of social progress; it is a disease arising during the process of progress. The reason for this disease is that man cannot live. Because man cannot live, so this disease results in wars. Marx in all his results of the inquiring into social problems only sees the defects of social progress and does not see the principle of social progress. So Marx may be called only a social pathologist and not a social physiologist." Again he said : "Marx in recognizing the class struggle as the principle of social progress is putting the cart before the horse. Because his teachings amount to an inversion of cause and effect, and are not clear as to the fundamentals, so after their appearance the facts that

have appeared in the societies of different countries are at variance with and sometimes in opposition to them."

Dr. Sun's view was that since the time Marx wrote conditions have changed. He was not opposed to Marxism as such, but he held that it would not be applicable to the China of to-day. His idea was that the economic conditions and the facts in the present China would not allow her to use the Marxian method; and in attempting to solve the economic problem of China it is facts and not purely theories that should guide us. He said:

"Our party in its position in China and in its opportunity of the time, what method should we adopt to solve the problem of the people's livelihood? This method is not a metaphysical theory and is not empty knowledge, but it is facts. . . . So in solving the social problem we must use facts as the basis and not merely theories. What, then, are the facts in China? It is the poverty from which everyone is suffering. In China everybody is poor. There is no special class of great wealth, but there is only general poverty. What is called inequality between the poor and the wealthy is only a distinction between the very poor and the less poor."

China is to-day still an agricultural country, and capitalism in the modern sense has not arisen. So Dr. Sun said:

"But before industries are developed in China, the Marxian theory of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship cannot be used. So to-day, while we may follow the suggestions of Marx, we cannot use his methods. The method we advocate to solve the problem of the people's livelihood does not begin by proposing a radical method that does not suit the present time, and waiting for its adaptation after the development of industries. What we want is a preventive method, to prevent great wealth from going into private hands, and to guard against the great defect of inequality between the wealthy and the poor in the future. This is the proper method for solving the social problem of China to-day. It is not like one who anticipates the winter by putting on his fur coat before the season actually arrives."

Following this standpoint, Dr. Sun put forward two concrete proposals as the guiding principles in dealing with the economic questions of China. The one is the equalization of right in land and the other is the control of capital. These

are the cardinal points in his principle of the people's livelihood. A few words are necessary for explaining the meaning of each. In the first place China is to-day predominantly an agricultural country. Over 85 per cent. of her population are farmers. Any party that aims at the reconstruction of China must take this great majority of the people as a substantial basis to begin with; for if the agricultural problem is solved, then is solved the problem of livelihood for the vast majority of the Chinese people. Although there are in China at present no great capitalists in the European sense, yet there are many landlords who control vast areas of land, living on the sweat and toiling of the farmers, of whom there are large numbers without land; they are mere tenants, and the land they cultivate belongs to the landlords. So Dr. Sun thinks that it is the duty of a Government to furnish land to these farmers, who are the real backbone of China's economic life. The land policy has yet another aim—that is, it involves not only the rural land, but also the urban land in its scope. In regard to the urban land, it aims at the abolition of private right to enjoy the unearned increment in land values, which go directly to the Government. In working out this phase of the policy in regard to urban land, the Kuomintang proposed the dual process of taxation based on the landowner's own declaration of the value of the land. It involves first that the landowner pays the tax according to his own declaration, and secondly the Government has the option to buy the land at the value declared by the landowner. Thus it is hoped that concealment of value and much controversy that usually arises under such circumstances might be obviated. It is a fact that the unearned increment in the land values in modern cities is very large in the present day. The Kuomintang, in recovering this unearned increment for the Government, is following a method that has been proposed in some modern cities. The money thus obtained will be used not for the enjoyment of the few, but for the benefit of society. Of course, the application of this land policy will

entail many detailed processes in all their ramifications, but here the fundamental principle in regard to one of the most urgent economic problems is stated.

Secondly, in regard to the regulation of capital, we can see that it implies the existence of and protection to capital as a necessary instrument to production in future China. China is a poor country. It is not enough to protect and encourage agriculture alone. She must try her best to promote her industries, and means must be found to enable her to pass from the present agricultural stage to an industrial stage with the least amount of evil that usually attends such transformation elsewhere. As capital is necessary, and private capital cannot be abolished under present circumstances, the best that any Government could do would be to ensure that the greatest good is done to the service of the society by capital, while at the same time preventive measures are to be taken to guard against the excesses and vices of modern capitalism. That is the stand the Kuomintang takes to-day in regard to capital. It is not capital as such that is to blame in industrial evils; it is the excesses and misuse of capital. So the second cardinal point in the economic principle of the Kuomintang is that capital, in order to serve as a social instrument, must be subject to the regulation of the State. Capital is neither a sacred right, as provided in the constitution of some countries, nor an infamous thing, as denounced by some of the communists. It is an instrument for a purpose, and as such should be subject to human control.

There are two categories of capital, the private-owned and the State-owned. The Kuomintang not only intends to encourage and regulate private capital; it also wants to promote State-owned capital; for the trend of social movements in other countries has indicated to the party the necessity of State ownership of the public utilities. These would include nationalization of a much larger scope of the services that are elsewhere in private hands. Whether mines will be made a

State enterprise is a question on which nothing can be said definitely at present, but railways are already nationalized. It is to be hoped nationalization will have a larger scope in the future of China under the Kuomintang than elsewhere. Certainly many other things, such as hydro-electric power, will be reserved in the hands of the State. It would not be well to dilate here on a detailed treatment of the subject, but it suffices to remark that the principle is that wherever possible public ownership will prevail, and where it is not possible, private operation will be subject to State control and supervision in regard to profit and working conditions. Dr. Sun wrote a book called *The Plan for Industrial Organization*, in which he also envisaged the possibility of utilizing foreign capital on large scales for Chinese industries. In the conclusion he said:

"The development of Chinese industries must go on at any rate. But is it to proceed by the old way of the West? . . . The object of material civilization is not personal gain but public benefit. Its most direct route is not competition but mutual help. . . . In short, my view is to utilize foreign capitalism to build up the Chinese socialism, harmonizing these two kinds of economic power of human progress, rendering them mutually useful, to promote the world civilization in the future."

This remarkable book, for its new viewpoint and ambitious scale, deserves to be studied with interest and care by all who are interested in the economic and industrial development of China.

These are the fundamental principles of the Kuomintang in regard to the social and economic problems of China. These principles have been formally adopted by the First National Congress of Kuomintang in 1924. Now everyone upon admission to the party pledges himself to carry out these principles into effect, for these constitute the way of salvation for China, and point out the direction in which the future social democracy of China is to move. In how far these prin-

ciples have been realized, and how the Kuomintang is proceeding to realize them, and what effect they are having in the internal and external policies of China, it is too early to say; but in the next few chapters we may notice what beginnings are made to further these principles and what initial success and what failures have already attended these attempts.

CHAPTER IV

PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PARTY WORK

1. The National Congress of Representatives.—While the fundamental strength of the Kuomintang lies with the masses of peasants, labourers, students, merchants, and people of all walks of life, structurally and organically, the final authority of the party is vested in a body called the National Congress of Representatives. This body is the depository of the final and ultimate authority that has been entrusted to it by the members of the party as a whole. It is the collective expression of the will of all the members of the party, for theoretically it is assumed that the members of the party are sovereign in its affairs, and such sovereign will is made effective through the National Congress of Representatives. It occupies a position of pre-eminence in the party, for all the provincial and the city branches of the Kuomintang look to it for guidance and direction. It is, in short, the supreme power in the functioning of the party.

The National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang is convened once a year by a body called the Central Executive Committee, whose nature and functions will be outlined presently. Suffice it to say here that the Constitution of the Kuomintang provides in the 25th article that the Central Executive Committee shall within a certain range exercise some discretion in the matter of calling the National Congress of Representatives. It says:

"The National Congress of Representatives shall be the highest organ of the party. It holds its regular session once each year, but a special session may be called if the Central Executive Committee recognizes such necessity, or if more than one-third of the provincial branches of the Kuomintang, or of those organs having equal status as the provincial branches, petition for it."

The power of discretion of the Central Executive Committee in this matter is further augmented by another provision in the same article:

> "The Central Executive Committee may postpone the convening of the regular session of the National Congress of Representatives by proclamation if conditions constrain it to do so, but such postponement shall not be longer than one year."

The First National Congress of Representatives was held in January of 1924, and the Second Congress was not held until 1926, two years after the first. The reason was that in December of 1924 Dr. Sun had to go to Peking in order to carry personally the influence of the Kuomintang to the north; and subsequently he was ill, and he died there in the next spring. So the Second Congress was postponed to the spring of next year. Again, the third regular session of the National Congress of Representatives was to have been held in the beginning of 1927, but again something intervened to prevent it from being called. It was the Northern Expedition, with the battle still raging in the province of Kiangsi at the end of last year, when preparations for the session ought to have been made. In order to call the Congress it is required to publish the date of its opening and the important items on the agenda three months ahead.

Such being the nature of the National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang, it is necessary to inquire what are the powers of this body. In theory and in practice it is a body competent to deal with all questions that have arisen in the party and in the Nationalist Government, which is its creation. But there are certain specific powers granted by the Constitution of the Kuomintang. These powers are not to be taken as enumerative or as excluding other powers that the Congress may see fit to exercise from time to time, for the supreme nature of its competence readily excludes such an interpretation. They are specified in the Constitution as indicating certain of the powers as of paramount importance

to the functioning of the party. These powers are indicated clearly in the 28th article of the Constitution.

First there is the power of receiving and putting into effect the reports from the Central Executive Committee and the departments under this Committee. As will be explained, the Central Executive Committee is a body created by the Congress, and is therefore subordinate to it. The departments are again subordinate to the Central Executive Committee. That this power is one of the most important is evident if one reads the proceedings of the First and the Second National Congresses, which were held in 1924 and 1926 respectively. A great deal of time was spent in reporting on the conditions of party affairs in the different places and abroad during the previous year. These reports were made by the delegates that have come to represent their "constituents," which may be a provincial branch or a city branch or an overseas branch, or again a branch of a vocational organization like the branch of the Kuomintang of the Canton–Hankow Railway. Sometimes these reports are verbal and sometimes they are written. They are made and discussed, and finally they are passed upon, and a resolution is made if a report is accepted as satisfactory. In the First as well as in the Second Congress there were reports on the party affairs and on the political conditions in the various districts of the country, as also in the different countries abroad where there were branches of the Kuomintang. In these reports conditions were revealed and suggestions were made as to future improvements to be made in the work of the different branches. As is evident, the Congress meets but once a year, and the session lasts but a few weeks. It cannot carry on the work of the party itself, and it must depend upon the different organs and branches of the party to carry on the work ; and as the supreme organ of the party it calls on the branches to make a report through their delegates at the Congress, in addition to the reports that it may call upon them to make through the

Central Executive Committee at any time of the year. These reports occupy an important part and absorb a considerable amount of time of the Congress.

Secondly, there is the power of revising the political platforms and the regulations of the party. This power is self-evident. The Constitution of the party was passed by the First Congress of Representatives, and it was amended by the Second Congress. The power of amendment and of revision of the Constitution belongs to the National Congress exclusively; also the power of revising any regulation that affects the party as a whole must belong to the Congress. Similarly the power of revising the political platform of the party is too important a task to be left to any organ of the party except the National Congress. As a rule each Congress issued a statement during its session. The First and the Second Congresses both issued such statements, which embodied its views on the political situation in its domestic and foreign aspects. These statements coming from the highest authority of the party to the whole country and to the world are regarded with the greatest importance, because they represent the opinion of the party as a whole.

Thirdly, there is the power of determining the policy and tactics that ought to be taken by the party regarding the situation of the time. This power emphasizes the policy as well as the tactics that are to be taken to meet a certain situation. By this power the Congress decides what is to be the policy of the party on the many fundamental questions, as the labour and the peasant questions, the woman's question, and the land question. In general it is the general principle that the Congress decides, and the details are left to be worked out by the departments of the party or the Ministries of the Nationalist Government. Sometimes an exigent question of the time may also be attended to by the Congress, as the Canton Customs Question, during the time of the Second Congress. In this connection one point must be stressed—that is, the tactics

that are to be adopted to meet a situation and to carry out a policy. As time goes on the efficacy or the inefficacy of certain tactics may become manifest, and it was at the session of the National Congress that means were discussed. For instance, it was at the session of the Second Congress that the attention was directed to the necessity of increasing the vigour of the propaganda work of the party, so as to make the aims of the party more articulate, and bring the principles of the party nearer to the people of the country. The policy is the aim, while the tactics are the means. The Kuomintang as a modern party pays much attention to the effective means for the carrying out of its policies.

On its negative side this power prevents any other organ from exercising the function of determining a policy or a course of action that affects the party or the country as a whole. It preserves the unity of the party and prevents the existence of divergence of opinion as far as the formulated policy of the party is concerned. As soon as a certain policy is determined upon by the National Congress, it is incumbent upon every branch, as well as upon every member of the party, not to voice any opinion different from the one decided upon. Members may express opinion freely on any subject provided it does not contradict the official opinion of the party—that is, the opinion arrived at in the session of the National Congress as representing the party as a whole. The local branches, as will be explained later, are free to draw up specific regulations to meet local situations, provided these do not violate the decisions of the National Congress or the Central Executive Committee. This power is vital to the existence of the party as an organic and functioning whole if it is not to degenerate into an organization where multiple influences work for multiple ends, for the unity of the party must be maintained at all costs. In other words, this power touches the all-important question of party discipline, of which more will be said later.

Fourthly, there is the power of electing the Central Executive

Committee and the Committee of Control. The members, as well as the reserve members, of these two Committees are elected by the National Congress at its annual session. It is through the Central Executive Committee that the party carries on its work from the time of adjournment of one session till the beginning of the next session a year later, or during a longer period. So in electing this Committee the Congress simply delegates many of the functions that it cannot perform itself during the adjournment. When the Congress meets again, the Central Executive Committee makes a report of the work that it has performed during the year. There are certain powers that the Central Executive Committee cannot exercise although it is the trusted organ of the Congress; it cannot decide on anything that is a reversal of, or a fundamental deviation from, the policy decided by the National Congress. So it is an important function of the Congress to choose a body of men that are to act for it during the whole year when it is not in session, and it must be very careful to see that the proper men are chosen. In any session the election of the members of the Central Executive Committee is a very exciting matter, as men of various shades of political opinion all try to get their own men elected on the Committee. Once elected, the destiny of the party and the Nationalist Government during the following year is in their hands.

These are the powers specially provided in the Constitution as belonging to the National Congress. As has been said before, they are not to be taken as enumerative and exhaustive of the powers that may be exercised by the Congress. In fact, until some form of direct legislation is introduced which is envisaged in Dr. Sun's Three Principles, but which is intended to be used at a later stage of political development, the National Congress decides on every important question, and there is no limitation to its powers. Then the question may well be asked, that since the authority of the Congress knows no bounds, where is the necessity of setting forth these four

powers as belonging to this body? The reason is not far to seek. They are set forth as belonging specifically to the National Congress and to no other organ of the party. They are there to prevent any unauthorized organ or a group of persons from exercising the functions that only properly elected and properly qualified delegates of the party in session, such as the National Congress, can exercise, to determine upon policies that affect the party and the country as a whole. So these powers are there not to indicate that the Congress shall exercise these only and no other, but rather to say that the Congress alone shall exercise them. There are two ways of defining the powers of a body such as the National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang. One would be to enumerate them specifically and the other is to mention them generically. The latter is evidently the one followed in the Constitution of the Kuomintang with regard to the powers of the National Congress; and these four powers enumerated are more in the nature of a guard against usurpation and prevention of chaos in party authority.

The National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang, being such an important organ, the next question to consider is how the representatives or delegates to this Congress are elected and what are their qualifications. Article 27 of the Constitution of the Kuomintang provides that "the method of organization, of election of the National Congress of Representatives, as also the number of representatives the different localities are entitled to send to the Congress, are to be determined by the Central Executive Committee." Since the first Congress met only in 1924, previous to that there was no Congress, and therefore there was no body entitled to elect a Central Executive Committee to attend to the election of the Congress. But a Central Executive Committee, *pro tempo*, was created by appointment by Dr. Sun, called the Provisional Central Executive Committee. This Committee consisted of nine persons, and was appointed by

Dr. Sun toward the end of October 1923. In addition there were appointed five reserve members to this Committee. The special meeting of this Provisional Central Executive Committee and party members to consider the question of reorganization of the party was held on October 25, 1923. This Committee later on held a number of meetings to discuss how to bring into existence the first National Congress of the Kuomintang, whose notable task—and perhaps the sole task—was how to reorganize the party. It must be remembered that the project of reorganizing the party was already decided upon by the Doctor after mature consideration, and this Committee was there to devise ways and means to put the idea into effect. As the work of the party at that time in many places was secret, because it was in enemy territory, and as it was the first time that such a Congress was called by the party, the choice of the delegates on purely elective lines was found to be impracticable. It was decided that the representatives should be partly elected by the localities and partly appointed by Dr. Sun. Of the former class there was a number that were elected not in the locality itself, but at some convenient place where a large number of party members belonging to the same locality took upon themselves the responsibility of returning representatives to the Congress. For instance, the representatives of some provinces were elected in Canton. In this way there were sent to the First National Congress of the Kuomintang 199 representatives, which opened its session on January 20, 1924, at the city of Canton. There were gathered at this Congress representatives from all the twenty-one provinces, Sinkiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and the party branches abroad in many countries. The four big cities of Shanghai, Peking, Hankow, and Canton also sent representatives. In general each provincial branch sent five or six representatives. Each of the city branches returned a like number. The city of Shanghai sent seven, the highest number for that class; the province of Hunan sent twelve, Kiangsi nine, Honan eight, the rest

of the provinces five or six; the province of Kansu sent two, while Mongolia sent three. In general, the overseas branches of the Kuomintang sent each one or two representatives. Places as far as Sydney, Australia, and cities in the United States of America also sent representatives, not to mention such nearby places as Siam, Burma, Japan, and the Straits Settlement. The Congress had reason to be proud of these representatives from the overseas branches of the Kuomintang, for it remembered the old days when the party owed its very existence to the material and spiritual support of the Chinese abroad. The representatives from Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang were also very distinguished features of the Congress, as the Kuomintang stands for the rights of the minority races. Finally, mention must be made that there were three woman members at the Congress.

It was not until the Second National Congress, held two years later, in 1926, that any definite rule for the election of the representatives was made. The First National Congress finished its business and after electing the first Central Executive Committee adjourned. As has been said before, the Second National Congress did not meet in the following year as provided in the Constitution of the party, due to the illness and the death of Dr. Sun. In the middle of the year 1925 preparations were begun to be made for the calling of the Second National Congress. On May 19th, at the 84th session of the first Central Executive Committee, and on May 20th, at the 85th session, were passed respectively the laws of election of representatives of the Second National Congress from China and from the overseas branches of the Kuomintang. These two laws were really one, both dealing with the election of representatives of the National Congress, the one dealing with China and the other with abroad. It was under this law that the Second National Congress was elected, and it met on January 4, 1926, at Canton. Since then there has been no opportunity of holding the Third National Congress.

What changes there are to be made for the election of representatives of the Third National Congress it is very difficult to say at present, but before that is done the laws passed on May 19, and May 20, 1925, will be considered as the basis for any revision in the future, although they cannot be considered as applying permanently to all future elections. But whatever changes are necessary there are certain features that will survive them. It will be of interest to consider the prominent features of the law of election of the Second National Congress, which will serve as the basis of the laws of election of the National Congress in the future.

The election of the representatives of the National Congress is a double process, consisting of the primary election and the final election. The primary election is carried out in the basic and fundamental organs of the Kuomintang—that is, in those organs that are in immediate touch with the members of the party, in the village branch, where the farmers are organized by the party, and in the neighbourhood branch in the cities. These are the primary places where the members meet face to face to discuss political and party problems. These organs of the party are the strength nearest to the soil. The success of the party means their success; and if the party fails in working out their problems the party cannot be anything but a total failure. These are the units of peasants, labourers, students—in short, the masses of the people organized in their unions and party branches. Each primary branch of the Kuomintang is entitled to elect a person which for the purpose under discussion may be called the "elector." For it is the electors that are to elect the representatives finally. In case there are more than a hundred members to any primary branch, it is entitled to elect two electors. Beyond that, every fifty members entitle that branch to elect one more elector.

The final election is carried out by what is sometimes called in political phraseology the "electoral college"—that is, the electors are summoned to meet at a certain place by the superior organs in the different provinces. What takes place exactly

is that the primary branches report to the provincial Executive Committee or the city Executive Committee the names of the electors elected in their districts. It is for the provincial or the city Executive Committees, which correspond to the Central Executive Committee in their own domains, to summon together these electors to meet at a certain place and to elect from among themselves the representatives whom that province or city is to return to the National Congress. In order to be qualified as "electors" of the "electoral college," and therefore possibly as representatives of the National Congress, a person must be a member of the party and must produce his or her certificate of membership. In case the certificate is not produced, his name must be traced in the party register of that locality. Certain other precautions are also taken in order to guard against irregularities in election. For instance, it is required that the primary and the final elections are to be carried out in the head-quarters of the party, and that the ticket or ballot used in the final election of representatives is to be designed only by the Central Executive Committee, and those branches that use any ballot other than that designed by the Central Executive Committee will have the results of their elections considered null and void.

As to the number of representatives that a province is entitled to send to the National Congress the following table will illustrate it. A branch of a special municipality, as Hankow, Shanghai, and Peking or Canton, has the same status as a province and sends the same number of representatives as a province.

1.	A province or city with less than	500 members elects	1
2.	A province or city with more than	500 members elects	2
3.	A province or city with more than	1,000 members elects	3
4.	A province or city with more than	2,000 members elects	4
5.	A province or city with more than	3,000 members elects	5
6.	A province or city with more than	5,000 members elects	6
7.	A province or city with more than	7,500 members elects	7
8.	A province or city with more than	10,000 members elects	8
9.	A province or city with more than	12,500 members elects	9
10.	A province or city with more than	15,000 members elects	10

The highest number that a single province is entitled to send to the National Congress is ten, and no province is allowed to send more. Every province is allowed to send one if its members do not amount to five hundred. This applies only to those provinces that have already been organized with proper party organizations. For those provinces that have not been organized, each one is allowed to send one representative with only power to speak but not to vote. In this way representation is secured for all the provinces and all the overseas units of the party. The minimum vote of one representative secures for every one of the provinces under the party a voice in the National Congress, while the limitation of a maximum of ten votes restricts any one province from dominating the Congress by sheer numerical advantage. As far as the experience of the First and the Second Congresses goes, there is no dissatisfaction on the question of either over or under representation. What the future experience will say on this matter it is difficult to determine at present.

The law of election for the overseas branches of the Kuomintang needs a word of explanation. These branches are grouped under a number of head-branches. For instance, there is a head-branch at Tokyo, and there is another head-branch at Mexico, and there is a head-branch in almost every country of the world to take care of the party affairs among the Chinese resident in those countries. These head-branches are under the direct control of the Overseas Department of the Central Executive Committee. Under each of these head-branches there are a number of local branches scattered in the different districts of each country. These local branches receive orders from the head-branches. In this way the Kuomintang secures the control of every one of the local units abroad. The law of election for China cannot be applied to the overseas units without much adaptation; so on May 20, 1925, a law was passed by the Central Executive Committee dealing specially with the elections abroad. In general the procedure was much the

same as the law dealing with the election in the country. There was to be the double process of selecting the representative, except that the primary election was dispensed with in view of the fact that the Chinese resident abroad do not often congregate together except in a few cities. So instead of holding the primary election, the law provides that the head-branches were to nominate a number of candidates for the election of representatives. In other words, the head-branches were to draw up a list of candidates, but the local units have the power of recommending candidates to the head-branches, which are required by law to accept these recommendations and to publish their names together with those chosen by themselves, so that the local branches may vote upon them. The voting is done by mail on a ballot designed and authorized by the Central Executive Committee. So each local branch is considered as a unit for the voting of the representatives to the National Congress. Each head-branch is entitled to send two representatives to the Congress, while in places where there are no head-branches every local unit with more than five hundred members is entitled to send one representative. Local units with less than five hundred members may combine with their neighbouring unit under similar numerical deficiency to elect one representative. The representatives from the overseas districts must proceed to China from the locality of their election; those that are already in China are precluded from acting as representatives; and when the Congress is over they must return to the seat of their election to report on the work of the Congress. In this way the Congress expects to establish genuine touch with the overseas party branches. The overseas branches of the Kuomintang returned in all to the Second National Congress in 1926 thirty-three representatives.

The following table of the Second National Congress of Representatives is inserted here, not only to show the operation of the law of election, but also to indicate the relative develop-

ment of the Kuomintang in the different parts of China up to the year 1925. All these representatives were elected except those for Yunnan, Kweichow, and Jehol, who were appointed by the Central Executive Committee. There was no representation from Sinkiang. The table is arranged in the order of their numerical strength.

Canton	.. ..	11	Kwangtung	..	11	Kwangsi	..	9
Shanghai	.. ..	7	Hunan	.. ..	7	Szechuen	..	6
Kiangsu	.. ..	5	Shantung	..	5	Peking	..	5
Hupeh	.. ..	4	Fukien	.. ..	4	Chihli	.. ..	3
Shensi	.. ..	3	Kiangsi	.. ..	3	Anhwei	..	3
Chekiang	..	3	Hankow	.. ..	3	In. Mongolia		2
Honan	.. ..	2	Kansu	.. ..	1	Shansi	..	1
Yunnan	.. ..	1	Kweichow	..	1	Fengtien	..	1
Kirin	.. ..	1	Harbin	.. ..	1	Chahar	..	1
Jehol	.. ..	1	Suiyuan	.. ..	1			

In order to give a touch of reality to the abstract description of the National Congress, a few words may be devoted to the actual working of the two National Congresses that were held in 1924 and 1926 respectively. The First National Congress opened on January 20, 1924, and ended on January 30. It held seventeen meetings, usually twice a day. The Second National Congress opened on January 4, 1926, and lasted till January 19. In general the National Congress works in much the same way as an American presidential election convention. There are a number of committees in the National Congress just as there are such committees in the American convention. There is the very important Committee on Credentials, which decides on the genuineness of the credentials of the representatives that have presented themselves to the Congress, and pass on the disputed elections before it reports its findings to the Congress in session. There is the more important Committee on Drafts, which in the American convention drafted the platforms of the Republican or the Democratic Party, but which in the Congress of the Kuomintang plays

perhaps a much more important and conspicuous part than the same committee in the American convention. It is this Committee on Drafts of the National Congress that drew up the declaration of the Congress to the people of the country, and made important statements to the world or to foreign Governments. Important resolutions must also be passed on by this Committee on Drafts before they are presented to the Congress and passed. At the end of each Congress there emerges from its deliberations a set of documents which comprises in general a declaration of the Congress on the present political situation in its domestic and foreign aspects, and a line of solution that the Congress advocates as its views on this matter, and a number of resolutions on the different specific political, economic, or social problems. The Second Congress passed resolutions on a number of questions, among which may be mentioned those on the woman's movement, the youth's movement, the labour movement, on propaganda, on party discipline, and most important of all, and as the first act of the Congress, on the acceptance of the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The First National Congress passed the all-important document of the Constitution of the party, which was amended in the Second Congress. Then there are the reports from the different parts of the country and from abroad on the condition of party affairs during the previous year. These reports are generally very instructive as to the real condition of the political and party affairs in those localities, and reveal the progress as well as the shortcomings in directions where methods have to be devised by the Congress to remedy them in the next year. These reports are made, and if they are considered satisfactory are accepted by the Congress. There are reports from Peking as well as from Shanghai, and from other places in the country; and there are also reports from Java, from the Straits Settlement, from Northern Europe, as well as from the United States. These reports take up a great deal of the time of the Congress and are

listened to with eager interest by the Congress. As has been said before, they form an integral part and a very vital part of the work of the Congress, as specially laid down as one of the four powers of the Congress. In addition to these reports the Central Executive Committee must also make a report on the condition of party affairs as a whole during the previous year, and the Nationalist Government must submit statements on the political, financial and military situations of the Government.

The next important task that the Congress must address itself to before it adjourns is the election of the Central Executive Committee and the election of the Committee of Control. The Central Executive Committee is by far the more important of the two, for it is to function on its behalf during the adjournment, and is literally a miniature reproduction of the Congress itself. Actually the work of election of this Committee does not involve an amount of competition and perhaps partisan feeling among the representatives, because the Kuomintang being a revolutionary party, and working in a revolutionary time, many prominent leaders are re-elected without any difficulty. That sense of party politics in winning election to important committees that so prominently characterizes the political parties working in peace and normal times is singularly absent in these elections of the National Congress of the Kuomintang. The Central Executive Committee, once elected, assumes office immediately upon the adjournment of the Congress, and functions till the meeting of the next Congress.

Mention must be made here of one difference in the atmospheres of the First and the Second Congresses that was caused by the occurrence of a very great event to the party, the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader and the founder of the party. Dr. Sun died on March 12, 1925, almost midway between the meeting of the First Congress and that of the Second. The First Congress was very fortunate in meeting

under the personal guidance of Dr. Sun, while the Second was convened with a heavy heart to mourn his absence. In the First Congress Dr. Sun was the Chairman, with a Presidium or Board of Chairmen to assist him. Since his death the party rightly thought that there is no man great enough to take his place, so the Second Congress decided in the amended Constitution that the Kuomintang looked upon Dr. Sun, the founder of the Three Peoples' Principles and of the Five-Power Constitution, as its Chairman and Director for all time to come. The whole of Chapter IV of the Constitution was preserved for the memory of the Doctor. The reading of the Doctor's will also dated from the Second Congress, which accepted for the party his will in a resolution. But aside from the sorrow for the death of the Doctor, there were other things that stirred the hearts of men assembled in the Second Congress. Since the First Congress there was much progress in the affairs of the party and in the political and financial and military situations of the Nationalist Government that functions under the direction of the party. The Congress had reason to be satisfied with the work of the Government in ridding the province of Kwangtung of bandit-like militarists and in unifying the finances of the Government and raising it from an almost bankrupt condition to unparalleled productiveness. Much satisfaction was also expressed in the progress of the work of the party, due in great part to the increased effectiveness of propaganda work. In short, the progress both in Government and in the party was directly traceable to the work of reorganization carried out in the First National Congress held in 1924. For the survey of progress made since the Second Congress we have to wait for the meeting of the Third Congress.

2. The Central Executive Committee.—The National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang meets but once a year at most, and such a session lasts but two or three weeks only. It is necessary, therefore, that during the time that it

is not in session there should be some organization to function in its place and to exercise the powers of the central authority of the party. Such an organization is found in a body called the Central Executive Committee. Out of a whole year the National Congress exercises its authority only during the time of its session. The rest of the time is taken up by the Central Executive Committee. Therefore the length of the time allocated to the Central Executive Committee would indicate its importance in the functioning of the party. Article 9 of the Constitution of the party provides that the authority of the party as a whole belongs to the National Congress, but during the time that it is in adjournment it belongs to the Central Executive Committee. So to all intents and for all practical purposes the authority of the Central Committee is coterminus with that of the National Congress, although it is to the Congress that the Committee holds itself responsible. At the present time, when the Congress is not in session, the Central Executive Committee is the authority in the party that all the provincial and the city branches as well as the overseas units of the Kuomintang look for direction and guidance in all party affairs. It is this Committee that has to decide on a course of action when a situation arises affecting the party as a whole. It is the Committee that decides on important questions of the day, but in doing so it is in practice subject to two conditions—that is, the meeting of the Committee must be a full and plenary one, and that it is not to reverse or change the policy decided upon by the National Congress. For the Congress creates the Committee and is therefore superior to it in authority. Subject to these restrictions, the Committee actually handles all questions of the party and supervises the Nationalist Government, and its competence on all such questions is beyond any doubt.

The Central Executive Committee is elected by the National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang at its annual session, and it begins to function immediately after the

adjournment of the outgoing Congress and terminates upon the meeting of the incoming Congress a year later. One of the most important tasks of the Congress is the election of the Central Executive Committee, upon whose competent administration during the next year the success of the party depends. Before the reorganization of the party in 1924 there was a Provisional Central Executive Committee of nine persons appointed by Dr. Sun. With this Committee there were also appointed five reserve members, who act as reserves in the event of vacancies caused by unforeseen incidents. Article 29 of the Constitution of the party provides that the number of members of the Central Executive Committee, as also the number of members of the Committee of Control, are to be determined by the National Congress. Article 30 provides that in the event that any vacancy is caused on the Central Executive Committee the reserve members are to sit on it in the order of the majority of their votes. Since the reorganization of the party in 1924 there have been two Central Executive Committees. The first one was elected by the First National Congress in 1924, and the second was elected by the Second National Congress in 1926. The First Central Executive Committee consisted of twenty-four members, and the reserve members numbered seventeen. The number was increased by the Second National Congress, and on the second Central Executive Committee there were thirty-six members and there were elected twenty-four reserve members. That which functions at present is the second Central Executive Committee. This Committee will continue to function until the meeting of the Third National Congress, when it will make a report of its work to the Congress and terminate its office.

The authority of the Central Executive Committee is very great; it extends to all the spheres of party activities. But the Constitution provides in its 31st article five powers as belonging exclusively to the Committee, namely:

1. To represent the party in its external relations.
2. To organize and direct the party organizations in all districts.
3. To appoint the editors of newspapers of the central party organization.
4. To organize the departments under the Central Executive Committee.
5. To distribute party fees and its finances.

The remarks regarding the powers of the National Congress, that those mentioned in the Constitution are not to be regarded as enumerative and exhaustive, apply equally well to these powers of the Central Executive Committee. These five powers are those that may be exercised only by the Committee during its term. For instance, the power of appointing editors that will handle the opinion of the party as a whole and propagate its views cannot be left to any other organ without disastrous results to the unity of the party; and likewise the power of representing the party in its external relations cannot be given to other organs without threatening the very existence of the party.

In actual working the powers of the Committee extend far beyond the scope set by the last-mentioned five powers. First of all, there is the power of organizing the party branches in the country and abroad. This in itself is a stupendous task, and it alone involves a tremendous amount of work for the Committee. In those provinces that have recently been recovered from the enemy it is necessary to start the party branch there by organizing the provincial party head-quarters. For this purpose the necessary funds must be found, and more important than the funds is the choice of workers that has to be made in order to start the party work in any particular province. For the purpose of supplying these party workers it is sometimes necessary to open a special training school for the preparation of competent men. After the work is started in any locality it is necessary to supervise the work so that it may not go counter to the principles of the party. And the farther these branches are removed from the central

head-quarters, the more difficult it is to keep watch over them and the greater is the necessity of doing so. Recent experience has shown how difficult it is to control the activities of these provincial and local party organs and to restrict them to the channel where they will run with, and not counter to, the policies decided upon by the central party organ. All the provincial party branches and all the head-branches overseas communicate with the Central Executive Committee directly on party questions. They are all responsible to it. All conflicts that have arisen between party branches are referred to the Committee for adjustment. In general, this phase of the work of the Committee may be said to belong to party organization, party direction, and party supervision. Its authority in this direction is as extensive as it is final, subject to the responsibility that it always holds to the National Congress.

The next branch of work that the Central Executive Committee attends to may be said to consist of the general policy of the party and the Nationalist Government, which is under the immediate control of the Committee. When it concerns a general policy or a fundamental policy of the Government is affected, it is always understood that the question is one in which the party as a whole is interested. In that case only the National Congress is competent to deal with it. Any change that involves a fundamental deviation or reversal of the policy adopted by the Congress can only be dealt with by that body. This is what is known as party authority. In these fundamental cases not even the Central Executive Committee is able to handle them. But in practice there are many important things that may happen from time to time between the meetings of two congresses, and in these cases, which may border very nearly on the fundamental policy of the party, it is evident that no authority other than the Central Executive Committee is competent to deal with them. In the course of the year there are many things of the party or the Government that need the attention of the Committee. In the event of an occur-

rence that has important international implications (such as the massacre of Shanghai on May 30, 1925, or the holding of a Pacific Labour Conference in China), the question must be decided by the Committee. This branch of the work of the Committee may be grouped as the political work of the Committee. In general, and especially in the case of vital questions, the Committee must meet in plenary session; and even when it is in full session it must remember that it is a creation of the National Congress and it must not go beyond the sphere of its entrusted competence.

The Central Executive Committee also carries on a large amount of work in special fields, such as the woman's movement, the labour and the peasant movements, which are the acute social and economic questions of the day. The Committee has under it departments to deal with these problems and to care for the welfare of these classes of people. In these fields the Committee, through its proper departments, carries on a great amount of propaganda and education in an effort to enlighten the people and bring progress to these movements. For instance, in the matter of the farmers it is the task of the Committee, through the Peasant Department under it, to educate the farmers to the cause of revolution and to bring them into line with the other sections of the people to push together the work of revolution. The Committee is working out at the same time the schemes that will fundamentally lighten the burden of the farmer and make his life a better lot than it is at present. In short, the Central Executive Committee intends to make of the farmer in the first place a revolutionary supporter, and in the second place a greater sharer of his produce by improving the present agricultural system. Similarly each of the other departments pursues the work that falls within its own sphere.

These are, in short, the main branches of work that the Central Executive Committee carries on in its everyday life. They indicate the scope of authority that the Committee

exercises. It is, in the nature of things, very extensive. As the Committee represents the National Congress during the time it is not in session, extensive powers must follow extensive spheres of activities.

The Central Executive Committee is intended by the National Congress to be a safe and active depository of party authority during the time that it is not in session. It must combine the quality of an active organ where the powers entrusted to it will be used to achieve a purpose and the quality of safety where the powers entrusted will not be abused. For the latter purpose, if safety cannot yet be found in other means under modern conditions, it is expected that it will be found in numbers. Therefore the Central Executive Committee is of necessity a body of sufficient size. There is yet another reason for the large size of the Committee in that the body, being supposed to act for the representative National Congress, must be large enough as to represent fairly well the opinions of the sections of the party even in its geographical aspects, and certainly in the various shades of political tendencies and inclinations within the party. Because of its large size, the question arises that it will not be efficient as an administrative organ, and the work of the Committee, as outlined above, entails a tremendous amount of party administration. For this reason there are two kinds of meetings of the Central Executive Committee; one is the plenary session of the Committee and the other is the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Committee. The plenary session of the Committee deliberates on all important issues that involve policies, and the meetings of the Standing Committee deal with the more or less routine matter of the party that do not require a great amount of discretionary power. The Constitution of the party requires that the Central Executive Committee must hold one plenary session at least once in every six months and that the plenary session must be held in the seat of the Nationalist Government. So during the time that it is not

in plenary session the members of the Committee do not have to stay together, and they often are scattered in many places until the time of the plenary session, when a full month's notice ahead must be given for them to come together. Special plenary meetings may be held as occasions require. In these plenary sessions the reserve members of the Committee are admitted, and all of them have the power to speak, but only those reserve members that fill the vacancies of the regulars of the Committee have the power of voting. And the number of such substitutes may not exceed one-third of the regular members present. These vacancies may be for a few hours, and the substitutes are there so as to speed up the work of the meeting.

The Central Executive Committee necessarily has the power of creating Committees. There is one important Committee required by the Constitution that the Committee must set up, that is, the Standing Committee. As has been said before, the large size of the Committee renders it difficult to handle the large amount of party administration of the Committee. Article 34 of the Constitution provides that the Central Executive Committee elects from its own members nine persons to form the Standing Committee of the Committee, and that this Standing Committee functions during the time that the Central Executive Committee is not in plenary session. The Standing Committee is responsible to the Central Executive Committee for its actions. It is this Standing Committee of nine persons that attends to the administration of the party's affairs. In actual practice the things that are decided upon by the Standing Committee are sometimes very important in character, but it must always hold itself responsible to the Central Executive Committee for its decisions. During the time that the Central Executive Committee is not in session it is this Standing Committee that deals with all things of the party in the name of the Central Executive Committee. Its authority is very great until the plenary session of the Central

Executive Committee, when it makes a report to that body on its work. In short, the Standing Committee is the custodian of the authority for the Central Executive Committee. This Standing Committee holds its regular meeting at least once a week and as often as it is necessary to hold it, as it is a very easy matter to do so due to the small size of that body.

For the purpose of administration of the affairs of the party there are created under the Central Executive Committee eight departments. They are:

1. The Organization Department.
2. The Propaganda Department.
3. The Peasant Department.
4. The Labour Department.
5. The Woman's Department.
6. The Youth Department.
7. The Merchant's Department.
8. The Overseas Department.

These departments are in no way connected with similar Ministries of the Nationalist Government, although they have similar names. For instance, there is also a Ministry of Labour as well as a Ministry of Agriculture. The one deals with the labour and peasant problems from the party angle, while the other is concerned with these affairs as an agent of the Government. A few words will be sufficient to indicate the kind of activities in which the Departments of the Central Executive Committee are engaged. Their names readily suggest their activities. Suffice it to say that these departments have the responsibility of looking after the interests of the various classes of the people from the point of view of the revolution. Their foremost task is to guide and direct these people in the work of revolution. Take the Labour and the Peasant Departments. They organize and direct the political activities of the two classes of people; they try to reach them with the principles of Dr. Sun, and to teach that the best way to redress their wrongs is through the success of the revolution.

In these two classes of people the party found a new source of strength, and perhaps the main strength of the revolution will be in their hands. The success of the revolution will have to be judged by its effect on these two classes of people, who after all are the great majority of the population of China. The same remarks may be applied to the Woman's Department, which undertakes the task of freeing the millions of Chinese womanhood from the centuries-old bondage of political, social, and lastly of intellectual oppression.

There are two Departments that may require a word of explanation, namely the Organization Department and the Propaganda Department. The Organization Department undertakes the work, first, of organizing the party in those territories where there was no party branch before. This work is sometimes very difficult, for in places under the enemy the work will have to be carried out secretly, which means a great amount of hazard to the workers that are sent there by this Department. In order to organize the party work in a certain province, authorization will have to be obtained from this Department. Secondly, there is the work of supervision of the work of all the provincial, city, and special branches of the Kuomintang directly under the Executive Committee. Reports on the work of organization from the branches, both at home and abroad, have to be sent to the Department from time to time, and these have to be passed by it. Mistakes in the work in the branches will have to be pointed out and corrected. Lastly, this Department has the duty of sending out men to supervise elections in the branches and to conduct certain meetings, if it thinks necessary. In short, this is a very important Department in the party.

As for the Propaganda Department, the first thing to observe is the elevation of the work of propaganda in the importance of the party, and the consequent creation of a special department to take care of it. Before the reorganization of the party, its leaders knew the necessity of reaching the

people with the gospel of the revolution. But few of them realize the immense importance of an effective propaganda work and an efficient propaganda machinery. The First and the Second National Congresses laid special emphasis on the work of propaganda. As a result of this realization there has been much progress in this direction. The editors of the party papers are appointed by this department so that the opinion in these papers will be in line with the settled policy of the party, and solidarity in party opinion is thus maintained.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on the work of the Youth Department, the Merchant's Department, or the Overseas Department. The Youth Department is created to take care of the young people's movement in the country, for it is realized that the revolutionary work is one in which the young people of the country will have to take an increasingly important part. And in China the history of the recent years shows the leading part taken by the students and the young people in the political and social reforms. The work of the Department of Youth is to try to instil into the minds of the youth the spirit of the revolution. The Merchant's Department is established to guide the great majority of the merchant class in the direction of revolution, for while in general the big propertied class is lukewarm towards the revolution, the majority of the smaller classes also belong to the oppressed class. Aside from this, much useful work is being done by this Department in conjunction with the Labour Department in improving the relationship between the merchant and the labourer. The work of the Overseas Department is confined to the supervision of the party affairs of the overseas branches of the Kuomintang in the countries abroad.

In addition to the eight Departments mentioned above, there is a Secretariat attached to the Central Executive Committee, which attends to the many things that do not readily fall into any one of the departments.

3. The Political Council.—There is one important Com-

mittee under the Central Executive Committee which requires particular attention, because it is such a vital organ in the party and in the Nationalist Government. It is the Political Council. It is a body composed of all the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee and six other persons elected by it. It is, therefore, a body of fifteen. These other six members of the Political Council are usually Ministers of the Nationalist Government, although many Ministers are already included in the nine members of the Standing Committee. So in practice all the Ministers of the Nationalist Government are on the Political Council. Briefly, the work of the Political Council is political. It meets twice or sometimes three times a week to consider the problems that are brought up by the Ministers for discussion and decision. It is the highest political organ of the party and of the Nationalist Government. Its decisions are handed down to the Nationalist Government for execution. The sessions sometimes lasts many hours, and its deliberations are not published except those authorized by it. It is responsible to the Central Executive Committee and it is superior in authority to the Nationalist Government. The present members of the Political Council were elected by the third plenary session of the second Central Executive Committee in March 1927.

A Minister brings up the questions that he thinks involve a principle that has to be decided, or that the question is too vital to the Government for him to decide alone without consulting his colleagues. It is in the Political Council that he consults them as a whole. There the question is freely discussed and sometimes fiercely debated before a decision is reached and taken in the form of a resolution. After that it is binding on all the Ministers of the Government. It becomes the policy, not of this or that particular Minister, but that of the Government as a whole. After the decision is reached in the Political Council the responsibility no longer rests with the Minister that brought up the question,

but with the Government. The responsibility is, therefore, a joint responsibility. This is especially important in the present day of China, where the strong man controls the policy in whatever territory he might be established. The Kuomintang is out for national power to establish a civil as opposed to a military Government, and lays special stress on the point that its policy shall be the policy of the whole Government and not that of a single man. In the way of joint responsibility it resembles a Cabinet Meeting. For instance, a certain question with a certain foreign country arises—it would be necessary to consult the political Council ; or, again, a certain situation arises in the finances of the Government—the Political Council will have to be consulted in the first instance. In every instance the policy that ultimately emerges is the policy of the Political Council as a whole. In this way it has the strength of the whole Government.

But in one respect the Political Council differs from a Cabinet Meeting. In a Cabinet Meeting only the members of the Cabinet take part, while in the Political Council there are the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, who act as a sort of counterpoise to any tendency that is inherent in a body to protect itself against criticism from outside. These members of the Standing Committee who sit on the Political Council are an element from outside of the Nationalist Government. Without them the members of the Political Council, who would thus be only Ministers of the Government, would be prone to the influence of that *esprit de corps* which destroys the healthfulness of its deliberations. On the contrary, the presence of other members of the Central Executive Committee in the Political Council will give to that body a wider representation of the views of the party on the affairs of the Government. Although the Political Council is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but is created under the general power of the Central Executive Committee to create Committees to

deal with special problems, it has now become a permanent organ of great influence in the party.

The importance of the Political Council is readily seen when one considers its work from two points. First, the wide scope of its work extends to every corner of the political activities of the Nationalist Government that has national effect and significance. The Ministries of the Nationalist Government are, of course, under its direct influence, and its decisions are carried out by them. In addition to the work of the Nationalist Government, there is a great amount of work of the provincial governments that also come within the purview of the power of the Political Council. In those problems that concern a province alone the government of that province has the full power ; but in those problems that involve a fundamental principle, or have bearings extending beyond the provincial authority, or again in those problems that involve more than one province, then these matters are brought up before the Political Council for consideration and decision. The opinion of the Political Council must be obeyed by the provincial governments. Secondly, the relation of the Political Council to the Central Executive Committee shows the preeminent position of the Council in its field. It is a prominence that is acquired on account of experience and knowledge. This Council, devoting itself to the political activities of the party, has had a very large share in shaping the policies of the Nationalist Government. It is this political experience of the Council that made it such an important organ of the party. Although the decisions of the Political Council are communicated to the Nationalist Government in the name of the Central Executive Committee, it is the Council that leads in political affairs, and the Central Executive Committee always has shown great reliance on the Council for its political opinions. There has rarely been an occasion when the Committee has found it necessary to veto the decision of the Council on an important question.

There remains only one feature of the Political Council which needs to be considered. It is the Presidium, or the Board of Chairmen, which preside at its meetings instead of a single Chairman or a President. This is one of the novel features of the Kuomintang that will need a word of explanation. In the experience of the last few years of the party it was found that the one-man chairmanship had its merit as well as defect. The advantage was that responsibility was easily located, but the danger was that it concentrated too much power in the hands of one man. It is the common experience of democratic assemblies of the world that the elected President may possess a great deal of power which is not granted by the written procedure of an assembly, and that very often the Chairman or the President abuses his unwritten power for the furtherance of his selfish purposes. This is a danger that the Kuomintang aims at particularly to prevent. So instead of a single person to head the Political Council, there are at present a Presidium of five persons, who preside over the deliberations of the Council by turn. For all orders of the Council to be effective it is necessary that they should be signed by all five of them. Besides the work of presiding at the meetings there is another function that the Presidium performs. The Presidium, being a body of five persons in the large body of a Political Council of fifteen, is in the nature of a small Committee of the Council. When the Council is not meeting it may decide on many small matters without bringing them to the Council's meeting, thereby saving much time and making for efficiency. Also it has the larger and more important part of taking the initiative in the Political Council by bringing before it its proposals and schemes for consideration and decision by the Council. In this way many important things are done, and many documents are drafted before they are presented to the Council. The men elected to the Presidium of the Political Council are generally among the best of that body, and they have the confidence of the whole

Political Council and of the Central Executive Committee in playing a leading part in the Council directly and in the Central Executive Committee indirectly. So what was designed as a check in the beginning on the abuse of the power of one man turns out to be an organ of great utility, initiative, and courage.

4. The Committee of Control.—There remains only one Committee of the central organization of the Kuomintang—that is, the Committee of Control. This Committee is also elected by the National Congress of Representatives of the party at its annual session. It is on a par with the Central Executive Committee in status. Briefly the work of the Committee, as the name indicates, is of the following kinds, and consequently it has the following three powers, namely:

1. The power of auditing accounts.
2. The power of supervising party and Government work.
3. The prosecuting power against breaches of party rules and discipline.

First, the auditing power of the Committee is a simple one. It consists in the auditing of the accounts of the Central Executive Committee. It is a power that cannot be entrusted to the Central Executive Committee itself. It is the Committee of Control that makes the financial report of the party to the National Congress.

Secondly, the power of supervising the work of the party and the Government is of two kinds: the supervision on the party work of all grades, including the highest, and the supervision of the personnel of the party and the Nationalist Government. It is required by the Constitution of the party that this Committee of Control should from time to time examine the condition of party work, and also it has the power to make investigations of the party conditions of the lower party branches. It can examine the conditions of efficiency of the workers of the party. The power of supervision also extends

to the personnel of the party as well as the Nationalist Government from one particular point of view. It is to examine whether the officials of the party and of the Nationalist Government have followed the principles of the party and the policies based on these principles in their work, and their records are judged from this point. There are many things that a party member, either in the capacity of a member or in the capacity of an official, must not do. In being sworn to office he has to declare that he would abide by the principles of the party, and as his other qualifications he must be honest and economical. It is for the Committee of Control to see that the officials of the party and of the Nationalist Government do not deviate from these principles of the party and of conduct. When they do break these rules and principles it is for the Committee of Control to have recourse to its third power.

Thirdly, the power of prosecution which is used against the breakers of party principles and party regulations. There is yet another direction in which this power of prosecution is to be used—that is, in connection with breaches of party discipline. Articles 74, 75, 76 provide very clearly for the kinds of offences that are considered to be breaches of party discipline. These breaches include not only those actions contrary to the principles of the party, but also any expression of opinion not consistent with the policy of the party. It is allowed for members of the party to express their own views on all subjects, but once the decision of the party on the point is reached it is binding on all party members to abide loyally by that decision and not to express any opinion contrary to it. Any individual or party branch that violates this rule will be dealt with by the Committee of Control. This is perhaps the most important function of the Committee, which has in its charge the observance of those rules of unity of action and unity of party opinion so that the party will always move as a united body. For the purpose of performing

its duties the Committee may send its members on a tour of inspection to the local branches.

The first Committee of Control was elected by the First National Congress in 1924. It consisted of five persons. The second Committee of Control—that is, the Committee that is functioning now—was elected by the National Congress in 1926. The number of its members was increased from five to twelve. There are at present also eight reserve members to this Committee, whose duties to the Committee are the same as the duties of the reserve members of the Central Executive Committee to that Committee.

5. The Provincial and the Local Organizations of the Kuomintang.—Having described the organization of the central body of the Kuomintang and the way they function —namely, the National Congress of Representatives, the Central Executive Committee with the Committees under it, and the Committee of Control—it is now necessary to complete the description by an outline of the lower branches of the Kuomintang. These consist of two classes, the provincial and the local. Only a brief outline is needed in order to make them clear, for the different strata of the Kuomintang are organized along the same principles. The Constitution of the party provided similar structures for them. They differ not in organization, but in the scope of authority.

The province is an important geographical unit for the organization of the Kuomintang. The principal idea for the creation of the provincial units of the Kuomintang is that the country is too big for the administration of the party without sub-divisions. It is very natural that some divisions are necessary, and the divisions easily follow the political divisions into provinces. While the authority of the party must be kept under the leadership of a unified organ—that is, under the guardianship of the National Congress and of the Central Executive Committee—it is also realized that autonomy in provincial party matters must be granted to the provinces. The Constitu-

tion of the party sets up the general principles of organization of the provincial organs and gives a general limitation to their powers. Subject to these conditions, the provincial party organization has the power to make its own regulations and special laws to deal with special conditions ; but any regulations or laws that the provincial party branches may make must not contradict the laws of the central party organization.

In matters that affect the party as a whole the provincial branches of the party must follow the instructions of the central organ. The decisions of the Central Executive Committee are binding on all the provincial branches, which must communicate them to the lower branches under their control. This control is a power that the Committee has used again and again in the most drastic way. In many cases the provincial party organization was dissolved and a new one organized in its place. In order to make the party work as an organic whole, it is necessary that the provincial party branches should follow the decisions of the Central Executive Committee in matters that are vital to the success of the party. For instance, it would be futile for the party to have a consistent foreign policy, or a concerted policy on any of the major issues that face the party, if the provincial party branches are to move as they please or if they are to move contrary to the instructions of the Central Executive Committee. Actually it is found that although the Central Executive Committee often issues specific orders on the line of actions that the provincial party branches are to follow, it is found that compliance with them is a matter that has to be learned with some difficulty. In some instances orders of the Central Executive Committee are apparently ignored by the branches of certain provinces. These independent actions are inimical with the existence of the party as a united and fighting organ. It is very essential that the provincial branches of the party should be under the real and effective control of the Central Executive Committee.

The highest authority of the provincial party branch is the Provincial Congress of Representatives, which meets once a year. Special meetings of the Provincial Congress may be called if the Central Executive Committee requires it or more than one-third of the District Executive Committees jointly petition for it; or if more than half of the members of the province petition for a special session of the Provincial Congress, as well as when the Provincial Executive Committee recognizes such a necessity, it shall also be called. The organization and the election of the Provincial Congress are to be determined by the Provincial Executive Committee. The Provincial Congress is in many ways a miniature of the National Congress. To understand the one makes it easy to understand the other. In the main the work of carrying on the party in the province, the determination of the policies regarding the party affairs of the province, the election of the Provincial Executive Committee and the Provincial Committee of Control, are the principal lines of work laid down in the Constitution of the party. The part of the Provincial Executive Committee is similar to the part of the Central Executive Committee, only the one deals with provincial and the other with national party affairs. It also supervises the provincial government in much the same way as the Central Executive Committee supervises the Nationalist Government.

Under the provincial party organization there is the district party branch. There are in one provincial party organ as many district branches as there are districts in the province. These districts are the political sub-divisions of the province. The organization of the party in the district is similar to that of the province, only its scope of authority is still smaller, having for its scope the confines of a single district. There is the District Congress of Representatives, the District Executive Committee and the District Committee of Control. The functions and the powers of these bodies are like those of the provincial bodies, but only within the limits of a district.

The district party organization is subject to the control of the provincial party organization, as the latter is subject to the control of the national party organization.

Lastly, and at the bottom of the ladder of organization of the Kuomintang and as the bed-rock foundation of the party, therefore the most important part, is the party organization of an area of a city or of a village. The city is divided into many areas, and each area is sub-divided into many sub-areas. Each area and each sub-area has its organization. They are the neighbourhood party groups, so to speak. They are the source of party authority and the fountain-head of its strength. Hence its immense importance in the party, and the healthfulness of these party branches cannot be too strongly insisted on. Also a number of villages (hamlets) may be grouped into one area for the purpose of party administration. In organization it is similar to the district branch of the party, with its elected executive committee and committee of control, and if unavoidable its congress of representatives. But here emphasis is particularly laid on the meeting of all the members of the area in a face-to-face meeting to take the place of the Congress. For here the area is the neighbourhood where the members can gather together for the purpose of discussing the problems of the party. If the party of Kuomintang is to be a strong party, if its members are to be fully instructed in the principles of the party, and, in short, if the democracy of the nation is to be real and not merely a name, it is here in the neighbourhood branches of the Kuomintang that the leaders of the party should pay the greatest amount of attention, For it is here that real democracy, both in government and in party, begins; it is here that the members of the party receive the necessary party and political instruction; it is also here that the members learn the art of self-government, just as democracies of other countries also lay stress on the neighbourhood meeting of the citizens as the place to educate the people in government. Article 61 of the Constitution

provides that meeting of the representatives of the area, or whenever possible the meeting of all the members of the area, is to take place once a month to discuss the party affairs, according to the following scope :

1. To receive the reports of the executive committee of that area.
2. To report the progress of the party affairs of that area, to discuss the difficulties encountered, and to find out means to overcome them. The members of that area may have the opportunity there to express their opinions on the current party and political affairs.
3. To discuss projects for the training of party members in that area.
4. To recruit new members for the party and to devise means of executing the resolutions of the District Executive Committee.

In the case of the sub-areas, the meeting of the members is to be held fortnightly. The number of members required for the formation of a branch of the sub-area varies, but it must be more than five persons. In such small areas the opportunity of meeting is easily obtained. The party requires that every week there is to be held a memorial meeting to the memory of Dr. Sun, the founder of the party, in all the branches of the Kuomintang. In the areas or the neighbourhoods such meetings are especially easy for the discussion of party and political problems of the day. These meetings are held every Monday morning, and are being used with good effect.

CHAPTER V

THE KUOMINTANG AND SOVIET RUSSIA [1]

To illustrate how the world at large views the Chino-Russian relationship, the following little quotation is taken from a lengthy article written by an American who is supposed to understand Chinese affairs because of his residence there. The naïve way in which it is written is surprising. Among other things it says :

"Whether the American people desire to know it or not, the SIMPLE TRUTH is that the upheaval in China is the direct result of propaganda directed and financed from Moscow, with a view to the Bolshevizing of the 400,000,000 Chinese and the making of China the centre of world-wide revolution, which is declared in their own documents to be the ultimate goal of the Communists. A Bolshevized China would be the world's greatest peril."

The simple truth! If any truth is simple, then the Chinese problem is not worth the paper on which it is written. This is by no means an occasional occurrence of an isolated mind that writes in this way about the Nationalist Movement in China and Russia's influence in it. It is very typical of the viewpoint which finds support in great numbers of people in all walks of life in Europe and America to-day. This view is more than erroneous ; it is, to say the least, an insult to the intelligence of the Chinese people, which supposes that a great movement, like the Nationalist Movement to-day, could have been manipulated by a handful of intriguers seated thousands of miles away in Moscow. That is the mentality that fails to understand the meaning of the Nationalist Revolution that for a time swept irresistibly like wild-fire across the plains of China ; that is also

[1] This chapter is an attempt to trace the history and development of the Russian policy of the Kuomintang, and the validity of this chapter is in no way affected by what has taken place under the regime at Nanking, which, being under the Right Wing exclusively, cannot represent the true and revolutionary Kuomintang.

the mentality that fails to understand the policy of the Kuomintang *vis-à-vis* Russia. To be sure, the Russian Revolution has undeniably had great influence on the outlook of the Chinese people, just as the French Revolution of yesterday exerted a tremendous influence on the leaders of the American Revolution; but that influence is many times magnified by the opponents of the Chinese Revolution, who wish to discredit the Chinese as the running dogs of Bolshevist schemes. But that is not trying to understand the nature of the policy of the Kuomintang *vis-à-vis* Russia.

The opinion of the people in authority in some Governments on the Chino-Russian relationship is scarcely more informed than the general run of people. Whatever their opinion regarding the Chinese Nationalist Revolution, it is always regarded by many sections of the Governments of certain countries to be under the control of Russia, which, it is believed, is using the Chinese Revolution as a means to work for their destruction. That is their version of the way the destruction of capitalist civilization is to be brought about. Russia may see in the world revolution the realization of her proletarian revolution, but it is quite another thing to say that the Kuomintang is actively in the employ of Russia and that its objective foreign policies are dictated by the latter. England, which is loudest in the cry against Russia, is also the bitterest in denouncing the Russian influence in Chinese Revolution in the veiled name of "extremists" or the "extremist section" of the Kuomintang. The British Government has always believed that the anti-British feeling of the Chinese people following the May 30, 1925, affair in Shanghai is the direct result of Russian instigation and a Communist plot to break England in China. The inference is inescapable that, according to the opinion of this section of the British Government, the Chinese people could have remained the same as ten or twenty years ago if the Russian influence could have been removed, and that Russia is the only obstacle to British prosperity in China, commercial prosperity and

prosperity in prestige as of old. In February of this year Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, summarized the official opinion of the English Government regarding the Russian influence in China in a memorandum to the League of Nations that it was the "extremists" of the Kuomintang that instigated the then very powerful anti-British movement. The Press reported the memorandum in the following language :

"Further, the extremists of the Canton Nationalist Party have singled out the British people for an implacable campaign of calumny and boycott. Indeed, enmity against Great Britain has been deliberately and persistently cultivated by this section of their advisers in order to promote the solidarity of the Nationalist Party and stimulate its aggressive spirit."

It is not necessary to read many statements of this kind, coupled with many other statements from official and semi-official sources of various Governments, before one is convinced of the official point of view regarding the Chino-Russian relationship. The "extremist advisers" can only mean one kind of people—that is, the hand of Russia—which they think is the only thing that is directing the Nationalist Movement in China, and that this hand of Russia is directing it in order to destroy the power of imperialist countries, especially England. Therefore the Baldwin Government shaped its Russian policy of this year on this hypothesis. The breaking of diplomatic relationship following the raiding of the Soviet trade agency was the culmination of this policy, which is based more on fear and suspicion than on knowledge. Many writers of note held the opinion that the real reason for the British Government's Russian policy in the Far East is China. We see here once more the policy of one Government regarding another, arrived at via a third country.

The consequences of a policy such as the Russian policy of the British Government on the internal politics of England, and more particularly on world peace, is not yet clear. But it seems that the opinion characteristic of the British Government is not

confined to that Government alone. After the fall of the late Cabinet of Japan and the inauguration of the present Tanaka Government a cry was raised in Japan calling for a reversal of the foreign policy of its predecessor. In the Press no pains were spared in focussing the attention of people on what they think to be the "Red" or "Bolshevist" influence in China. Regarding the "new" foreign policy of Japan *vis-à-vis* China, Baron Mitsunojo Funakoshi, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Germany and of the House of Peers, has this to say :

"Behind all the Chinese Nationalist activities there is the sinister hand of the Third International, and the Third International is no other than Moscow. It is Japan's mission to maintain the peace of the Far East, which is to-day deliberately threatened with ruin by Soviet Russia."

Similarly, in no uncertain way the Premier and Foreign Minister of Japan, Baron Tanaka, declared in a special session of the Japanese Diet early in May this year that :

"I stated in a recent declaration that I could not feel unconcerned with regard to the Communist Party in China. It is my belief that adequate punishment should be meted out to those who use force to carry out their acts of destruction, which are not only detrimental to the interests of our fellow-countrymen but would also endanger the Empire. We therefore must view the matter with the greatest concern. Russia, I believe, must understand the situation in its bearing upon Japan, and the relations between Russia and Japan should not be affected in any way."

Well, the relations between Russia and Japan have not been affected, at any rate not so dramatically as the diplomatic relationship between England and Russia. Both Russia and Japan have reasons not to pursue a headlong policy of plunging into a breach. But it is established that England is not keeping a lonely faith in regard to the protection of civilization against Russia and in checking the Russian conflagration that, according to them, is now fast spreading in China, and may in the future spread over the whole of Asia. England and Japan are not the

only countries in relationship with Nationalist China that hold such an opinion regarding the Nationalist Movement as being directed by Russia. There are other countries that also misunderstand the policy of the Kuomintang *vis-à-vis* Russia. But these other countries do not come into the same close relationship, either of conflict or otherwise, with Nationalist China as England or Japan, and these others also do not take such leading positions in the Far East diplomacy to-day. Japan, by reason of her geographical propinquity and more particularly by reason of her past policies *vis-à-vis* China, has come to take such prominent positions. Great Britain, too, is playing a rôle that she believes cannot fail to shape the destiny of Russia in China.

Such positions of Great Britain and Japan regarding Russia's designs in China are on the reverse side an indictment against the policy of the Kuomintang *vis-à-vis* Russia. They are based not on facts but on fear and suspicion that is enhanced by the so-called documents and news of the activities of the Russian Communist Party. It is useless to deny that sometimes news, and even the so-called secret documents that have been unearthed, show quite alarming things that have been proposed for the "destruction" of civilization. These things make the first-class newspaper headlines. They are dramatic and sensational ; they serve as delightful after-dinner reading. But foreign policy of a great people in regard to another great people, which involves perhaps the destiny of mankind for many generations, is quite a different matter. To base the objective foreign policy of a country on mere newspaper headlines, or even on the result of espionage work, on raids and searches, and not on the great lines of political, social and economic forces of both countries, is the work of old-school diplomacy that led Europe to 1914. It is this danger that we have to guard against in reviewing the misunderstanding on Nationalist China's Russian policy in its manifold relationship between England and Russia as well as between Japan and Russia.

The Russian policy of the Kuomintang is one of the three cardinal policies laid down by Dr. Sun as the sure means of realizing the Nationalist Revolution. It is a policy arrived at after a long time of matured deliberation and based on certain fundamental forces and vital facts. These forces and facts, be it remarked, are not obtained by espionage work or as a haul of any raid on certain trade premises so characteristic of many Governments in arriving at their policies. If these Governments think so lightheartedly about the decision and the choice of their foreign policies, that is not the way the Russian policy of the Kuomintang is arrived at. Based on certain vital forces and facts, it is conceived in a very favourable and very certain atmosphere which renders such a policy possible and easy. This necessary atmosphere created by these forces and facts, if understood, will also render it easy to understand the Russian policy of the Kuomintang. What, then, are these forces and facts ?

First, it is patently true that no alliance or even a *rapprochement* between two countries is possible to-day if the peoples of these two countries are in temperament, and in particular in mentality, so averse to each other, let alone the interests of the two countries which are supposed to create the alliances of the past. This was true of Europe thirty years ago when the social conditions in Russia were so repugnant to the people of England that a *rapprochement* between them, so much dictated by the common necessity of facing a strong and aggressive Germany, was arrived at with much difficulty, and such repugnances had to be overcome with great effort by the statesmen of England. So to suppose to-day that such a great policy of the Kuomintang as its Russian policy could have been brought about with nothing more than a few tricks of the insiders on both sides, and particularly when these tricks are supposed to have all come from the side of Russia, is to ignore all the broad facts of human nature and the logic of history. What was true thirty years ago is certainly more true to-day when the people have progressed

in education and in democratic sentiments, and especially in mental contact brought about by improved means of exchange of ideas between the peoples of different countries. What is true of the international relationship between two European countries as England and Russia in this respect is also true between China and Russia. And what seems to be the fundamental obstacle to the resumption of normal relationship—as, for instance, between America and Russia—is by many people attributed to the differences between their two types of civilization. This may be true or may not, but one thing is sure, that is, that there exists between the two peoples such complete lack of understanding that the return to normal will not be easy for a long time to come. But this cannot be said to be the case with the relationship between the Chinese and the Russian peoples. Contact between the Chinese and the Russians have always been very close for many generations. Across the long frontier border the two peoples have always mixed together. In the diplomatic history of the Chinese there is one people that they know perhaps better than they do any other, and that is the Russians. The Chinese know the Russians, perhaps, even better than they do the Japanese. And culturally Russia is in closer relationship with the Chinese than the English is to the Russian. Russian writers of note are eagerly read and easily appreciated in China by Chinese scholars. Given such natural atmosphere, any two peoples so favourably disposed the one to the other as the Chinese and the Russian cannot fail to become fast friends, unless it is hindered by other more palpable and more powerful influences to the contrary, such as the political factor.

Secondly, fortunately the political factor that interposed in the relationship between China and Russia is also the most favourable that can be expected. It is true that Russia was for a long time, in the eighties and in the nineties, the spectre in the diplomatic horizon of the Far East. At that time and in the period following many historic events occurred mainly out of

fear for a powerful and ever-aggressive Russia. Japan contracted the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for fear of Russia, while China of that time looked on quite helplessly. But Russia of that date was more than inspiring fear in the minds of the Chinese statesmen. It was a menace to the existence of the then Chinese Empire. In the days of Li Hung-chang there was one central problem in the minds of the diplomats of China, and that was Russia. Everything was done with a view to stalemate Russia, in the hope of alleviating the danger of the Russian menace. These people were thinking in terms of Chinese history, where it had more than once happened that an alien horde was able to come to bring the country under its military power. The fear that Russia might one day occupy the country in great tracts of provinces preyed on their minds. But looking back at the fears of these statesmen of the old days in the light of to-day, one is convinced how aimlessly and erratically human affairs move, that it is the improbable that eventually happens. The Russian Revolution appeared on the horizon all of a sudden, and more sudden still the success of the Revolution of October 1917. Czarist Russia was transformed into the Russia of the proletarian. Then came the renunciation by Russia of the special rights and privileges that she had acquired in China in the Czarist days. This change of policy on the part of Russia implied more than the giving up of the specific rights and privileges ; it meant a complete change of psychology on both sides in their dealings with each other ; it meant that Russia, who was formerly a terror in China, had become a friend and all that friendship in international relationship means. And that long border-line stretching from the east to the west between the two countries has ceased being so many points of suspected hostilities and intrigues, and relationship between the two countries entered a new phase. This is the political factor that is favourable for the sort of *rapprochement* that came eventually to exist between the Kuomintang and Russia.

Thirdly, in addition to the cultural and political factors

between China and Russia that make for their friendship there is yet another which has a more important and more immediate bearing on the creation of the state of close relationship between them—that is, the revolutionary factor. Of all the influence that Russia has in the minds of the Chinese people, the Russian Revolution stands out as the most potent. Not only has the Russian Revolution demonstrated their ability to destroy the most despotic of all monarchies, but it illustrated their achievement in raising the status of that nation from the abyss of half-slavedom to that of political liberation. Dr. Sun told of his encounter with certain Russian revolutionaries in Europe in the Czarist days and before the success of the Revolution of 1911. It was said that the Russian political refugees predicted that the success of the Russian Revolution would be achieved in one hundred years from then. That impressed Dr. Sun tremendously. The speedy success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, therefore, made the most profound stir in the hearts of the Chinese people just as it made the same stir elsewhere, perhaps more so in China than elsewhere. There are reasons for it. The Chinese people, having just gone through a period of agitation and work that culminated in the elimination of the Manchus from the throne and in the establishment of a Republic, and having the memory of their 1911 still fresh in their minds, sympathize more deeply and more readily with their Russian friends than the people of the West. The Chinese people cherished their own Republic, which, although still a name, is the more cherished because in the absence of the real they cultivated the spirit even in the name. In this spirit the Chinese felt the throbbing of the Russian Revolution more keenly perhaps than people elsewhere.

In their sympathy with the Russian Revolution there is another factor of great importance that must be noted here—that is, the sympathy of the Chinese people for the success of the Russian Revolution is real and genuine, while the sympathy of Europe and America for it is interested. Inasmuch as the

sympathy of one country for another can be altruistic, that is the sympathy of China for Russia. Between Russia and the countries of the West there is the supposed or real divergence or incompatibility of their categories of civilization, as the events of Russia's relationship with the West since 1917 proved. The West is interested in one kind of civilization that they hoped would evolve from the Russian Revolution ; so when the Russian Revolution seemed to be in the direction contrary to the civilization of the West, there began a continuous campaign of intervention and blockade and the forceful isolation of Russia by the West in order to bring her to her senses. So Russia got from the hands of the West hostility, economic blockade, and punitive expeditions instead of sympathy and help. That is all because the Russians are not going in the same way as the rest of the gang of nations. On the other hand, the relationship between China and Russia is not tainted by such hostile acts on the part of China ; it is not even tainted by any suspicion in that direction. Fortunately there appears to be no incompatibility, real or imaginary, between the Chinese civilization and the new civilization Russia is experimenting. China and Russia are both proletarian or non-capitalist countries ; there is therefore no hostility on the part of China toward the sort of civilization that the Russians thought best. During all the years when the West was adopting an attitude and policy of active hostility towards Russia, China was maintaining an attitude of patient waiting and watchful disinterestedness. The people wished the Russian people well, and they wished to see the experiment of Russia a success, whatever the outcome of that experiment may be. Not only in sentiment, but in actual political facts, there was nothing that was likely to disturb the disinterestedness of the Chinese people towards Russia. There was no political alliance between China and Russia as between Russia and the Entente that would give the Chinese ground to complain of the conduct of the Russians. There were no bond-holders in China as there were in France

that would urge the Chinese Government to demand reparations. The singular absence of these factors of irritation leaves the Chinese sympathy for the Russian Revolution as pure and genuine as can be. But there is yet another factor that counts a good deal in cementing the new friendship between China and Russia.

The great majority of the Chinese people were disinterested onlookers and well-wishers of the Russian Revolution; but there is a smaller class of the Chinese that do actually wish the Russians success in their proletarian Revolution—that is, the small class of scholars and students. These are the intellectual elements of the country. To say that these people wished the Russian proletarian Revolution to succeed is not to imply that all of them favour the adoption of the same experiment in China. Some of them did, but not all. But it does show that the mind of the Chinese, which has always been speculative and philosophical, and which has not been reduced to the rut of taking the *fait accompli* of the capitalist civilization as the inevitable and the final. In their hearts they wished the Russian experiment of doing away with capitalism to succeed for the reason, if for no other, that here is being worked out a system that would do away with the horrors of the capitalist civilization. These horrors and abuses of capitalism have only been made too clear to them during the past few years by a group of young Chinese writers, and they are pathetically substantiated by their daily experience at the hands of alien capitalism in China. For China is one of the few countries that have not enjoyed the benefits of capitalism, but has tasted the bitter result of that system of foreign origin. Is it any wonder that there exists in China a group of people that would like to see the Russian experiment a success? Besides this group, the people in China in general entertain for the Russian people genuine sympathy and good wishes, for they see in the success of the Russian Revolution perhaps a way out for their own problem. Whether the Chinese people are justified in their

hope for the success of the Russian experiment, or whether the Russians themselves have ground for optimism in their own success, is a question that is out of place here. But for the Chinese they have everything to gain and nothing to lose in the success of the Russian proletarian Revolution, and that alone is sufficient to account for the wide and genuine sympathy that the people in China have for Soviet Russia.

This revolutionary factor is the determinant that settled the Russian policy of the Kuomintang. It was based on more than sympathy that one people may have for the struggles of the people of another. It was based on vital facts that existed in both countries. Both countries are similarly situated economically; both countries are striving for economic and social liberation for the people; both are fighting foreign imperialism. Their ultimate aims and the sort of State may be different, but in marching towards their final destinations they find that they have to march on a stretch of highway that is common to both of them—in short, their vital interests are similar *vis-à-vis* the world situation. Dr. Sun was the first and the foremost in bringing out the similarity of aims of these two countries before his countrymen and the necessity of their close co-operation. In his writings and speeches he constantly expressed his admiration of the Russian Revolution and its leaders in unmeasured terms. In one of his speeches on the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 he referred to the Russian Revolution in the following language :

"Russia only had her Revolution six years after the Revolution in China. But the Russian Revolutionary Party had not only destroyed the most powerful of imperialist countries, but it has gone farther in searching for a solution for the world economic and political problems. This Revolution is indeed, a thorough-going revolution. It is because their methods are good."

By this time—that is, about the time of the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924—Dr. Sun's thought on this question of Russia had materialized in quite definite and recognizable

form. On October 8, 1924, upon the occasion of the visit of the Russian fleet to Canton, an address of welcome was sent to the Russian Commander, saying :

"The relationship between the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of China is of the most intimate kind. The Russian Soviet Socialist Republic recognizes its mission in the overthrow of brutal imperialism. I have always advocated the Three Peoples' Principles, and am also fighting for the Chinese Revolution and for the world revolution. Now that you have come a long way with your fleet, the friendship between the two countries will thereby be rendered more intimate. In helping each other and in overcoming all obstacles the two countries will together serve world peace. This is a blessing not only for the two countries but also for the world."

To sum up, the Russian policy of the Kuomintang is based on the three important factors, the cultural, the political, and the revolutionary. The last factor is decidedly the most important and the immediate determinant of the three in bringing about the close relationship between these two great countries of the Far East. It is a relationship as close and intimate as the relationship between one country and another can be, short of a formal alliance. It is based on broad existing political facts, and it is dictated by political necessities on both sides. Russia on her side has as much reason as China for entering into intimate relationship with China. Her leaders saw the necessity as clearly as Dr. Sun. Russia has by her experiment on the proletarian revolution antagonized practically the whole of Europe and America. Out of all the great countries that she called the capitalist nations she has not a single friend to stand by her in her present hour of great need. On the other hand, the opinion of the whole capitalist world has been effectively mobilized against her. For the mere necessity of maintaining her existence she has had to look around for a friend. On the whole she seems to have adopted the method of concentrating her attention on her political battle with the West, while in the East she has used all her efforts to win as many friends as possible, not only among those nations that she characterized

as oppressed, big and small, but also among those nations that are capitalist, notably Japan. It is not that of a capitalist nation in the East and a capitalist nation in the West, she has the preference for the former. It is simply that although the Russian tenets declare world revolution as their final goal, practically she cannot be at war or in a state of suspended truce with the whole world. That explains why in her dealings with Japan, the only great capitalist nation in the East, she resorted to the method of conciliation. As she found that the political and revolutionary necessity of China affords much ground of revolutionary affinity, she stretched her hand across the border to make a fast and binding friendship. This friendship is one that is cemented by the spirit of revolution on both sides, and this bond has proved to be the strongest tie between any two nations. It was facilitated by the presence on the Chinese political arena of a great figure in the person of Dr. Sun, who grasped at once the immense significance of such an intimate friendship. As events during the last few years have proved, the value of such a friendship both to Russia and to China is tremendous. On many occasions its utility has been demonstrated beyond any doubt—that is, in the diplomatic field. While there is no engagement to give and to receive diplomatic support, or that there is any word of honour not to extend that diplomatic support in the form of open armed support, the value of such a relationship between China and Russia has repeatedly acted to the benefit of both countries. It is a support that is freely and generously given and sincerely appreciated on both sides. In many cases the mere existence of this close relationship between Russia and China is sufficient to have a deterrent effect on the actions of the other powerful nations in their dealings with either country.

Looking back after all these years of this profound and real friendship, which is less than an alliance and more powerful than any written alliance, but which is more than a diplomatic understanding, one realizes that the Russian policy of the

Kuomintang, advocated and consummated by Dr. Sun, is truly a great policy of a great man. It is due to Dr. Sun that what now exists between China and Russia is much more than in the form of mere sentiment of good will towards each other. It is due to Dr. Sun that it has been made a thing of concrete and recognizable form. It is also due to him that is has become an instrument of action and vitality, to command the serious thought of the Powers in their dealings with China and Russia, for the Powers know only too well that combined these two countries cannot be despised. That explains why some Powers are so interested in the supposed " Red " problem of China, as if it were a problem affecting their own destiny. That is why the Russian problem has assumed such big proportions in their own politics, notably in England. That is all due to a mistaken idea of the nature of the Russian policy in the minds of these Governments, who think that by removing the straw from the eyes of China they will be removing a beam from their own eyes. But that is all a mistake. They do not yet understand the Russian policy of the Kuomintang, and they do not yet understand the purposes that Dr. Sun had in view when he was almost standing single-handed in bringing about the realization of this great policy of his. Perhaps they will never understand it but will continue to make a meddling policy regarding it. But that will be very unfortunate.

Having sketched briefly the atmosphere in which the Russian policy of the Kuomintang was prepared and made possible, it will be of interest to examine here the successive stages through which this policy passed from the beginning to the time when it materialized into a definite policy. This policy, as so many things of the Kuomintang, began as an idea of Dr. Sun, and it was developed and shaped also by Dr. Sun. It was out and out a product of the great political genius of Dr. Sun. So in noting the actual stages of development of the Russian policy an attempt has to be made to trace Dr. Sun's contact with the leaders of the Russian Revolution from the very beginning.

Dr. Sun made references to the Russian leaders in many places of his writings and lectures. In one place he mentioned specifically his meeting with them. He told the members of the first National Congress in 1924 at a banquet, saying :

"Once I met several Russians at a library in London while I was doing some reading. After an exchange of conversation we knew that we were all revolutionary comrades. The Russians asked me, 'How long will it take the Chinese Revolution to succeed?' Confronted with that question I did not know how to answer. I was then in exile after my first defeat. Although I did not know what was the next thing to be done, I was very hopeful to begin again in a year or two, and wished to succeed. But to those Russians I did not want to give a casual answer, so I told them my most conservative estimation and said, 'Perhaps it will succeed in thirty years.' The Russians were surprised, and remarked, 'In such a big country as yours, can you succeed in thirty years?' I asked the Russians, 'How long does it take your revolution to succeed?' They answered, 'If we can succeed in one hundred years, we shall be satisfied, but now we are struggling. Although success only comes after one hundred years, we must struggle now. If we do not struggle now, we shall not succeed even in one hundred years. Because we want to succeed in one hundred years, therefore we must struggle hard at present.' After having heard what they had to say, and reflecting on what I had told them, I felt very much ashamed of myself. It was because that after my first defeat I was very anxious for the Chinese Revolution to succeed, and in order to give a guarded answer to these foreigners I made an allowance of thirty years. After I heard what they said, I knew that their project was many times surer and their spirit many times greater than mine. So I was very much ashamed of myself at that time."

There is reason to believe that the Russians mentioned were important leaders of the Russian Revolution, and the place was the British Museum, where the Russian leaders used to go for reading. Whether Lenin was there it is difficult to say, but Dr. Sun certainly met Lenin and others in Europe in the days when they were all political refugees. But Dr. Sun scarcely knew at that time that the men he met would in a short time control the destiny of Russia and they were to be a party to his great policy *vis-à-vis* Russia. Dr. Sun met the leaders of the Russian Revolution in Europe many times in the days of exile,

and together they exchanged views regarding the revolutionary work, but all these were of a private character.

When the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, and the opinion of the world was against her, Dr. Sun was one of the few men who saw that the Russian Revolution must succeed. Next year Dr. Sun was in Shanghai, and managed to send a telegram of congratulation to Lenin through his countrymen in America, for all the cable facilities being under the control of Russia's enemy, he found it impossible to wire Moscow directly. This telegram arrived under circumstances where the Russian Government was besieged on all sides by its enemies. It gave the Russians much ground for joy and for a great future in the relationship between the two countries. This telegram seemed to be the first of its kind sent by Dr. Sun to Moscow after the assumption of power by the Revolutionary party in Russia. But what appeared to be the first definite step towards the establishment of an understanding with Russia came in 1921, when the Soviet Government sent a special representative to see Dr. Sun. His mission was a double one : to report to Moscow what he observed in Canton, and to inform Dr. Sun of the real economic and political conditions in Soviet Russia. Although nothing definite resulted from that mission, much information had been obtained on the conditions in Russia, especially on the methods of Russian Revolution and on the new economic policy of Soviet Russia. That mission paved the way for the arrival of yet another and more important mission in the person of Adolf Joffe in 1922. In January of 1923 Dr. Sun and Joffe made a joint declaration in Shanghai, which was the first public indication of what was approaching in the development of the relationship between China and Russia, but few at that time grasped the full significance of the very fact that such a joint declaration had taken place. Joffe's mission was important from many points of view, notably for the full exchange of views on both sides. This exchange of views was effected quietly between Joffe and an important member of the Kuo-

mintang, Mr. Liao Chung-kai, in a certain place in Japan where Joffe went for recuperation from illness. A very brief reference must be made here to Mr. Liao Chung-kai's standing in the party and his place in the confidence of Dr. Sun in order to show the importance that Dr. Sun attached to the mission of Joffe, for Mr. Liao may be said to be the chief worker most responsible for the labour and peasant policy under Dr. Sun. Associated with Dr. Sun in the revolutionary work from the Tokyo days, Mr. Liao was one of the few of Dr. Sun's most faithful co-workers. He was assassinated on August 20, 1925. To return to the Joffe mission, he and Mr. Liao stayed in Japan for a month, during which full exchange of views was made, and the exact conditions of Soviet Russia was given to Mr. Liao. He was also informed by Joffe of the method that was used by the Russians in carrying on the work of revolution in face of great obstacles, both of domestic and foreign origin. Mr. Liao returned to Canton to report the views of Joffe to Dr. Sun and to help him to push forward the Russian policy. Equipped with the information that he was able to gather from his month of contact with Joffe, Mr. Liao was able to support Dr. Sun from the very beginning in the work of Russian policy, although there were many doubting Thomases among the members of the Kuomintang regarding that policy. That mission of Joffe in 1922 and in the beginning of 1923 practically determined the question of the Russian policy. In the summer of that year Dr. Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek to Russia to study the organization of the Russian army. Later on in the same year Borodin came in a private capacity to help Dr. Sun and the Kuomintang. Then began the career of a man who during his four years' stay in China has been so much criticized by the world at large. What Borodin did for the party of Kuomintang, be it definitely said here, is in his private character as adviser to the party. At this stage the Russian policy of Dr. Sun was already a reality, and no power on earth could have changed it, but even at that time the world was quite ignorant of the significance of

such a policy. In a few months, when January of 1924 arrived, there was held at the city of Canton and under the personal direction of Dr. Sun, the first National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang. It marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the party and it also marked the definite success of the preparations that had been made for the launching of the Russian policy. From that time on the Russian policy of the Kuomintang began to operate, and the effects of such a policy will be revealed when the history of the party in the years following 1924 are examined. It is a great policy of the Kuomintang that has fundamental influences on the direction that the party is to take in its onward march to the final goal, and it is also plain to see that it has tremendously influenced the political events of Nationalist China and also the diplomatic relationship between the Nationalist Government and foreign Powers.

The Russian policy of the Kuomintang is to-day still a vital policy of Nationalist China, in spite of all that the Powers have done to break it up. It has already a history of four years. What the future operation of the policy will bring to bear on the political situation of the Far East and the world at large it is hard to predict at present, but it is interesting to note to-day in what respects the Russians have contributed to the Kuomintang. The policy is not a secret alliance aimed at the exploitation of any country, and therefore there is no necessity to conceal the exact nature and the advantages of this policy. In this connection it is unfortunately necessary that some words have to be said to refute some charges brought by the imperialist Press against the Kuomintang on account of its Russian policy. The most virulent attackers of the policy and also the most fanatic held the fantastic view that the Russians financed the Kuomintang and that the money for carrying on the northern campaign came from Russia. The cry is often uttered that the Russians have bought their right to control the Chinese Revolution. The question is, Where did the Russians get the

money from? This charge of Russia using large amounts of money to bribe the Kuomintang in order to plot against the other Powers paints a picture where one criminal resorts to underhand means to reach another in some conspiracy against a third party. It is an insult not only to the aims of the Nationalist Movement, but also to the intelligence of the members of the Kuomintang. It seems that the Kuomintang is nothing but a machine controlled and paid by Moscow, and that the members of the party are but tools and running dogs of Bolshevist schemes. It again shows, as in so many other things, the smallness of the minds of these people, who refuse to see things in the larger and broader aspects, but choose deliberately to believe rumours in preference to truth. The broad facts are that Russia is so poor at present that she has to look for credits in the West, and that every cent that was used to finance the northern expedition last autumn came from the province of Kwangtung. There is no doubt that these deliberate rumours are created with the sole motive of discrediting the Nationalist Movement in the eyes of the uninformed and the ignorant people.

Naturally the Russians have made definite contributions to the Nationalist Revolution. These contributions are of a spiritual instead of a material character. These are in the methods and tactics of revolution that the Russians themselves have acquired in their own struggles against their counter-revolutionary opponents at home. The Russians have been so successful in their revolutionary methods and tactics that someone has ironically remarked that the Russians are as unequalled in civil warfare as the French are in international warfare. The Russian leaders are experts in revolution, so to speak. They are masters of the revolutionary art. They put their experience at the disposal of the Kuomintang. They did everything they could to help the Kuomintang to improve revolutionary methods. The military school organized at Whangpoa, Canton, to train revolutionary troops is an attempt to reorganize the revolution-

ary army on improved plans. But it is more in the political and party fields than in the military field that the contributions of the Russians have been the most conspicuous. Of this political contribution Dr. Sun said in the opening speech to the first National Congress at Canton in 1924 :

"Now we have got the method. We call the Congress at Canton in order to present this method for the discussion and adoption of all. . . . The origin of these new methods are the result of my carefully made comparative study of all the revolutionary methods of those revolutionary nations that have gone ahead of us as well as those who have come after us, which they used before as well as after the success of the revolution."

In another place he referred to the Russian Revolution in the following tribute couched in glowing terms of admiration :

"The Russians made up their mind to carry out the revolution in the hope that they would succeed in one hundred years. In no more than twenty years they have completely accomplished their aims. Formerly I expected to succeed in a few years, but it is now already thirty years and we have not succeeded very far. This is because that in methods and in spirit we are inferior to the Russians. It is because the Russians have such methods and spirit that, once the revolution is launched and meets with good opportunity, its success is great. Why is the success of the Russian Revolution so vast and so quick? It is because the Russians are firm in their purpose and are far-sighted, and they made calculations for the affairs of State for a hundred years, and they made very exhaustive plans. The quickness of success results from richness of experience. Success in everything depends upon good methods. Where do we get methods? From knowledge and experience. Experience comes from knowledge and methods come from experience. If we have methods for our revolution, our success is assured."

These words of Dr. Sun were the warm tributes of the leader of the party and the originator of this Russian policy to the services rendered by the Russians to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. It is the revolutionary method that the Russians have helped the Kuomintang to devise in carrying on the revolutionary work during the past years that constitutes the most conspicuous of their services. Of course, a small number of Russians came in private capacity to serve as advisers and

technical experts in the different branches of political and military work, but their number has never been great. The Russians are not the only foreigners that have served under the Kuomintang ; there are people of other nationalities as well.

On the point of contributions made by the Russians to the Kuomintang, it is necessary to produce here the evidence of an eminent correspondent of a great paper, who belongs to England, a nation which is supposed to be the strongest against the so-called Russian influence in China. England—at least, the intelligent and informed elements of the English population—are not opposed to Chinese Nationalism, but it is a fact that the British Government is deadly against Russia in China, so this evidence from the apparently unfavourable quarter on this question of the services of the Russians to China ought to put a stop once for all time to any doubt. This is what Arthur Ransome, of the *Manchester Guardian*, has to say on this matter:

"What, precisely, has Russia done in furthering the movement of the Chinese Nationalists? All that she could. I do not believe that she has given them much help in the way of money, for the simple reason that she has not got much to give. . . . Russia's main contribution to the success of the Nationalists has been one of ideas and methods. She has done this without the need of a non-existent army of expensive agents.

"Her most obvious contribution of this kind has been the putting at the disposal of the Chinese Nationalists experience gained in the Russian civil wars in organizing an army whose allegiance was less to an individual general than to an idea. . . ."

In diplomacy every nation is a realist. One need not deny the sincerity of Russia to carry out a world revolution, but one may question what, after all, does Russia want from Nationalist China for her services ? Obviously, all the highly idealist catch-phrases about world revolution to the contrary, Russia must live her from-day-to-day life in the family of hostile nations. They are there in spite of Russia's wishes, and she must adjust herself to her surroundings. World revolution is a matter of

to-morrow, but to-day Russia needs a friendly and strong China. That is the central aim of Russia's policy towards China. This is evident from all her actions in the Far East diplomacy. Besieged on every hand in the West, her position is isolated. To break this state of isolation she wants friends in the East. She has tried to make friends with Japan, and in this direction she has succeeded to a certain extent. In general, she wants no quarrel with any Power at all in the East. She has received untold indignities at the hands of Chang Tso-lin, but has swallowed them without making the situation worse than it was. Her legation at Peking was searched, but she did nothing beyond protest. Regarding China particularly, she wants, first and last, a friendly China. China is too big and too strong potentially for her to antagonize, and she must have her as a friend and not as an enemy. But does she want a strong China ? This is not so obvious, but it will not take much to explain.

The question whether Russia wants a strong China or a weak China depends on what she wants her for. If she wants her as a place of future conquest, leaving out for argument's sake the factor of China herself, she will obviously want a weak China. If what she wants of China is a friend to stand by and a good neighbour in her time of need, she will naturally want a strong China. If Russia had not had her revolution, and the Czar were still on the throne, we would certainly have ground to doubt the sincerity of Russia to want China to be strong. But as it is, Russia for many years will not be able to embark on an aggressive attitude for the purpose of conquest, either territorially or economically, even if she had the intention to do so. The minimum that she wants to secure in China is that she shall not be used by any one of her many strong enemies of the West and Japan in the East as a base against herself. A weak China, constantly under the influence of the militarist and imperialist countries as she has been made so by her Tuchuns and military bandits, is a constant menace to Russia, just as a strong and prosperous China must justly and necessarily be the

enemy to the countries who are continuously endeavouring to prolong the life of exploitation and of unequal treaties on her. The interests of Russia and of the other Powers *vis-à-vis* China are, therefore, in sharp conflict. That is the fundamental reason why England and Japan, for instance, and the other Powers to a less apparent degree, decry the so-called Russian influence in China. That is also the reason why the Russian policy of the Kuomintang receives so much misunderstanding at the hands of these Powers.

The question, it may be asked, is: Will these Powers succeed in breaking up the Russian policy of Kuomintang? They might have done it by force if conditions had permitted them to do so, but the Chinese Nationalist Movement is too complicated, from their point of view, to permit them to use the simple measure of force. But there is sufficient ground to say that, short of employing force, the Powers have done everything in their power to accomplish this end. They have used diplomatic means and they have carried on intensive and unmitigating propaganda for several years, from our Canton days to the present, to achieve this purpose. The universal and convenient form of such propaganda is "communism." But for a time they did not succeed, and were more likely to strengthen the Russian policy of the Kuomintang in their very attempts to break it up. History abounds in such lessons. In the nineties and in the years before 1914 the policy of Imperial Germany was to break up the Entente between England and France and between England and Russia, but as a result the Entente was for that very fact strengthened, until it brought about the downfall of the German Empire. In all such things as the Russian policy of the Kuomintang of to-day and the Entente of Europe of yesterday, foreign interference is worse than futile. What the future of the Russian policy of the Kuomintang will be it is difficult to say at present, but one thing is demonstrably clear—that is, in trying to destroy the Russian policy of the Kuomintang the Powers will only injure themselves.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

It is said that the Kuomintang split on the question of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party. Is this assertion true? In order to understand the exact nature of the split of the Kuomintang it is necessary to examine thoroughly the question of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and to make a survey of the whole field. It is important to know the reasons for the admission of the members of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang, and then to test the results of the co-operation in the light of what has actually happened during the past two years.

To begin with, a few words may be devoted to the Chinese Communist Party. It is comparatively a young party. Its beginning as a party with definite organization dated from 1920 with the organization of the railway strike on the Peking and Hankow Railway at one of its northern depots, Changshin-tien, near Peking. Its organization from the very beginning has been a secret one, and it has maintained absolute secrecy in all matters relating to the party. The initiation into the party is by two steps. One has to pass a long period of probation by entering the Young Communist Order. The period of probation varies with the amount and the quality of work that one performs, and at the end of this period one is actually admitted into the party as a full member, and is only then entitled to the privileges and activities on an equality with all other members. The number of its membership at first was very small, and at the time of the massacre of the Chinese by the British authorities at Shanghai on May 30, 1925, the number of the Chinese Communist Party amounted to but a

few thousands. But its membership has since that time greatly increased. That affair gave a great impetus to the growth of the Chinese Communist Party. During the past two years the growth of the party has been a phenomenon, and it is authoritatively stated that its membership increased four-fold during the past two years. Between eighty thousand and ninety thousand is a close estimate of the total number of the membership of the Chinese Communist Party, and of this number about thirty thousand belonged to the Young Communist Order, leaving about fifty thousand full members. That was the condition before the present persecution of the Communists in China started. Since then a great set-back has started. A great number of the members of the Chinese Communist Party have been killed and a still greater number have been driven into exile abroad. But the greatest number came from those who have voluntarily withdrawn from the party by declaring their intentions in the Press as a result of the wave of persecution in China. To-day perhaps only one-half of the members remain.

It is interesting to note the type of men and women that were drawn into the Chinese Communist Party. At first only students came in, led by some intellectuals. Professors and students of universities were among the first recruits of the party. Later in the stages of the development, workmen began to come in, as the party is essentially one of the workmen and the peasants. Peasants also joined, but in very small numbers. The main strength of the Chinese Communist Party consists of students, who are its leaders, and the workmen who are the rank-and-file of the party and who also furnished a number of leaders. Its influence with labour in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton and many other commercial centres, as Changsha in the interior, is very powerful. One may safely say that all the great labour strikes in Shanghai and elsewhere are directed in one way or another by this party, for it is the party of labour. For obvious reasons the party has to concentrate on labour,

for labour is concentrated in the great cities, while the peasants are scattered in the great country and cannot be easily reached, especially under the present conditions in China. As regards the student and the workmen elements in the party, it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction between them, as in many cases the students in the middle schools are so poor that they had to go to work in some factory, and very soon they become full-fledged Communists. This kind of case has been noted in many instances. They reflect the economic condition of the people that fundamentally gave rise to the Communist Party in China.

The Chinese Communist Party aims to bring about a socialist regime in China. That is its purpose, and it needs no apology for that fact. Socialism as a social ideal has always found in China, as in other countries, advocates who would like to see the injustice of society removed once for all time and the life of the people regulated according to principles of humanity and not force and coercion. That is essentially the stand of the Chinese Communists as well as that of Communists of other countries. There were Socialists and Communists without number in Chinese history, but the Socialists in Chinese history belonged to the type of social philosophers whose ideas remained in the realm of the abstract. The Chinese Communist Party of to-day differs from these social philosophers of history in that it is a political party, and that as a political party with definite non-Utopian doctrines it aims to put these principles into effect in the society of the present day. It goes without saying that the success of the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a tremendous influence on the growth of the Chinese Communist Party. That is a fact that everybody can see. But there is another factor which has perhaps more to do with the development of the Chinese Communst Party than the Russian Revolution—that is, the continued worsening of the political and economic conditions in China since 1911 due to the incessant civil warfare and to the efforts of many

imperialist Powers to prolong this state of chaos in order to put off the day when their reign of special privileges, based on the unequal treaties, would be terminated. Militarism and imperialism and their mutual help to strengthen each other in China are the direct causes that drive many young men and women into embracing a party that aims to free the country from this double yoke in the first instance, and then to introduce into it what they think to be the best order of society. With this fact fully grasped in mind it is not difficult to see why Soviet Russia exerts to-day such a tremendous influence on the Chinese Communist Party.

The type of men and women that are enlisted in the services of the Chinese Communist Party and the kind of work that they have performed at this stage of the Chinese Revolution speaks volumes for the devotion to a cause that is entirely outside of their own interests. This one cannot refuse to accept if one is at all acquainted with the activities of that party and if one is not politically so blind that one cannot see it. Especially to-day, when the Communists in China are a persecuted race, the services that the party rendered to the Chinese Revolution after the inauguration of co-operation between the two parties should not be left unnoticed. The questions whether the order of society that they conceived to be the best, and whether the Chinese Communists are so Utopian as not to be cognizant of the actual conditions of the country, should not prevent us from making a due evaluation of the work of the party and its men and women in an impartial spirit. The men and women joined the party with the intention of sacrifice for the cause of the masses, especially for the labourers and the peasants who in Communist terminology formed the Chinese proletariat. The spirit of sacrifice and of endurance for hardship is not limited to individual instances, but widely prevalent among the ranks of the Chinese Communists. In general, the Chinese Communists are politically clean, and they are true to their principles. They do not join

the party with the intention of using the membership as a stepping-stone to office and power, and this is especially true when they had to work under the teeth of the militarists. Although there was a time during this spring when to join the Chinese Communist Party was almost a fashion, and even many militarist generals were waiting on the threshold to be admitted, the present persecution has served to purge the party of all such opportunist elements. The first task that lies before every Communist when he joins the party is to work among the labourers, and to organize them sometimes under great secrecy and under danger to their own lives. This entails great hardship, and in many instances the work of the Communist worker in some factory or in some mine is so heavy that health is prematurely ruined, and death came upon him at a very early age, for in addition to work as one of the workmen he has to carry on the work that the party has entrusted to him. The Communist worker in a factory is always a fellow-workman. He may be a student, but he goes to that factory to seek employment as an ordinary workman, for it is only so that he is able to get at the workman and enlist his sympathy and, most important of all, to win his confidence. He may be the son of a rich family, who has embraced the communist faith, but after he was sworn into the party, and he goes to work among the workers, he must live as a simple workman. And in the conditions of the Chinese workman to-day this means a standard of living that is hardly speakable. To cite a particular instance, there was a university student who came to Hankow to organize the ricsha coolies. The first thing was to rent a ricsha and pull it on the street as any other ricsha coolie. This man did pull a ricsha for several months, eating and sleeping in their society. During the leisure hours he would speak to his fellow-coolies of the pitiable conditions of their present life and the advantages and the necessity of organizing themselves into a union. In the end he succeeded in his purpose, and the union of the ricsha coolies of Hankow

was formed. This instance may be multiplied without number, and it illustrates the kind of hardship that a Chinese Communist has to undergo at present when the whole of the power of the Government is against him. If one compares the comparative security that the Communists in other countries, in France and in Germany, and even in England and in the United States, and the comparative immunity from immediate danger of death of the Communists of these States, one can appreciate the spirit of the Chinese Communists, although he does not agree with the communist doctrine. In short, one may say that the Chinese Communists are among the best type of the Chinese youth, and to-day it is precisely this part of the best of Chinese youth that is being killed off or driven abroad.

In principle and in political outlook the Chinese Communists are Marxists. They aim at bringing about a state of society based on the dictatorship of the Chinese proletariat. They stand on the class basis, which is the starting-point of their politics, and the theoretical discussion whether there is any class distinction in the present-day China does not interest them. They would like to see in China a revolution similar to that through which Russia underwent in 1917. They would like to introduce in China a Government on similar lines with the regime that is to-day ruling in Soviet Russia. Specifically, the Chinese Communist Party would like to nationalize all the means of production of the country, following the example of Soviet Russia. Consequently it wishes to nationalize the land of the country, and the question of the agrarian revolution becomes one of the most dominant issues of the Chinese Revolution in the views of the Chinese Communists. Hence their feverish attempts to organize the peasants in Nationalist territory last year and this year, following the victory of the revolutionary army—in fact, they contend that the agrarian revolution will be an acid test for the success or the failure of the Chinese revolution for the simple reason that it involves the economic life of the vast masses of the Chinese peasants.

Hence they stand for the expropriation of the great landlords of the country in favour of the peasants, who are poor and without land. They stand for the organization of the labourers and peasants into a powerful force for the establishment of the dictatorship of the Chinese proletariat. They also stand for the arming of the workers and the peasants as the military force for the Socialist Revolution in China—in fact, a small number of workers were armed in some places, but only for a short period, and in many provinces under Nationalist authority the peasants were to a small extent armed. In short, the Chinese Communist Party stands on the class basis of the labourers and the peasants for bringing about a proletarian revolution, starting with the nationalization of all means of production as a preliminary step to the establishment of a socialist order of society. These are the principles of the Chinese Communist Party; but whether one agrees with them or not is another question. But one cannot blame the Chinese Communists for holding these views, and still more one should not wish to kill them for holding them, as the persecutors of Communists are doing to-day in China. One cannot even blame the Communist for wishing to introduce into China some such Government as obtains in Soviet Russia, for to the Chinese Communists who have been to Russia, and who have compared the economic conditions of Russia to-day with those before the days of recovery, the orderly government of Russia is certainly preferable to the chaotic conditions under the imperialist and militarist rule of China. The Chinese Communist Party in China, although being persecuted, is a powerful political force to-day, with which whatever party wishes to rule China in the future will have to reckon, whether it likes it or not. Their activities in China during the past year and part of this year have produced events of far-reaching consequence, which it is the purpose of this and partly of the following chapters to elucidate.

There remains one word on the relationship between the

Chinese Communist Party and the Third International that has its seat in Moscow. The Third International is a body composed of representatives of the Communist Parties of the world. The Chinese Communist Party is a member of this organization, and is like all other members subject to its orders. Of course, Soviet Russia has a predominating influence in it. But all international organizations are usually under the influence of some leading country, and so in the same way the English are dominating the League of Nations. The fact that the Third International is having its seat in Moscow ought not to damage its international character from the communist point of view, just as the League of Nations is not confined to the territory of Switzerland. The Third International now pays great attention to the Chinese Revolution not only because the Chinese Communist Party is a member of it, but also for the more weightier reason that the success of the Chinese Revolution will have a great influence on the revolutions of other countries, particularly in the Far East. In this respect the future of India cannot fail to be influenced. Again, Soviet Russia is the only country that is now operating on the communist basis. According to the point of view of Soviet Russia, the success of the Chinese Revolution must strengthen her own position and broaden communism as a basis of world economy, if it can be brought about in the fashion of the Russian Revolution of 1917 under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In the eyes of the Third International the Chinese Revolution is but another struggle of capitalism against socialism carried on in a vast area and affecting the future of hundreds of millions of the world's population. It will determine whether the future of the development of China will be along the lines of capitalism or along the lines of socialism. Looked at in this light, the importance of the Chinese Revolution to Russia herself cannot be ignored, and so to the rest of the world. And diplomatically Russia cannot stand isolated, and a friendly China based on similar doctrines is of immense

importance to her. That is a very natural view for Soviet Russia to maintain. The Chinese Communist Party is sometimes charged with being the tools of Soviet Russia; but looking at the question from the view of the Communists, and from their view of the solidarity of world Communists, the receiving of orders of the Chinese Communist Party from the Third International cannot be interpreted in the same light as the citizens of one country listening to the orders of another country and betraying their own interests. As a matter of fact, the Chinese Communists are as a rule so clean in politics that it would be entirely beside the point to charge them with being the agents of another country. Such charges are usually the result of prejudice of their political opponents. Whether the Chinese Communist Party should receive orders from the Third International is another question. But from the view of the Chinese Communists it seems that this should be determined by the fact whether that body is able and qualified to direct the activities of the Chinese Communists at such a great distance. If it is to discharge this function properly at such a great distance from the actual scene, it is important that its opinions should be sound and based on correct information. While it is true that the Third International has devoted a very great amount of attention to the question of the Chinese Revolution, and its analysis, supported by the experience of the Russian Revolution, has often been very valuable, it often occurs that its diagnosis is not based on the actual facts. The conditions in China as involved in the revolution are very complicated, and it is extremely difficult for the Third International to get at them from Moscow. As it is at present, the solidarity of the Communist Parties is maintained sometimes at the expense of truth as to the real condition of the Chinese Revolution.

The above is briefly, and it is hoped correctly, a statement of the position of the Chinese Communist Party. Many people do not agree with its political principles, and honest disagree-

ment in politics is a sign of political health instead of weakness. The application of the principles of the Chinese Communist Party to China under the present conditions, both with reference to the internal conditions and to the international situation of China to-day, is a question of such vital importance that it is worth the closest attention of all that have the interest of the Chinese Revolution at heart. In discussing this question it is also assumed that political prejudice would be eliminated as far as it is honestly possible to do so. To the members of the Chinese Communist Party as well as to the members of the Kuomintang this warning against political prejudice applies. But that does not touch the question under review—that is, the question of the co-operation between the two parties—for when the co-operation was brought about by Dr. Sun the Chinese Communist Party fully knew that Dr. Sun did not share its view regarding the application of communist doctrines in China. If this question was not even raised at that time, it cannot be said that the Kuomintang split because the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang quarrelled on the application of communism in China. It would indicate that one must seek elsewhere for reasons of the split of the Kuomintang. One thing, however, must be recognized : the Chinese Communist Party has risen from a very modest beginning to the position of great influence in a surprisingly short time. The rise of any political party in history cannot be compared with the rapid rise of the Chinese Communist Party. The rapidity with which it developed was unparalleled. Of course, the Kuomintang has contributed to its growth by working hand in hand with it for several years, but that is not the main reason for its growth. The main reason for its growth must be looked for in the political and economic conditions of the country. The phenomenal growth of the Chinese Communist Party is therefore worth the attention of anyone who wishes to study the political and social conditions of China to-day. Its position in China is definitely established.

The attitude of the general run of people in China is sceptical towards the Chinese Communist Party. The number of labourers under its organization is still small compared with the number still to be brought under its influence. Its work with the peasants has just broken the ground. The small merchants and shop-keepers are in general opposed to it, while the attitude of the big merchants and the class of the *comporadores* engaged in import and export trade are hostile to it. They have reasons to be so, for one of the principal aims of communism in China is the destruction of private capitalism as a first step towards a socialist order of society. While there is no big accumulation of wealth in the European or the American sense in private hands in China, there is a class of rich merchants who have accumulated wealth by trade or by engaging in manufacture. The work of the Chinese Communist Party in organizing the shop workers and the labourers during the first quarter of this year has given these merchants something to remember for all their life. At that time organization of the labourers and the shop workers went on with such success that the merchants felt handicapped at every turn by the regulations of the unions, from the hours of work that they are permitted to keep open their shops to the right of dismissal. The Chinese factory owners as well as the foreign owners are particularly in dread of labour strikes, which aim at the reduction of working hours, the increase of wages, and the improvement of working conditions. There is another group of men in China who are hostile towards the Chinese Communist Party. They are the class of landlords and the rich men of the country. These men were embittered by the organization of the farmers' unions. Before that time there was no organization of any kind at all among the farmers of the country, and consequently the farmers must suffer all kinds of hardships at the hands of the unscrupulous landlords without any means of self-redress. They welcome the farmers' unions as the only organ through which their voice may be

heard. Lastly, among the intellectual class of China there is a very strong opposition to communism. It has been the few among them that have embraced the communist faith, while the majority of them are hostile.

Foreign nationals in China are as a rule against the Chinese Communist Party. They have nothing good to say of the Communists. The reasons are plain. They are owners of businesses or of factories. In China to-day foreign nationals own all sorts of factories, from spinning mills to cigarette factories. Some of the biggest industries of the country are owned by foreigners, and the number of workmen that they employ runs to tens of thousands of hands. But the Chinese Communist Party is a party of the labourers. It is easy to understand how the strike of a few thousand workmen would affect the foreign owners of these factories—in fact, the struggle of the Chinese workmen is in the first instance directed at the foreign owners, as they own more of the factories of the country than the Chinese themselves.

The existence of the Chinese Communist Party side by side with the Kuomintang was a problem of the first magnitude to the Chinese Revolution in the years immediately before the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924. In those years the Kuomintang did not even control the whole of the province of Kwangtung, and its authority within the confines of the city of Canton was sometimes disputed. While the principles of the Kuomintang differ fundamentally from those of the Chinese Communist Party, the two parties had the common interest in pushing the Nationalist Revolution to a successful finish. The Kuomintang aimed to free China from its three arch-enemies, feudalism, militarism, and imperialism, and construct a State based on the principles of the Kuomintang. For the Chinese Communist Party it is also necessary for China to free herself from these three enemies before a Socialist State could be introduced. That is the point of view of the Chinese Communists. Their ultimate aims as to the kind

of society are different, but before the ultimate aims are reached there is a common stretch of ground that the two parties may travel together. That is the essence of the co-operation of the two parties. There was no attempt on the part either of the Kuomintang or of the Chinese Communist Party to compromise any of their principles to bring about a sort of fusion of the two parties. They frankly recognized the irreconcilability of the principles of the two parties as regards the ultimate reconstruction of society. They also recognized that their fundamental difference in principles should not prevent them from working together in the common task that is lying in front of both of them. Whether the future society shall be one based on the principles of the Kuomintang or one based on the doctrines of communism, the present immediate task is to rid the country of the enemies that make any kind of reconstruction impossible.

On the part of the Kuomintang it was recognized that in the interest of revolution it was necessary to unite all forces of revolution of the country, and out of these form a strong, united force to crush the forces of reaction that kept the country on the verge of ruin for years. In those years the reactionary forces of the country were particularly strong. Anything that tends to strengthen the revolutionary forces must be in the interest of the revolution. Since the Chinese Communist Party is also a revolutionary party in the country, it was necessary that it and the Kuomintang should work together. That was the sole reason and the logic for Dr. Sun's policy in inaugurating the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. There was no wish on the part of the Kuomintang that the members of the Chinese Communist Party, in joining the Kuomintang, should forsake or even compromise their own principles and adopt those of the Kuomintang. Li Ta-chao, the Chinese Communist leader that was executed by Chang Tso-lin after his raid on the Russian Embassy at Peking with the connivance of the so-called

Diplomatic Corps of foreign Powers there, was the first one to join the Kuomintang. He told Dr. Sun that in joining the Kuomintang he could not give up his membership in the Chinese Communist Party. Dr. Sun told him that he could come into the Kuomintang to work for the Chinese Revolution and at the same time work for the Chinese Communist Party. So when the Chinese Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang it was understood that they came in to help the Kuomintang to carry on the work of revolution, and that it was further recognized that their work as Communists was not inconsistent with their work as members of the Kuomintang. It was only the generous nature and the political genius of Dr. Sun, which embraced all and saw all in the interest of the Chinese Revolution, that could bring about the policy of co-operation between the two parties. The policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party became one of the three corner-stone policies of Dr. Sun, the other two being the labour and peasant policy and the Russian policy. Beginning with the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924, the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party was definitely inaugurated. From that time onward the members of the Chinese Communist Party were admitted to all the fields of activity of the Kuomintang without any distinction on party basis. Its members served on the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and also in ministerial capacities in the Nationalist Government. When they were admitted there was no disability or qualification attached to their membership. Its members therefore had a dual membership, one in the Kuomintang and the other in the Chinese Communist Party. They joined the Kuomintang as any other people, only they were allowed to retain their own membership and to pursue their own activities of communist propaganda and work.

At the time when Dr. Sun decided on the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party there were very

few members in the Kuomintang who could see their way to the adoption of such a policy. Even among the close associates of Dr. Sun he found it difficult to convince them and get their support at the beginning. The rank-and-file of the party were naturally opposed to it. But it was only the courage, the foresight, and the political genius of Dr. Sun that could choose such a course and policy in front of opposition of such magnitude. It was his personality alone that finally won over the opposition to his views. Seeing what he decided was in the broad interest of the party, his prestige soon conquered all opposition. Those who opposed Dr. Sun in this policy contended, as people still contend to-day, that the Chinese Communist Party, being a party having radically different principles from the Kuomintang, would surely utilize its admission into the Kuomintang to further its own purposes. They feared that it might be the beginning of the disappearance of the Kuomintang as a party, since the young and the militant Communist Party would surely attempt to absorb the older Kuomintang. They said that the Communists would try to create trouble for the Kuomintang from the inside and prepare for its final substitution by the Chinese Communist Party. The worst that they feared was that when the time came the Communists would try to effect the transfer of power by a *coup d'état* against the Kuomintang. Their psychology in regard to this policy was that of fear. They were sincerely afraid that the admittance of the Communists into the fold of the Kuomintang was like the kind-heartedness of the Arabian who let his camel come into his tent inch by inch, until in the end the animal, which had in the meanwhile gained complete entrance to the tent, kicked his master out of it. It was, in short, a psychology dominated by the fear complex. All these misgivings were not unknown to Dr. Sun, but he took a different point, and looked at it from the broader interest of the Chinese Revolution and not from the narrow point of possession and retention of political power. On this occasion, as on many

another important occasion, Dr. Sun held his purpose in the face of opposition from nearly the whole of the party. In this as well as in the other cases future events proved that he was right. His judgment on this and other important questions was based on the broad interest of the country. Dr. Sun was not blind to any of the arguments against the adoption of this policy, but he thought that all the things that they were afraid of might be left to take care of themselves, and the immediate task for the Kuomintang was to unite all the revolutionary forces of the country, and he would not let the narrow considerations, based on fear and other interests, interfere with his main purpose. The Kuomintang must proceed to conquer the political power of the country, and in this work the wise policy was not to scatter the revolutionary forces of the country but to unite them. When the Kuomintang has conquered the political power in China, if there is any danger from any quarter the party would be in a position to take care of it. From the historical point of view there was another reason why the Kuomintang need not entertain fear of the Communists. What may come in the future cannot be influenced to-day. If communism is what is wanted by the future generations of the country, there is no power on earth to prevent it from adopting communism. If it is not wanted, then the question may be left to take care of itself. In either case, why worry to-day? It was in this spirit that the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party was decided upon by Dr. Sun.

On the part of the Chinese Communist Party the question of joining the Kuomintang and co-operating with it in the work of the revolution was by no means a simple one. Inside the Communist Party there was a group that was opposed to it. They feared that it would mean the absorption of the younger party by the older party. Then there is the more basic reason that the Chinese Communist Party should maintain its own identity and operate as an independent organization,

even at the sacrifice of persecution. They argued that the Chinese Communist Party, being a party of labourers and peasants, it would be wrong to identify itself with a party which, after all, is different from it in fundamental principles. This view was not only entertained by a group of Chinese Communists, but was also shared by a group of members of the Third International, who have since formed themselves into what is known as the opposition among the Russian Communist Party on this and on other questions. But the majority of the Chinese Communists and of the Third International was for co-operating with the Kuomintang. The benefits that would accrue from co-operation for the future of the Chinese Revolution were too big to be over-ruled by other considerations based purely on party reasons. In coming into the Kuomintang it would join forces with it for the work of the Chinese Revolution, and that was a policy dictated by common sense as well as by common interests of the two parties. But it also conferred a specific advantage on the Chinese Communist Party, which, being a young party and having to operate in a country hostile to it, had so far to work secretly among the workers and the peasants. By joining the Kuomintang it could work more openly in any territory under the authority of the Kuomintang. It was enabled to reach more people than it was able to do before. Standing alone, the Chinese Communist Party would not be able to show its face in the country, but by joining the Kuomintang it was able to do many things that it was unable to do independently. The Kuomintang alone had great prestige among the masses of China, due to its history in the Chinese Revolution, and the Chinese Communist Party was able to share this prestige in pushing its work among the masses after it had joined the Kuomintang.

Although Dr. Sun was able to over-ride all opposition in the adoption of the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party, and to a certain extent was able to convince

the rank-and-file of the party, it seemed that the conviction was not very deep. Most of his close associates acquiesced in his policy under the pressure of his great personality and his tremendous prestige, but they were not convinced. For a variety of reasons, a group of men remained alien to the weighty reasons for the adoption of this policy. Although they did not voice their lack of conviction when the Doctor was alive, they remained doubting Thomases. A small number of Dr. Sun's associates were convinced of the wisdom of his action and remained loyal to his policy from the beginning till to-day, and are still loyal when his policy is considered as out of date. So one can discern here the beginning of the cleavage of opinion within the party regarding the co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party. But if this cleavage of opinion is only on the question of co-operating or not with the Communists, then it could not have assumed the alarming proportions it assumed to-day, culminating in the split of the party. While no one minimizes the importance of the question, it is unfortunately true that the cleavage of opinion now evidenced on the co-operation with the Communists runs through all the fundamental policies of the Kuomintang and is not confined to the relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. It is the cleavage between two types of mind, of political outlook, and of the whole of the political philosophy of the two groups within the Kuomintang. That is a very important fact to remember for anyone who attempts to understand the present condition of the Chinese Revolution and the events that have transpired in China this year. The same men who are wrecking the policy of co-operation with the Communists are also opposing the other policies of the Kuomintang. Although they say that they are for the interest of labourer and peasant, they do not have the confidence of these two classes, for they are not at heart the real supporters of the labourer and peasant policy of the Kuomintang. So also with regard to the third of Dr. Sun's policies, the Russian policy ; it is not under-

stood by them. As a matter of fact, the three policies of Dr. Sun form a harmonious whole and are dominated by a unifying spirit. One cannot profess to be loyal to the one and express disagreement with the rest. The underlying principle of all three is the interest of the Chinese Revolution. Leaving aside the tactical reason for the co-operation with the Communists, one cannot be said to be loyal to the interests of the labourers and the peasants and at the same time opposed to working with a party that is essentially the party of the labourers and the peasants. Even with regard to the Russian policy, it is clear that it is a policy built on principle and not on political and diplomatic expediency alone. On all these questions and on the fundamental principles that underlie them these two groups within the Kuomintang have differences of opinion that are irreconcilable. The two types of mind differ fundamentally in the way they look at the nature, the character, and the final outcome of the Chinese Revolution as a whole. The one wanted it to be purely a political revolution, and the other wanted it to be not merely a political revolution, but a social revolution as well. Following the conventional terminology of politics, the one may be called the Right Wing and the other the Left Wing of the Kuomintang.

It is necessary here to state fully the positions of these two wings of the Kuomintang, for the struggles within the party since the reorganization in 1924 to the party split in 1927 are really the struggles between these two wings. One easily recalls the circumstances under which the party was founded at the last quarter of the last century. It was principally due to the defeats and humiliations that the Manchu Government suffered at the hands of foreign Powers that Dr. Sun started to organize the revolutionary party in order to overthrow the defunct Government and save the country from being lost. The Kuomintang received practically the unanimous support of the whole country, for the cause of defending the country against foreign encroachment was a popular one. The elements of the

country that came forward to support the Kuomintang, which was known at that time as the revolutionary party, were students, intellectuals who formed the brains of the movement, and merchants who contributed to the funds of the revolution. Particularly the students abroad and the Chinese merchants overseas took a decisive rôle in the work which was crowned with the overthrow of the Manchu Government in 1911. At that time the people were thinking, with the example of Japan in their mind, that with the overthrow of the corrupt Government and the establishment of a Republic there would begin a reign of prosperity within, and internationally China would be strong again. The elements that supported Dr. Sun in the Revolution of 1911 were the bourgeois elements of the country, thinking in terms not of the sufferings of the masses of the country, but how to make China prosperous and strong. In supporting Dr. Sun to carry out successfully the Revolution of 1911, these elements rendered a meritorious service to China. But with the advent of the Republic and the passing of fifteen years after 1911, they found that the reign of prosperity within and power abroad did not arrive, and they were sadly disappointed. Some of these men who came from the bourgeois elements achieved important positions in the party due to their long association with Dr. Sun. These men have exercised great influence in the affairs of the party for many years. The history of the party after the establishment of the Republic was understandable if one remembers that under Dr. Sun there was a bourgeois element who had a controlling influence in the affairs of the party. Although this bourgeois element had associated with Dr. Sun for many years it never shared his views as to what the Chinese Revolution ought to bring about. Dr. Sun's ideal of social reconstruction remained alien to them from beginning to end. He had on many occasions ground to complain that his principles were not understood by his followers. The reason was not far to seek. The bourgeois elements had come to assist him to carry

out a bourgeois revolution. The idea of a social revolution was wholly beyond their understanding. That is the fundamental reason why these men were opposed to the policy of co-operation with the Communists and other policies of a social character of the Kuomintang. These men, born and reared in the society which shaped and coloured their outlook, cannot adapt their thought to the new set of conditions that have arisen in the decade following the establishment of the Republic in 1911. The notable events that contributed to bring about the new set of conditions are the continued worsening of the conditions in China, politically and economically, due to a variety of reasons, and the success of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The times have changed, but the bourgeois elements of the Kuomintang failed to see the signs written large on the wall.

Dr. Sun was then leading a party which consisted actually of two elements, the bourgeois Right Wing and the socially-minded Left Wing. The two groups differed in temperament and in political outlook. They differed fundamentally in the way in which they looked at the Chinese Revolution. That was the real line of demarcation between the Right and the Left Wings of the Kuomintang. This difference was not noticed before 1911, for at that time the common object before the party was the overthrow of the Manchu Government. But in the years between 1911 and 1924 the difference began gradually to crystallize into definite forms. For thirteen years, 1911–24, the Right Wing of the party had exercised a powerful sway under Dr. Sun to bring about a regime that would conform to their ideology, but they have failed. With the reorganization of the Kuomintang the ascendency to authority of the Left Wing within the party may be said to have definitely begun. Of the effect of the influence of the Right Wing on the development of the party it would be interesting to notice what Dr. Sun himself had to say, for no one was more conscious of the effect of this wing than himself. Time and again it was this

group that exercised a deciding influence on the turn of events at the critical moments. For instance, it was this group that defeated Dr. Sun's purpose in the Provisional Constitution of 1911, the instrument that played such an important part in the years of constitutional struggle against militarist adventurers, and saved the young Republic from premature death more than once. Dr. Sun defended the Provisional Constitution because it was the only instrument in which the Republican form of Government was laid down. But he was opposed to the way in which it was drawn up. He had thought that the Provisional Constitution should not only embody the organization of the Central Government, but also the principles of practical local government, which would enable the people to exercise the real power of democracy. But this group ignored the purpose of Dr. Sun, and failed to incorporate in the Provisional Constitution the system of local self-government. The history of the Chinese Republic proved that such a Government cannot survive the onslaught of military adventurers. Speaking on the failure of the 1911 Revolution, Dr. Sun said: "In the campaign of 1911 I was obstructed by my fellow-workers from putting into effect my revolutionary proposals." Consequently he resigned from the Presidency, and on this action he said:

"In the beginning of the Republic I strongly urged the putting into effect of the revolutionary proposals in order to reach the aim of revolutionary reconstruction and to realize the Three Principles. But the members of the party strongly disagreed with me. Repeated arguing and explanation on my part availed nothing, for they thought that I was too idealistic and that it was easy to know but difficult to do. But was I too idealistic or the members themselves too ignorant? I was sadly disappointed. Revolutionary destruction and revolutionary reconstruction should follow and accompany each other. In refusing to begin revolutionary reconstruction after the revolution, the term revolutionary reconstruction became an empty phrase. Since there is no revolutionary reconstruction there is no need for a revolutionary President. That is why I resigned, and after the establishment of the Government at Nanking I continued the peace negotiations. After a long time there are men who blamed me for renewing the peace

negotiations and for resigning the Presidency. But suppose I had continued to be the President. Many members of the party had refused to follow the sworn principles of revolution after the success of revolutionary destruction and had refused to obey the policies of the leader. Even if the country could be united under the revolutionary party, the result would not amount to more than the substitution of the old officials by the new. It would not contribute anything to the basic problems of the progress of the country and of the masses—that is, the substitution of one bad Government by another."

These words of Dr. Sun may be taken as a lucid statement of the trend of thought within the Kuomintang, which in time grew definitely into the outlook and philosophy of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang. That is the type of opinion within the ranks of the Kuomintang that defeated Dr. Sun's policies at critical moments. If the Chinese Revolution is to succeed at all according to the principles, it depends first of all upon the elimination of the bourgeois elements of the Right Wing and upon the strengthening of the authority of the Left Wing in the party. Until this is done, any further development of the Kuomintang will be liable to premature death from the struggle of these two elements within the party. Between the Right Wing and the real revolutionary Left Wing of the Kuomintang there is no common ground to make compromise fruitful or possible. The Right Wing is working under the name of the Kuomintang but in reality betraying all its principles, and it is the group that is bringing the party to the low level in which it finds itself to-day from the unprecedented high position achieved a year ago under the leadership of the Left Wing.

The presence in the Kuomintang from the very beginning and the continued infiltration of the bourgeois type of mind is a phenomenon that must be taken notice of by anyone who wishes to understand the changing phases of the Chinese Revolution and the history of the Kuomintang. The characteristic outlook for this type of mind is that the change of Government through the Revolution must bring benefits to

themselves. To them, objectively, the Revolution is merely a shifting of the personnel of the Government. They wish to control the Government themselves, in the interests not of the masses of the people but of themselves, thereby objectively throwing the Chinese Revolution overboard. Remarking on this trend of thought within the party, Dr. Sun said in his speech to the reunion conference of the party in 1923:

"We recall when the Government was founded at Nanking (1911) how prosperous was the party and how bright its prospects. Why does the party, so prosperous then, present such a sorry condition at present when we are in Canton? The reason is found in the fact that the party is composed of too many divergent elements. There is such a heterogeneous group of men that the party begins to lose the respect of outsiders, so that they do not wish to join and help us in the struggle. For instance, many members of the party wish to get high positions in the Government. Those who had their wishes fulfilled and got high positions are satisfied. The psychology of these members of the party is that revolutionary work should stop once the object of high positions is reached. Those who are disappointed and failed to get the high positions turned to the enemy to oppose the party. While there are many who are devoted to party work and struggle really for its principles, the great majority of the members of the party look upon joining the party as a short cut to reach high positions in the Government. Because their aim in joining the party is to reach the high positions, so their character is despicable, and their presence in the party has produced such incongruity in its composition."

These were the men who wished to turn the Revolution into a means through which they would reap the benefits for themselves. The party under Dr. Sun had a programme which would make the Revolution not only a change of Government but also a change in the economic and social conditions of the country; but these men neither understood it nor wished it to be carried out. The work of revolutionary reconstruction under the Kuomintang in China was delayed and frustrated again and again, for it was not only fought from the outside by the enemies of the Chinese Revolution, but also from the inside of the party by the elements of the Right Wing. These words of Dr. Sun quoted above to illustrate the mentality of

the Right Wing of the Kuomintang were spoken about a year before the reorganization of the party in 1924. History has proved that even a reactionary movement must possess its talents and its abilities if it is to achieve any success at all. But the Right Wing of the Kuomintang possessed neither the intelligence nor the ability of leadership, so it failed to achieve anything, although it exercised great influence in the party for so many years. The time has come in the year of the reorganization of the Kuomintang to ask the question, Is the Chinese Revolution going to be a genuine revolution for the interest of the masses, or is it a masked reaction for the benefit of the bourgeois few? The question was decided practically by the direction in which the party was then drifting, towards the right or towards the left. It was particularly on the third of Dr. Sun's Three Principles—namely the principle of the livelihood of the people—that the cleavage between the two wings of the Kuomintang is most clearly brought out. That principle envisages the economic and social changes that the Chinese Revolution under the leadership of the Kuomintang is to bring about to the lives of the masses of the Chinese people. Dr. Sun himself spoke of this cleavage of opinion on this principle among the members of the party. He said:

"We may classify the trend of thought of all the members of the party into two types. One type of thought belongs to the old comrades, the other type belongs to the new comrades. The old comrades are conservative and the new comrades are radically progressive in their thought."

The rise of the new type of men in the ranks of the Kuomintang, and its gradual crystallizing into the Left Wing, was hastened by the failure of the Right Wing to bring in the reign of prosperity and power in the years after the Revolution of 1911. At that time the thinking elements of the country were unanimous in the desire that with the beginning of the Republic China would be able to follow the examples of the Western Powers to industrialize the country and produce

wealth in such abundance that she would be able to redeem herself soon from the humiliation that she has suffered at the hands of the foreign Powers. She would not only be rich, but with the wealth at her disposal she would be in a position to equip an army and create a navy, which are symbols of national strength. They thought that the only reason that prevented China from being wealthy and strong was the bad government of the Manchus. Now that the Government was changed it would be the beginning of new hopes. But unfortunately the conditions in China for the realization of this dual object were not happily combined, and in the years following, China, instead of getting wealthier and more powerful, was actually becoming poorer and weaker. This disappointment was the failure of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang to bring about a bourgeois revolution, and its leadership was bankrupt. Younger men of the country, seeing the failure of the leadership of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang, began to think that perhaps, after all, the problem was not so simple, and even with the attainment of wealth and power the problem of the Chinese masses would not be solved. They began to ponder on the fundamental question of the Chinese Revolution, and, dissociating themselves from the old outlook, they began to look at it from new angles. Then the European War came, and it shattered the established ideas of the young people, and set them to seek re-evaluations in the problems of their own universe. That war had a tremendous influence in upsetting the old ideas and establishing new ones in the minds of the young people of China, especially with regard to economic and social questions. People began to think that the problem of the Chinese body politic was not one of comparative wealth and power as compared with the standard of other countries, but needs fundamental reconstitution on sound social and economic principles. Then came the Russian Revolution of 1917. That Russia of all countries should have produced a revolution of the socialist type among all the types of revolution was

another fact during that decade which upset further the values in the minds of this new generation in China. It was from this rising new generation that the Left Wing of the Kuomintang drew its main strength. The new set of conditions produced in this decade have made the formation of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang definite and its assumption of power within the party necessary and imminent. The reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924, and the inauguration of Dr. Sun's Three Policies in that conference, marked a new period in the history, not only from the improvement of party work and party methods, but from the point of the struggle within the party between the Right and the Left Wings, and it was the beginning of the leadership of the Left Wing in the affairs of the party. That conference sounded the death-knell of the Right Wing for a time at any rate. And the symbol of the authority of the Left Wing was the Doctor's Three Policies—co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party, support to the labourer and peasant movements, and co-operation with Soviet Russia. The Left Wing stood on all three of these policies, not less firmly on co-operation with the Communists than on the other two.

The Kuomintang that came out of the reorganization in 1924 was definitely committed to the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party. In the second plenary session in August 1924 of the Central Executive Committee that was elected by the reorganization Conference, important resolutions on the question of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party were passed. These resolutions not only stated the fundamental position of the party on this question, but also served as an indication of the state of mind of the men at that time towards the Communists. They were:

1. "China is now in a semi-colonial state. It is natural that all classes have the common aim in seeking urgently the liberation of the country and in demanding her independence from the oppression of imperialism. The Kuomintang, based on the Three Principles, is a

political party that represents the common aim of these classes and works for the revolutionary movement; therefore the party should include in its fold all genuine revolutionary elements of the country, irrespective of class distinction.

2. "According to the General Constitution of the party, 'anyone who is willing to accept the principles of the party, to execute its decisions, and who acquires admission to any one of the branches of the party and pays the party fees regularly, is eligible for membership.' Consequently there is no necessity to interfere in cases where the members have not violated the provisions of the General Constitution in their conduct. If members should violate the principles and the regulations of the party in their conduct, and do not actually participate in the revolutionary movement based on the Three Principles, and if they neither oppose militarism and imperialism nor support labour and the masses, they will be disciplined irrespective of any class to which they may belong.

3. "The Chinese Communist Party is neither the result of speculation on the part of any individual nor of artificial transplantation from abroad to China. The Chinese Communist Party is a political organization that is crystallized out of the natural class struggle of the industrial proletariat that is just developing in China. The organization of the Chinese Communist Party being such, it has to become a part of the political organization of the world proletariat. Even were we able to dissolve the existing Chinese Communist Party by force, we cannot destroy the Chinese proletariat, and they will organize again. So the attitude of the Kuomintang towards the Communists is to ask whether their conduct is in harmony with its principles and platforms and nothing else, because everywhere and at all times the Kuomintang ought to govern all its members in accordance with its platform and regulations. Since the Communists have accepted the principles of the Kuomintang and are admitted to its membership, they ought to be governed as such."

No clearer and more fundamental statement of the position of the Kuomintang on the question of co-operation with the Communists can be had than the three resolutions passed by the Central Executive Committee in August 1924. In the first place they represented the frank recognition of the basic facts that led to the creation of the Chinese Communist Party. In the second place they stated the only fundamental reason which led Dr. Sun to admit the Communists into the Kuomintang, and that was for uniting all the revolutionary forces of the country, irrespective of party or class lines. In the third

place they represented the recognition of something that those persecutors of the Communists in China to-day have forgotten —that is, although the Communists may be killed, and the present organization of the Chinese Communist Party may be destroyed by force, the root of communism in China cannot be eradicated in this way. The masses of Chinese labour and peasants remain. All of these resolutions proved that the Kuomintang in those days, under the leadership of the Left Wing, was courageous enough, far-sighted enough, and great enough to put on record its position on the co-operation with the Communist in a spirit of political vision. In those days the party was under the personal direction of Dr. Sun, and the influence of the Left Wing under his guidance was on the increase. Seven months after the passing of these resolutions Dr. Sun died, on March 12, 1925. The Right Wing, which had been held in check by Dr. Sun, very soon gathered strength to attack the policies of the Doctor. Among the leaders of the Left Wing at that time may be mentioned Liao Chung-kai, a man who had perhaps more to do with the formulation of Dr. Sun's labour and peasant policy than any other, but who was unfortunately assassinated a few months after the death of Dr. Sun by his enemies. Soon after the hands of Dr. Sun were removed from the control of the affairs of the party, the struggle between the Left Wing that was then controlling the party and the Right Wing from which the power was just wrested began to assume definite forms, but it was then mainly in the stage of underground agitation instead of open attack.

In view of the growing agitation on the part of the members of the Right Wing on the question of co-operation with the Communists, the Central Executive Committee held a plenary session in May 1925, and issued instructions to all the members of the Kuomintang. In these instructions the Central Executive Committee reiterated the three resolutions that were passed by it at the plenary session held in August 1924, and went on saying:

"In reading these resolutions our comrades should realize that the admission of the members of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang is because they have accepted the principles and the platform of our party and wish to shoulder the responsibility of revolutionary work. In order to see that the success of revolution may be brought about quickly, the party cannot refuse the participation of anyone who is a revolutionist merely because he belongs to another party. This was the policy of our party in the early revolutionary days. But after they are admitted and have acquired membership, their duties and responsibilities are the same as all other members of the Kuomintang. That is the important thing to remember."

These instructions were issued only two months after the death of Dr. Sun.

The first onslaught on the policies of Dr. Sun made by the Right Wing of the party was on the policy of co-operation with the Communists. In September 1925, six months after the death of Dr. Sun, a group of members belonging to the Right Wing called a conference without authorization from the party in the Western Hills, near Peking. The conference voiced opposition to communism within the Kuomintang. The conference was known in the contemporary history of the Kuomintang as the Western Hill Conference, which came to denote the habit, the temperament, and the political philosophy of the Right Wing. It made a great stir among the party when the news of its gathering was heard. It was a challenge to the adopted policy of the party, and it was an open breach of party discipline which prohibited members from holding such meetings to advocate policies contrary to those already established by the party. From both of these points the Western Hill Conference was a serious affair to the party. Of the two issues involved, the question of the breach of party discipline was of more consequence than the question of co-operation with the Communists. For the question of co-operation with the Communists was at any rate a convenient point of attack on the part of the Right Wing in the inevitable and the irreconcilable struggle between the bourgeois type of mind

of the Right Wing, and the social revolutionary type of mind of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. In the reorganization conference held in 1924 the question of party discipline was one of the main questions discussed, because in the past the lack of discipline was a source of great trouble to the party. In the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in Canton in 1926, the question of the Western Hill Conference was discussed, and it was regarded by the Congress as one of the most serious cases of the breach of party discipline by the organized efforts of a group of men since the founding of the party, calculated to endanger the foundation of the party, and to break the united front of the Revolution. The ring-leaders of the Western Hill Conference were expelled from the party, while others who participated in it were severely disciplined in other ways. The onslaught of the Right Wing on the Left Wing that was holding power in the party was for the time being checked.

In the Second National Congress of the party the position of the party regarding the question of co-operation with the Communists was made still clearer. In that Congress both the members of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party participated on an equal footing, and to the ensuing Central Executive Committee the members of both parties were elected. The co-operation between the two parties was as complete and harmonious as could be desired. At this time the members who were suspected of leaning towards the Right were either compelled to leave Canton or they themselves have voluntarily abstained from participating in the activities of the party and of the Government. The Second National Congress issued a manifesto which said in part:

"The success of all revolutions must depend on the extensive participation of the masses; the labour and the peasant elements are especially indispensable. The failure of the Nationalist Revolution in the past was due to the fact that in it only the intellectual class participated, so that there was no broad basis for it and the force was small. In the Nationalist Revolution to-day and to-morrow we must

preach its significance in the farm and in the factory and organize these two classes in the struggle against imperialism."

Elsewhere in the same manifesto it said:

"The most effective method the imperialist Powers use to keep China in a semi-colonial state is to hamper the Nationalist Revolution, and in order to do this the best way is to break the united front of all the classes of the masses, especially to destroy the development of the labour and the peasant classes, for it is only so that they can scatter the forces of the Nationalist Revolution."

These statements were a reaffirmation of the common ground that made the co-operation between the two parties necessary and possible. In addition to this restatement of the position of the party on this question of co-operation with the Communists, the Second National Congress passed a special resolution. The resolution said:

"The concentration of all revolutionary forces of the country is the only way to promote the success of the Revolution. Therefore the party reiterated its obedience to the policy of the dead leader in admitting the members of the Chinese Communist Party to the Kuomintang for the common task. Therefore all disputes of such nature should be jointly and openly discussed by the two parties under the direction and supervision of proper party authorities so that misunderstandings may be dispelled by finding proper and satisfactory solutions. But members should not be allowed to indulge in sentimental calumny to endanger the fundamental policy of concentration of the revolutionary forces."

In spite of the severe discipline that was meted out to the participants of the Western Hill Conference, and in spite of the repeated reaffirmations of the position of the party on this question by the National Congress and by the Central Executive Committee, the efforts to discredit the policy of co-operation with the Communists by the Right Wing continued, and a large amount of agitation was carred on among the rank-and-file of the party. Of the members of the party a great many are still not clear as to the real intent and purpose of this co-operation with the Communists, and they were often the victims of their own ignorance and of the

propaganda of the opponents of the Kuomintang. In the country most people regarded communism as the scourge of civilization and the negation of everything that is decent and proper, in much the same way as the people in most countries in the early days of the Russian Revolution regarded the regime of the Bolshevists. The Right Wing of the Kuomintang, in its efforts to regain power in the party from the hands of the Left Wing, was then able to take great advantage of the ignorance of the members of the party and of the masses on this question, and raise a cry against the danger of communism in the party and in the country. This issue was most conveniently chosen, as it was the issue on which it could secure the support of sincere but ignorant people. They were not only able to secure the support of the members of the party, but they were also able to get the help of all the forces that were opposed to the Nationalist Revolution. The Powers, who naturally wished to see the Revolution retarded, and the rich merchants and the so-called *comporadore* class, and the supporters of the old order of society under which they were accustomed to live comfortably, were one and all able to support a regime of the Right Wing, if that could be brought about. The members of the Right Wing were therefore able to secure a united front of the ignorant and the reactionary elements of the country and to make a common attack on the policy of the co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party. One will remember that it was during these years 1925–26 that the cry was raised to its height against the "red" regime in Canton, and the propaganda in the imperialist Press in Shanghai and in Hongkong was especially vehement in its denunciation of the Government of the Kuomintang. Looking back at those days, it was virtually a concerted effort to discredit the party, and in this work to undermine the authority and the prestige of the Kuomintang the Right Wing bore a great share, and was actually taking the lead. In those days rumours about the imminent nationalization of goods

and property and of land in Canton were matters of daily occurrence, and no efforts were spared to make the Kuomintang appear as under the complete domination of the Communists and as having unconsciously undergone the transformation from a party of the people to the party of the Communists. As time went on the propaganda against the "red" Kuomintang in Canton increased and the agitation against the Communists gathered force. More members of the Right Wing of the party were forced to leave Canton and to retire to Shanghai, and there to spread more rumours about the communistic activities of the Kuomintang. The Left Wing was then left in complete control of the affairs of the party, and in the province of Kwangtung the Kuomintang Government was preparing feverishly for the coming northern expedition that was to start in the late summer of 1926. The Right Wing of the Kuomintang lost everything, and it was planning for revenge and for coming back. The issue that they have chosen for riding back to power was the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party.

The completeness with which the party then eliminated the elements of the Right Wing was perhaps more apparent than real. For as the events that culminated in the split of the party this year showed, there were a number of men who at that time were out and out for the policies of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang, but who in time completely turned around and became the prophets and leaders of the Right Wing. Certain people questioned the wisdom of the driving away of the members of the Right Wing from Canton in those years, and argued that perhaps if that process of elimination of the Right Wing had not taken place, and they had been allowed to stay in the Government, it might have served to conciliate them, and would have prevented the party split of 1927. It might. But that is a way of looking at the thing purely from a hypothetical point of view, and, like all other events in history, what did actually take place was often not

what men would like it to happen in the way they wished. To those who know the political conditions at Canton at that time, and the extreme tension that existed between the two factions of the party, one fails to see how the elimination of either the one or the other could have been avoided under those circumstances.

Misunderstandings between members of the Kuomintang and members of the Chinese Communist Party did exist in many cases, and there were plenty of such opportunities. They were bound to happen in the course of co-operation between any two parties in any country, especially in a country where the revolutionary tension was so great. But it is a question whether they ought to be allowed to grow to the extent of interfering with the main object of co-operation. It was also probable that under one set of conditions these misunderstandings were minimized and held in check as in the days when Dr. Sun was alive. Under a different set of circumstances they were not only magnified, but were maliciously fanned to serve another motive, as in the case of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang, who took special care that these misunderstandings should not die out, but grow to alarming proportions so that they might have the chance of fishing in the troubled waters. Many members of the Kuomintang were now sincerely alarmed by the activities of the Communists and by the feverish energy in which the Communists pushed the work of organizing the labourers and the peasants wherever the authority of the Kuomintang reigned. They have always been energetic in the organization of the labour unions and the peasant unions, and this was true when the Nationalist authority reached Wu-Han and controlled more provinces than Kwangtung. The members of the Kuomintang began to suspect many things of the Communists, and some even suspected that the Communists were actually attempting to monopolize the work among the masses as a preliminary step to the inevitable struggle between the Kuomintang and

the Chinese Communist Party. There were rumours that the Communists were preparing to stage a *coup d'état* against the Kuomintang in the immediate future. There was no doubt that individual cases of jealousy and competition existed in localities in the work of organizing the labourers and the peasants, but it is quite another thing to take these local differences as an indication of the matured and deliberate policy of the Chinese Communist Party as a whole. In the meantime the opponents of the Kuomintang were not slow to turn these differences to their advantage, and, magnifying old ones and creating new ones, they were able to disturb the mind of a great number of members of the Kuomintang and make them believe in the imminent destruction of their party unless the Communists were immediately driven out of the party. As a result there existed a great tension between the two parties.

The first event of real importance that threatened to wreck the co-operation with the Communists was the sudden arrest on March 20, 1926, of a number of officers of the navy who were suspected to be Communists and accused of planning a *coup d'état* in Canton. The arrest was made under the order of Chiang Kai-shek without authorization from the Government. He had by this time become the man of power in the Nationalist Government. It was explained on his part that the imminency of the danger made the summary arrest necessary. Later nothing was found to substantiate the charge against these men, and they were released. This action on the part of a general of the Government nearly made further co-operation impossible. But, due to the progress of the preparation for the northern expedition and the work that was ahead of the party, this incident was hushed up. As a result of this episode Wang Ching-wei, who was then considered the leader of the Left Wing, but who has to-day definitely lost this position due to his unfaithfulness to the party principles, had to go abroad. The affair was like the

sudden deflection of an electrical meter, and showed that a swing of the party towards the Right was at any moment possible. The Left Wing of the party received a sudden shock, from which it never recovered itself. The affair also indicated the extreme delicate situation which existed in the relation between the Kuomintang and the Communists. But with the imminence of a great campaign in view, the matter was treated as an isolated incident of an individual. It was, however, not forgotten among the members of either party.

Soon after the incident of March 20, 1926, happened, it was thought necessary to call a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee to overhaul the whole situation in the relation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. The Committee met in May 1926, and devoted itself wholly to the question of relation with the Communists. The Committee passed four resolutions, of which two were of direct importance to the question under discussion. These resolutions not only showed the psychological state of the men at that time toward the Communists but also indicated a new departure in the treatment of the Communists by the Kuomintang. In the history of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, these resolutions were landmarks which showed that a new development was in existence in the relationship between the two parties. The first resolution laid down the general principles that were to govern the relation with the Communists. They were:

1. To improve the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.
2. To correct the speech and action on the part of the members of both parties that are liable to endanger the co-operation between the two parties.
3. To guard the unity of party authority as provided in the General Constitution of the Kuomintang.
4. To specifically determine the position and the meaning of the admission of the members of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang.

These were the general principles along which the Central Executive Committee hoped to improve the relation between the two parties. The first and the second principles were clear without any explanation. But the nature of the third and the fourth principles was an admission of the weakening of the influence of the Kuomintang at the hands of the Communists. Therefore the third principle provided that the authority of the party should not be divided, and that its unity should be carefully watched over, lest it should slip from the hands of the Kuomintang and fall into the hands of the Communists. As a matter of fact, the authority of the party, which, as the General Constitution provided, should be in the hands of the party, and which, as the self-styled defenders of the Kuomintang against Communist encroachment asserted, should be jealously watched over and preserved, is never in the Kuomintang as a party; it was in the hands of the military men, as later events will reveal in a marvellously clear manner. The second resolution presently will make the meaning of the fourth principle clear, and show how it will work. In addition to these four principles there was provided in the same resolution a Joint Committee of the two parties which was to consider all questions relating to the two parties and to decide the disputes in which the members of both parties were involved. It was also proposed that a representative of the Third International shall act as adviser to this Joint Committee.

The second resolution was a drastic limitation of the status of the members of the Chinese Communist Party in the Kuomintang, and provided what amounted to a number of specific disabilities for them. These disabilities were:

1. If the members of any other party wished to join the Kuomintang, that other party shall instruct its members that the basic principles of the Kuomintang are contained in the Three Principles formulated by Dr. Sun; and that they shall not entertain any doubt on, or criticize, Dr. Sun or his Principles.

2. If the members of any other party join the Kuomintang, that

other party shall hand over its membership register to the custody of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

3. The proportion of the members of the higher Executive Committees (central, provincial, and of the special municipalities) who are admitted from any other party shall not exceed one-third of the total membership of such Committees.

4. Members of any other party who are admitted into the Kuomintang shall not serve as heads of departments in the central party organization of the Kuomintang.

5. Without authorization from the party, no member of the Kuomintang is allowed to call any meeting in its name to discuss party affairs.

6. Without the authorization from the highest authority of the party, no member of the Kuomintang is allowed to engage in any other political organization or activity.

7. If members of any other party have joined the Kuomintang and that other party wishes to send instructions to them, such instructions shall be submitted in the first instance to the Joint Committee of the two parties for its approval. In case of emergency, where necessary approval cannot be secured beforehand, they must be ratified afterwards.

8. The members of the Kuomintang are not allowed to join any other party before the permission to resign from its membership is granted. Those who have resigned and joined any other party are not allowed to join the Kuomintang again.

9. Those who violated these rules shall immediately forfeit their membership in the party, and shall be punished according to the degree of their offences.

The so-called "any other party" in these provisions of the second resolution meant the Chinese Communist Party. The authors of these provisions hoped to control the Communists and to prevent them from getting into very powerful positions on the Kuomintang, so that the Communists in the Kuomintang should be at all times under manageable conditions. It was a desperate attempt on the part of the authors of these provisions to save the Kuomintang from the dangerous position in which they believed the party had fallen. Under these regulations the Communists were in name on an equal footing with the other members of the Kuomintang, but in fact were subject to these qualifications that were specially designed for

them by these "defenders" of the Kuomintang. In the circumstances the Communists acquiesced in them. These regulations cannot serve the purpose for which they were designed, inasmuch as the aim of the Communists was to capture the masses by organizing the labourers and the peasants, and any attempt to restrict them from above was wide of the mark. Further, they were detrimental to the spirit of co-operation that ought to exist between the two parties. These regulations were more important for what was not said than for what was said, and that which was not said was the continued worsening of the good will with the Communists. The state of mind having drifted to the point of immediate breach of the two parties, it seemed that there was nothing that could prevent the premature breaking down of the united front of the revolutionary forces of the country achieved by Dr. Sun with great pains. The only thing that actually prevented it for a time was the coming of the northern expedition and the military campaign that followed in the last part of 1926.

There was one thing which must be noticed now in the affairs of the party—that is, the gradual gravitation of all powers of the party and of the Government to the hands of the military authorities and the continuous inclining towards the Right of the Government and the party. The gravitation of everything to the hands of the military was a thing that was created by the circumstances, and was tolerated also on that account. The campaign was already on, and the party was engaged for the first time in an extensive military campaign with the northern militarists. The success or failure of the campaign was vital to the party, so that all attention was concentrated on the military affairs, and the other things were left aside for the time being. Consequently military authority began to dominate party authority in the appearance of the person of Chiang Kai-shek. The individual person that represented this military authority, whether Chiang Kai-shek or any other person, was of lesser historical importance com-

pared with the important fact of the simultaneous appearance of the dual phenomena of the rising of the military power over the party power and the continued Rightward movement of the party. The important fact to remember is that the uniting of these two sets of tendencies in the same set of persons is not a matter of pure coincidence. As the campaign went on, the elements of the Right began to collect around the militarists of the party. There were plenty of chances for the Right Wing to work its way to the presence of the militarists of the party. In the heat of the battle, barters and tradings must be effected with the enemy on the ground of saving life and shortening the campaign. Enemy generals were admitted into the fold of the Kuomintang, and the elements of the Right Wing were allowed to come back on military grounds. There was formed in effect in the beginning of 1927, when the enemy was cleared of the great valley of the Yangtsze, a military Right-Wing block in the Kuomintang, and the seat of this block was in Nanchang, Kiangsi, where the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, was located. The capital of the Kuomintang was in Wu-Han. Nanchang and Wu-Han were no longer subordinated the one to the other, but were, in fact, rivals in authority. That was the condition about January and February 1927.

With the enemy definitely cleared, and with the arms of the party victorious everywhere, the military Right-Wing block soon began again the struggle with the Left Wing of the party. The Right Wing had by this time completely conquered the military power of the party, and the time for its coming back to power had arrived sooner than they themselves had expected. At this time there began the bitter dispute between Nanchang and Wu-Han on the question of the influence of the Communists in the party and in the Kuomintang at Wu-Han. The Central Executive Committee made a last attempt to save the party from splitting by calling the third plenary session, and it was held in the middle of March

of this year. The plenary session passed a resolution to the following effect:

"The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party should immediately call a joint conference to discuss the problem of co-operation in general and especially the following problems, namely :

"1. To unify mass movements, especially the labour and the peasant movements should be put under the joint direction of the two parties.

"2 The question of the minority races of the country.

"3. The political responsibility should be shared by both parties. The Chinese Communist Party should send responsible comrades to serve in the Nationalist and the provincial governments.

"4. The Press organs of the Third International, of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Kuomintang shall not violate the spirit of co-operation in their reports and criticisms of one another.

"5. In response to the invitation of the Third International, the Kuomintang should immediately send three representatives to it, to discuss with it the fundamental problems of the Chinese Revolution, especially the relation between the Chinese Revolution and the world revolution."

Resolutions of this kind cannot save a situation which seemed to have passed all hope of improvement. The first point in the resolution was a reflection that the Chinese Communist Party was monopolizing the labour and the peasant movements, and therefore it provided that in the future it should be put under the joint direction of the two parties. The second point concerned the frontier races, where it was suspected that the Communist influence dominated to the exclusion of the Kuomintang. Then the resolution proceeded to conciliate the Communists by allowing them to share the offices of the Government. The spirit of co-operation was entirely gone. With the insistence of the Right Wing, under the leadership of the military authority, that the Communists must be summarily expelled from the party, without going through the legal process of discussion either by the Central Executive Committee in plenary session or by the National Congress,

the split of the party was inevitable. The Nanking Government was established in April. It began its career by issuing declarations denouncing the Communists and the Kuomintang at Wu-Han for being a Communist Government. It then started a systematic slaughtering of the Communists in its territory under the name of purging the Kuomintang of the Communists and saving the party. The Right Wing and its leaders came back to power one and all, and occupied important positions in the Nanking Government. The issue was the Chinese Communist Party. The united front of the revolutionary forces of the country was definitely broken.

Although the Nanking Government was persecuting the Communists, the Kuomintang Government at Wu-Han was still co-operating with them. Here in Wu-Han another military star was rising in the person of Tang Sen-Chih, who a year ago was an insignificant general in the province of Hunan, but he was swept into power by the wave of the northern expedition of the Kuomintang. On May 21, 1927, his soldiers and the Communists in Changsha, the capital of Hunan, had a conflict, in which a number of persons were killed. The military being the armed class, easily got the better of the Communists. The Nationalist Government at Wu-Han ordered Tang Sen-Chih to make an inquiry in a case in which his own troops were involved, and the result was practically the acquittal of his own men. The Communists were embittered, and the relation between the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han and the Communists reached the point of breaking. It must be remembered that the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han had by this time come under the practical domination of the military forces of Tang Sen-Chih. On July 13, 1927, the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto denouncing the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government for siding with the military and with having actually become reactionary. The following quotation from the manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party

in a way illustrated the state of conditions as obtained under the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han. It said:

"In April the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang refused to publish the draft on land system as passed by the Land Commission. There was still less hope for its execution. The drafting and the publication of the labour law also met with many difficulties. The Kuomintang ought to pay attention to the oppressed classes of the masses of China and to the cries of labourers and of the peasants and of the handicraft workers. But it failed to do so and listened to the reactionary military generals, who come from the class of the gentry and the landlords. These military officers are always opposed to the peasant movement. In April and May of this year it was the time to put into effect the system for social improvement in order to tear up the roots of feudalism in town and in country and to deal a death-blow to counter-revolution. It was also the time to arm the labourers and the peasants against counter-revolution. But at that time the leaders of the Kuomintang and of the Nationalist Government issued to the country many instructions limiting the labour and the peasant movements, making the wavering elements turn the more to the direction of counter-revolution, and giving the counter-revolutionary elements a free hand to attack the Revolution. Reactionary military officers utilized such wavering policy to openly attack the movements of the masses, and waves of counter-revolution followed one another. . . . The victory of the Revolution entirely vanished."

Before another plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang could be called to make a final discussion of the situation, events had gone to such a point that co-operation was no longer possible. In Wu-Han as well as in Nanking it was the rising of military stars that preceded the persecution of the Communists. Now in the territory under the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han, as in the territory under Nanking, there was started a wave of persecution of the Communists. The Communist army under Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, numbering not more than ten thousand soldiers, made a dash for Kwangtung in a mad attempt to capture that province, but it was outnumbered and destroyed near Swatow. Thus the great policy of co-operation of revolutionary forces of China for the Revolution

was destroyed just on the eve when the Revolution was about to succeed!

Such are the facts of the breaking up of one of the cardinal policies of the Kuomintang and of the split of the party in twain. As to the real significance and the meaning of these facts, it will be found in the concluding chapter of this book.

CHAPTER VII

LABOUR AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS UNDER THE KUOMINTANG

THE Labour movement in China is comparatively young and the peasant movement still younger. Although labour strikes were not unknown in Shanghai and Canton and in other places of commerce in the early days, the manifestation of the power of labour did not come until recently. The gradual growth of manufacturing industries, which are largely in the hands of foreign capitalists, created in China a class of people who depend for their livelihood on employment in the factories and under conditions of greater insecurity and greater oppression than labour in other industrial countries for the fact that in China industries are still in the nascent stage and the system of legal protection for labour is not yet inaugurated. The Chinese wage-earner is therefore a wage-slave in an industrially backward country, and his lot is incomparably worse than the wage-earner of other countries. In real wages, in the matter of working conditions, the standard of the Chinese labourer is in a wretchedly low position. Labourers in other countries denounce the system under which they work as a system of slavery, and they would certainly despair to find adequate phrases to portray the condition of labour in China. Investigations have shown that, on the average, the adult labourer earns not more than ninepence a day and the woman and the child labourer still less. That is the condition of the Chinese labourer.

There is one thing which is a special characteristic of Chinese labour and distinguishes it from labour of other countries —that is, that Chinese labour is under the foreign capitalists. Foreigners came to China and opened factories and operated them under their own laws. They were the first to start in the

manufacturing business in China, and due to their special position maintained by the unequal treaties they were able to crush any Chinese manufacturer who was likely to compete with them. The foreign manufacturers pay less taxes than the Chinese manufacturers in China. All these conditions worked for the concentration of the manufacturing industries in the hands of foreigners. Chinese labour is not only under the oppression of capitalism but is also under the oppression of alien capitalism. That is a fact that has an important bearing on the part that the Chinese labourers play in the revolution.

The lot of the Chinese peasant is scarcely better than the labourer. The proportion of the peasant in the entire population of the country is very large, it being estimated that as much as 85 per cent. of the population of China are peasants. Therefore from the quantitative point of view alone the problem of the Chinese peasant is the dominant one in the economic reconstruction of China. Large numbers of peasants are landless and are in the state of poor tenants. These tenants sometimes have to hand over to the landowners one-half of their produce in the form of rent for the use of the land. These poor farmers are heavily in debt, and are compelled to borrow money at very high rates of interest. They are further subject to the vexatious and heavy taxes of the Government and of the militarists in recent years. The ravages and devastations of the continued civil war have reduced the farmers in many provinces to the point of desperation.

When one travels in the cities of China, and especially in the commercial cities, one is liable to forget the central fact about China to-day—that is, the almost universal poverty of the Chinese peasants, who together with the rising class of workmen of the town form the great majority of the masses of China. The poverty of the Chinese peasant is not a comparative term, but is a condition where in some provinces one uses all his efforts to produce something that is not sufficient to support the mere existence of life. The ports of commerce are but a drop

of water in the ocean compared with the great interior of the country, where millions of the Chinese peasants toil under feudal economic conditions in a severe struggle to keep alive. That is the important phenomenon to notice in the economic conditions of China to-day and is one that gives the real significance to any economic reconstruction of China. On this phenomenon Dr. Sun said:

"We must solve the social problem on the basis of facts and not purely on theories. What are the facts in China? It is the universal poverty of the people. In China everybody is poor and there is no special class of wealth; there is only the general poverty. The so-called inequality of wealth in China means only that in the class of the poor there is the difference of poverty, the poor and the very poor."

The greatest quota that contributed to the universal poverty of the country is the Chinese peasantry. This is a social fact that as a political factor will play an important part in the Chinese Revolution.

One wonders, why is poverty in China so general and so pervasive to every strata of society in an age which produces wealth in such abundance by the process of machinery? The fundamental reason is that the country is in an economically mediæval condition and needs modernization. The rural conditions in China to-day are pre-industrial conditions. Agricultural methods, farming implements, and methods of irrigation and transportation are all mediæval. As agriculture is the central means of livelihood of the people of China and agriculture is in a mediæval condition, it is reflected in all phases of the economic and social life of the whole country. Everything in the country is directly or indirectly connected with the agricultural production and is coloured by the feudal and mediæval agrarian economy of the country. The urgent problem of China to-day is, therefore, modernization of the mediæval heritage from the history of China. Of the general trend of thought on the direction of modernization of China

there are three schools. One of them would like to see China developed along the familiar line of European capitalism; another school would like to develop China along communist lines and produce a socialist State to replace the old order of society; then there is a third school which, taking the basic conditions of the country both in the domestic and in the international aspects, would like to see the country develop along sane and practical lines, realizing the principle of social justice in the distribution of the wealth produced.

While the fundamental reason for the universal poverty of China is the mediæval conditions bequeathed from history, there are several subsidiary reasons which tend to prevent her emerging from this condition and to prolong the mediæval state of things—that is, the general political chaos produced and maintained by the militarists to perpetuate their reign of plunder in the country and the efforts of imperialist Powers to prolong the militarist reign in China. The imperialist Powers aided the militarists in the hope of maintaining their regime of special privileges in China based on the unequal treaties. Thus revolutionary movements received repeatedly checks and hindrances at the hands of the imperialist Powers, and the civil war is kept up year in and year out, with the result that the condition of the Chinese masses is rendered poorer and more desperate every year.

The term "proletariat" is looked upon with spite and hate. But the basic fact in the situation in China is that the masses of the Chinese population form a formidable proletariat, the peasants and the labourers. Such a state of things cannot fail to have profound effects in the political evolution of China, if one admits the fact that the social and political life of a country is tinged by its economic conditions, and that the present conditions of China are the results of its mediæval economic state of affairs. To keep perpetually the Chinese masses under the mediæval politico-economical conditions is impossible. The longer the masses of China are kept under subjugation of

these conditions, the greater will be the reaction. The main reason for the rapid rise of the Chinese Communist Party is the existence of the great masses of China living under mediæval conditions, and that party will gather more strength if the conditions of the people are not improved. That is also the reason for the revolutionary temperament of the Chinese peasants and the Chinese labourers to-day. It is a revolt of the two classes of people who form the great majority of the population against the system of mediævalism maintained and perpetuated by militarism and imperialism. Chinese revolution is, therefore, in substance, a revolution of these two classes of people. Chinese labour strikes against the foreign owners of factories for the increase of wages and for the betterment of working conditions, but behind all these strikes there is the more profound significance of the struggle of the labourers for the liberation of the country. The Chinese labourers are to-day a politically awakened class, and their force is a powerful one in the revolution. The same remark applies to the Chinese peasants, who are in many provinces organized and who have shown their strength and voiced their political aspirations with the determination and vigour that characterize the youth of revolutionary organizations. In short, these two classes of the Chinese people, the labourers and the peasants, have already played an important part in the Chinese Revolution, and they will play a still more important part in it in the future. They are the deciding factors. The fundamental question for the Chinese Revolution is, for whom is it carried on? Consequently the next question is, by whom is it to be carried on? One may debate on the theoretical question of the existence of class interests and of class struggle; but as the history of revolutions tells us, every revolution is carried on by some classes of society. In the Chinese Revolution to-day the struggle is between certain sections of the people as represented by the Right Wing of the Kuomintang, who wish to turn the Revolution to their own benefit, and those who wish to see the Revolution

carried on in the interests of the great masses as represented by the Left Wing of the party. Specially if the Chinese Revolution fails to improve the status of the labourers and the peasants, then it will have failed in its objective.

The views of Dr. Sun on the conditions of Chinese labour and peasantry are very clear. He said :

"Labour in foreign countries is oppressed by its own capitalists, but labour in China is under the economic oppression of foreign capitalists and are indirectly their slaves. We may see how much lower is the position of the Chinese labourer as compared with the foreign labourer."

Then he went on to speak of the power of labour in the Chinese Revolution, and said :

"In China to-day only the intellectuals and the labourers are organized. The merchants are organized in a small way, while the farmers have no organization at all. Since labour is organized it must take the position of national leadership and become the vanguard of the masses in the struggle for the abolition of the unequal treaties and fight at the forefront of the battle-line. . . . The problem of Chinese labour is not one of livelihood involved in the struggle for shorter hours and better wages against Chinese capitalists. The biggest problem for Chinese labour is political."

After the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 the farmers in Kwangtung were to some extent organized, and in one of his speeches on the conditions of the farmers Dr. Sun spoke on the position of the peasants in the Chinese Revolution. He said :

"This revolutionary Government of ours is one which aims to make the people of the country its masters. Now, the peasantry forms the greatest majority of the population of China. If the Chinese peasants do not come to participate in the Revolution, then we have no basis for it. In the reorganization of the Kuomintang we have added the peasant movement to our programme because we want the peasants to be the foundation of our Revolution. . . . If this foundation is not strengthened, then the Revolution will fail."

Thus from the standpoint of the Kuomintang the participation of the labourers and the peasants in the Revolution is a

matter of vital importance. The final formulation of the policy of the Kuomintang regarding the labourers and the peasants and the enlisting of these two classes in the work of the Revolution is for the strengthening and the broadening of the foundation of the Revolution.

In tracing the history of the Kuomintang it will be found that it is a consistent and a continuous broadening of the basis of revolution. In the beginning of the history of the party the main strength of the party were principally the students and the merchants overseas. The students who were then studying abroad furnished the brain and the Chinese merchants abroad gave the money necessary for the carrying out of the Revolution of 1911. Since the success of the Revolution of 1911, these students have become the elders of the party and many of them have occupied the position of leadership in the party. They and the merchants overseas are generally imbued by the bourgeois outlook as a result of their surroundings. It would be interesting to notice a fact of singular interest in the present split of the party. When the party split occurred in April 1927, the attitude of the overseas branches of the Kuomintang became a matter of speculation and of interest. It was found out later that most of the overseas organizations in the foreign countries sided with the Right Wing of the Kuomintang that was in power in the Government in Nanking, and that it was only here and there in a very few places that they were with the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. This is another convincing proof that the Kuomintang was in the beginning under the leadership of a small class of people consisting of students and merchants and other elements of bourgeois outlook. The history of the party from 1911 to 1924 shows that the Kuomintang, under the influence of this bourgeois group and on the narrow basis of the intellectuals and the merchants and other bourgeois elements, has not been able to achieve the work of revolution as envisaged in the principles of Dr. Sun. At the end of this period came the reorganization of the Kuomintang, and the whole spirit that

dominated the work of the reorganization is the attention that was directed to the broadening of the basis of the Revolution. One of the major issues that was discussed at that conference was how to increase the efficiency of propaganda of the party, and on this question important resolutions were passed at that and the subsequent congresses. It was found that hitherto the Kuomintang had not paid sufficient attention to the problem of reaching the great masses of the country with its principles, not indeed as a result of wilful neglect, but rather as the result of defective method in propaganda. Hitherto it has been the theoretical rôle of the masses of the whole country that was supposed to be the strength of the Revolution, but now the masses are put in the concrete form in the persons of the labourers and the peasants, and special attempts were to be made to reach these two classes of people.

The Kuomintang at the reorganization conference in 1924 issued a manifesto and declared its position with regard to these two classes of people in the following significant words:

"In China to-day, from north to south, from the commercial ports to the villages and the inaccessible hamlets, poor peasants and overworked labourers are to be found everywhere. The positions which these two classes occupy, and the sufferings which they experience, are in general so similar, and their aspirations for liberation are so pressing, that in both of them is found the powerful will to revolt against imperialism. Therefore it goes without saying that the success of the Nationalist Revolution must depend upon the participation of the peasants and the labourers of the whole country. The position of the Kuomintang is, on the one hand, to help the development of the peasants and of the labourers with all its strength, to help their economic development without hindrance, so that the effective power of the Nationalist Revolution may be increased; and on the other, to make unremitting efforts to secure the participation of the peasants and the labourers in the Kuomintang, so as to speed up the advance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. For the Kuomintang is now engaged in the struggle against imperialism and militarism—that is, against the special classes opposed to the interests of the peasants and of the labourers, and to secure their emancipation. In short, it is a struggle for the peasants and the labourers, and it is one in which the peasants and the labourers struggle for themselves."

The platform passed by the reorganization conference which affects the interests of the peasants and the labourers includes the following measures. The Nationalist Government is to make laws for the utilization and the taxation of land, as also the taxation of the increased value of land. The taxation on land shall be strictly fixed by law and all other extra and miscellaneous taxes on land are to be abolished. The Government is to take steps to investigate the conditions of the land now under cultivation. The general principle that will guide the Government in its land policy is to equalize the production and the consumption of the agricultural products so that the whole population will have sufficiency of food. The Government is also to take measures for the improvement of agriculture and to improve the standard of living of the farmers. Rural organizations must also be improved. As regards labour, the Nationalist Government is to make labour laws for the protection of labour, to improve the conditions of living of labour, and to protect and help the development of labour organizations. In addition to these provisions that are directly of interest to the life of the peasants and the labourers, there are provisions of a general character which will affect their lives in no less degree. It was provided that the receipts from the increment of land of the country due to the general development of society shall be devoted to public purposes, as also the receipts from the forestry, from mining, and from the hydraulic powers and from all other public undertakings. The natural resources of the country that are of a monopolistic nature and those that are beyond the power of the private individuals to develop are to be undertaken by the Government and the proceeds realized to be devoted to the education, the provision for the sick and the old and the young, and other purposes of a public character. The devoting of the proceeds of so many important nationalized industries and from the taxes shall be sufficient to improve the general condition of living of the people that the lives of the peasants and the labourers are bound to be materially

affected and improved. These are the things that make the labour laws and the laws for the peasants a reality.

More specific provisions for the peasants and the labourers came from the deliberations of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang that was held in the year 1926. The movements of the labourers and the peasants had by that time had two years of operation, and many mistakes and requirements were then observed. That is the reason why in the Second National Congress the Kuomintang was able to make more detailed provisions for these two classes of people in its programme. During the two years that intervened between 1924 and 1927 many schemes were put into effect with a view to furthering the labour and peasant movements. In the province of Kwangtung, where the authority of the Kuomintang was then confined, there was established a department of labour and peasantry to look after the interests of these two classes. In the central organization of the party there were created two special departments, one for labour and the other for peasants. These two departments of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang were charged with the duty of guiding the movements of the peasants and the labourers, with especially the work of enlarging and developing their activities. Special appropriations were made for the work among the peasants and among the labourers. Therefore the work went on with very good results, especially with the peasants, where the organization had come after the organization of the labourers, and increased attention was paid to them. Before proceeding to see what the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang provided for the labourers and the peasants, it is interesting to notice how it reiterated the position of the party regarding these two classes of people. It declared the position of the party in a still clearer manner and with the greatest emphasis.

In the preamble to the resolution on the peasant question the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang said:

"China is to-day still in the age of agricultural economy. Agricultural products form more than 90 per cent. of the total national production and peasants form more than 80 per cent. of the total population. Therefore the Chinese Nationalist Revolution is specially an agrarian Revolution. In order to strengthen the foundation of the Revolution, the Kuomintang must first of all seek the participation of the peasants. In all movements, whether political or economical, the peasants ought to form the basis. The policy of the party must in the first instance pay attention to the interests of the peasants. The action of the Government must be directed to the liberation of the peasantry based on their interests, because if the peasantry is emancipated, it means the accomplishment of the greater part of the Nationalist Revolution, and it is the basis for the realization of the Three Principles of the party."

This was a very significant statement. It served not only to pledge the party on this question, but also to indicate the trend the party as a whole was drifting into. The party was then moving towards the Left, and the statement in a way represented advance from the position which it took at the reorganization conference in 1924. If one compares the decisive and emphatic statement of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang with the none the less definite but more general statement of the reorganization conference of two years ago on one of the greatest questions on which a great controversy of the party hinged, namely the question of the agrarian revolution in the Chinese Revolution, one will see that between the two years the party was swung more and more towards the Left, with the result that these specific provisions on the peasant and the labour movements were produced. One may say that the influence of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang reached its height at the Second National Congress, as expressed in these resolutions. The resolution on the peasant movement indicated three directions in which the movement in the future should be directed ; they were the political, the economical, and the educational aspects of the peasant movement.

1. POLITICAL.

(*a*) The peasants must be guided and organized so that they may participate in the Revolution.

(*b*) A certain class of people who obstruct the interest of the peasants must be punished, namely the militarists, the *comporadore* class, the corrupt bureaucracy, and the bad gentry.

(*c*) The armed organizations that oppressed the peasants must be dissolved.

(*d*) The principle that the peasants may have the power of self-protection must be established.

(*e*) The monopoly of the gentry in the local government must be broken down and the peasants helped to organize themselves for self-government.

(*f*) The Kuomintang should for all time struggle on the standpoint of the interests of the peasants.

(*g*) Laws for the protection of the peasants should be made.

2. Economical.

(*a*) Exorbitant rates of interest on rural loans shall be strictly prohibited.

(*b*) The maximum limit of rent to be paid to the landlords as well as the minimum price of grain shall be established by law.

(*c*) The working hours of the farm labourers shall be decreased and their wages increased.

(*d*) All miscellaneous, vexatious taxes, all extra taxes, taxes in advance, and taxes on land that does not exist shall be abolished.

(*e*) The rural banks should be established as soon as possible, and the peasant co-operative system in its productive aspect as well as for consumption should be promoted.

(*f*) To make investigation of the actual conditions of the land under cultivation and to improve agricultural and irrigation methods in general.

(*g*) The public waste land shall be distributed among the poor peasants who have no land.

(*h*) The employment conditions of the young farm labourers and of the woman labourers shall be improved.

(*i*) The profiteering of the merchants at the expense of the peasants shall be prohibited.

(*j*) The agencies of mutual help among the farmers should be encouraged.

3. Educational.

(*a*) There should be established for the peasants as soon as possible the system of compulsory education and a system of supplementary education for the old peasants.

(*b*) For the above purpose the receipts of the localities may be utilized as far as possible.

(*c*) To carry out propaganda among the farmers with a view to help them to develop the rural schools by themselves.

These are the principal provisions for the work that was to be carried out among the farmers. These were essentially mild measures of a character of rural reforms instead of a sweeping agrarian revolution. But it was clear that if these could be carried out, they would immensely accrue to the benefit of the farmers. The mildness of the measures would also indicate the backward condition of the Chinese peasants and the urgency with which the primary necessary reforms ought to be carried out. The party paid great attention to the peasant movement and required every provincial branch of the Kuomintang to establish a peasant department to supervise the work in that province. The party also established special schools for the training of the workers who should go out to the country to preach to the farmers the principles of the Kuomintang and to organize them into peasant unions. It was the first time in the history of China that the country farmer who in the ordinary time weighed so little in the political scale was sincerely approached by a great political party in order to enlist his sympathy and energy for the work of social reconstruction.

Another field to which the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang paid special attention was the labour movement. The importance of labour was regarded as only paralleled by the peasant movement. The difference between the two is that at the time of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang the labour movement was in a more advanced stage and that it had already demonstrated its power by its organization and by its history of struggle against the capitalists and imperialists. The Second National Congress made clear its position by an important resolution, in the preamble of which it said:

"In the revolutionary work of our party the fundamental task is to unite the masses and to firmly establish the foundation of the masses. Labour is the most important element of the masses. Without labour there can be no strengthening of the foundation, and perhaps there is no foundation at all. In the position that it occupied and in the sufferings that it experienced labour is to-day under the

political and economic oppression of the present social system to a peculiar degree. Its desire for emancipation is so urgent that its advance in the direction of revolution must also be very powerful. The object of the revolution is to relieve the masses of their sufferings. To achieve this aim, the attitude of the party towards this most oppressed and most revolutionary labour masses should be, on the one hand, giving it powerful help so that its strength and its organization may be developed, and on the other, the party should use all its means to secure the sympathy of labour and to establish close connection with it, to the end that the party may establish the great revolutionary foundation among the workers."

For the purpose of effectively bettering the conditions of labour as also to strengthen its organization, the Second National Congress made the following proposals for the Government to carry out. The Government was to establish a general labour code as soon as possible. This labour code was subsequently under preparation by the Ministry of Labour that was created in the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han. Other provisions required the establishment of the eight-hour labour day and the fixing of the minimum wage, and the special protection to child and woman labourers, as the minimum age to begin employment should be fourteen, and the requirement of a two months' holiday with pay for the woman worker after her confinement. The workers shall be entitled to wages during legal holidays. Sanitation in factories shall be improved. Labour insurance is to be set up. Special attention is to be paid to the education of the workers. Efforts are also to be made to encourage the co-operative enterprises of the labourers. But perhaps the most important of all of these provisions was one which guaranteed to the labourers the legal right of absolute freedom in the matters of association, of speech, of publication, and lastly of strike. All these provisions were primarily of an economic character, intended for the betterment of the livelihood of the workers. They are nearly all of them realized in the labour laws of practically all the industrial countries, in one form or another. The eight-hour day is now common in Europe and in America, and in some countries movements are on foot

for the shortening of the hours still more for the more arduous kinds of labour, as mining. Labour insurance and the sanitary provisions in the factories are to-day some of the necessary requirements for employment. Due to the consistent efforts of the more humanitarian sections of public men and organizations, and particularly due to the efforts of labour itself, there has arisen in most of the industrial countries a complicated system of labour laws running through all the ramifications of the employment of labour. Compared with these countries, the provisions of the Second National Congress are to be regarded as too short of the achievements in this respect already in existence in the world of to-day. They were just the modest beginnings of labour in a country which is industrially backward.

The unionization of labour is, then, the fundamental problem of the Chinese labour movement at present, for without unions labour would be powerless. The work of the organization of labour unions in China did not make great headway before the European War. Labourers in Hongkong and Shanghai were the first to organize themselves. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 the work went on with some progress among certain great branches of industries, such as railways and transportation. But trade-union movement on a national scale did not come until after May 30, 1925. The massacre of the Chinese by the British municipal authorities in Shanghai on that date, and subsequently in Canton in the following June, gave rise to national movements of the masses against the imperialists. The affair gave a tremendous impetus to many kinds of movements on a national scale, and the trade-union movement was one of the most important. May 30, 1925, will always live in the history of China as a day when the whole people of China rose against imperialism in China. In the following months strikes against the British imperialists were instituted in many places in the country, and notably in the great strike against Hongkong, which lasted fifteen months, and

which completely paralysed the economic life of that colony for the entire period. It was the greatest strike in the history of Chinese labour, and was one in which the labour power of one country was engaged in a great political struggle against the imperialist domination by another country. The strike was entirely political in nature, and demonstrated the extent to which the power of the labour masses in China had grown and was capable of growing. It was in the midst of the strike against Hongkong that the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang was held in Canton in January 1926. The resolutions on the political aspect of the labour movement as passed by that Congress gave the full significance of the participation of the labour masses in the revolutionary movement of China. They were as follows:—

1. " Since the movement of the 30th of May, the labour movement in the country has passed from purely economical struggle to political struggle. In the great anti-imperialist movement everywhere, especially in Shanghai and in Canton, there was extensive participation by labour. The Kuomintang should utilize this opportunity well and make special efforts in the revolutionary propaganda among the workers, to make the labour masses understand that the political struggle is not a temporary one but is a permanent one, and to develop the power of sustained efforts of the labour masses in the political struggle."

2. "The labour masses of the country have received proper experience and instruction in the struggle of the movement of May 30th. From the national point of view the result is satisfactory. The rapid rise of the labour movement in all places, and the emergence of the great labour organizations during the last half-year, are all proofs of the great development of the solidarity of labour. The party should at this time render great help to speed up its quick and further development, so that the All-China Labour Federation, the regional labour organizations, and other trade unions, may develop into healthy, independent, and systematic organizations."

3. "The imperialists and their tools, the militarists, the big merchants and *comporadores*, seeing the danger in the gradual awakening of labour, are using all kinds of cruel methods to destroy the labour masses and organizations, killing labour leaders without any pretext. Such things have aroused the more violent resistance of the labour

masses. It is the duty of our party to render help to the labourers in this instance."

Another instance of the power of labour in the revolutionary movement may be cited. When the Nationalist Army was approaching Shanghai this spring against the northern troops, the labourers disarmed a great number of the troops of the northern army almost without any arms themselves. They captured a large number of rifles and ammunition, and then proceeded to form the workers' battalion. This workers' battalion played an important part in the capturing of Shanghai for the Nationalist Government. Later, when the party split became a fact, the workers' battalion was disarmed by the Nanking Government, as it knew full well that the armed workers would constitute a serious danger to the existence of that reactionary Government. Now, the workers' battalion in Shanghai was not the first kind of the direct assistance of the workers to the Kuomintang at a critical moment. In the days when the Kuomintang Government at Canton was engaged in cleaning up the remnants of reaction in that province, the workers had rendered conspicuous service to the Revolution, and at one time, when the enemy forces were closing on Canton, the capital was saved by the timely strike of the railway workers, thus paralysing the communications of the enemy.

As to the extent of the organization of the workers of the country, it is practically nation-wide, extending to the commercial centres of the interior. Nearly all the trades and the handicrafts have now their unions, especially since the arrival of the Nationalist troops in the valley of the Yangtsze, the work had gone on with great rapidity. One hesitates to give any statistics of the number of the workers already unionized, as in many places in the northern ports the work necessarily remained for the most part in secret; and of the labour organizations in the central provinces and in the south there have been ups and downs since the reign of reaction started. Many unions have been broken up by the military forces and rival organiza-

tions set up in their places. In other places labour unions were forced to be reorganized under military pressure, and pseudo-labour organizations were placed in their places. To-day labour in China is being assaulted by the militarists, old as well as new, but its spirit is intact. Against this military pressure labour all over the country is rebelling, and strong resistance is in evidence. Everywhere the cry of the labourers is for the return of their genuine labour organizations. An indication of the extent of the organization of labour in China may be gathered from the following statistics furnished by the Pan-Pacific Labour Conference in May 1927:

Shanghai	800,000
Chekiang	300,000
Wusieh	120,000
Nanking	50,000
Chingkiang	30,000
Hupeh	450,000
Hunan	350,000
Kiangsi	200,000
Anhui	80,000
Kwangtung	400,000
Hongkong	250,000
Tientsin	10,000
Shansi	15,000
Shantung	4,000
Szechuen	45,000
Manchuria	5,000
Honan	6,000
Kwangsi	50,000
	3,165,000

These figures are given here as an illustration in default of other figures, and they must be revised considerably in view of the new facts arising out of the great extension of the power of the Kuomintang since last year. Considering the short period in which labour conquered its way from a small beginning to the position of power in China, these figures are satisfactory.

From the history of labour in China, short as it is, three

things may be gathered as the special characteristics of the Chinese labour movement under the Kuomintang : Firstly, the labour movement in China is political ; secondly, it is anti-imperialist ; thirdly, it is militant. The labour movement in China to-day has only made a beginning in the great historical struggle of revolution, and the part that it is yet to play in the future will be more important than that which it has so far played. To-day the revolutionary movement is temporarily down, and the labour movement has in consequence received a momentary set-back. But the political force of labour is to-day as strong as before. Unlike the labour movement in other countries, where it started primarily as an economic struggle for the betterment of the standard of living of the working masses, labour in China is from the very beginning organized on the distinct principle of a political struggle to fundamentally solve the social and the economic problems of the country. The whole labour movement under the Kuomintang is political. Then the anti-imperialist nature of the labour movement of China is only another aspect of the political struggle, inasmuch as the struggle for freedom of China involves not only the fundamental change from a feudal into a modern country, but also emancipation from the permanent domination of the imperialist influence and power in China. In such a double struggle, against militarism and feudalism within and against imperialism without, labour in China is necessarily militant. Of the whole labour world in China to-day only a very small fraction is what one may call of the "yellow" type. This small fraction is in number and in strength very insignificant, and cannot be utilized by those opposed to the Revolution to cause any harm. The whole movement is revolutionary and is opposed to the temporizing and "gradually improving" methods of the bourgeois elements of the country. It aims to help the Kuomintang to get political power and then to completely realize the aims of the revolution. What the future development of the labour movement of China will be no one can tell at present, but one thing is certain :

it will continue to be a powerful factor in the Revolution of China, and it will remain revolutionary. Judging from the past successes of the movement, one can see even now that labour will have a greater and more glorious contribution to make to the Chinese Revolution in the near future than the satisfactory and great service that it has rendered.

If the northern expedition of last year has achieved nothing more than a great development of the movements of labour and peasants, such results will be a permanent gain to the forces of revolution in China. The tangible fruits of the northern expedition in the form of territorial acquisition have to-day disappeared together with other things, but the spirit of revolution of the masses remains. While both are of the most oppressed and therefore most revolutionary classes, labour is more articulate than the peasants and also more strictly organized; therefore it brings to the Chinese Revolution another new source of strength which the peasants have not yet been able to bring about—that is, international labour's sympathy and help towards the Chinese Revolution. One need not describe the attitude of strong support of the workers of the Soviet Republic, for there the whole population is in sympathy with the Chinese Revolution, and the progress of the Revolution from the beginning of the northern expedition is so fully and carefully reported in the papers there that the people are informed to a surprising degree. But labour in other countries has from time to time manifested an attitude of such support that in some cases it has been a great force in that country *vis-à-vis* its own Government in the determination of the policy of that Government towards Nationalist China. The case of British labour may be particularly mentioned. In no country was labour put in such opposite position to the professed policy of the Government on the China policy than in Great Britain during the months of January and February when negotiations were in progress between the two countries on the retrocession of the former British concession at Hankow

to China. The British Labour Party, the British Trades Union Congress, and the Parliamentary Labour Party sent jointly the following significant message to the Kuomintang:

"The Labour Movement deplores the flaunted military demonstration against the Nationalist Government, as the effect may be to stir up the spirit of panic and aggression on both sides and make inevitable the very misfortunes which it pretends to prevent. This demonstration is likely to thwart the policy of negotiation and amicable settlement on the basis of a frank recognition of Chinese national self-government which our Foreign Office was appearing to pursue, and tends to set that policy aside for one of threat and defiance. The Labour Movement therefore calls for a patient and honest pursuit of peaceful negotiations with China free from the menace of armed force for the ultimate abrogation of the unequal treaties that have now no right to be enforced and for the amicable arrangements for the immediate winding up of the conditions that depend directly or indirectly upon the existence of these treaties. The British Labour Movement further sends to the Chinese workers its most sincere sympathies and support in their attempts to improve their economic conditions, and it hopes that by a firm and peaceful policy of negotiation they will guide their country through its recent difficulties and dangers and establish it among the self-governing nations of the world and make treaties of their own free will which will be for the benefit and dignity of their people."

Not only in England, but in Australia, in the United States, in Europe, and everywhere in the whole world, wherever there is organized labour, their sympathy has been with the Nationalist Movement in China for the realization of her independence from imperialist domination and freedom from the militarist reign at home. Labour in the world has come to realize the important part that the Chinese labouring class is playing in the Chinese Revolution. In May of this year there was held at Wu-Han the Pan-Pacific Trades Union Conference, in which representatives from China, Soviet Russia, Japan, Korea, Java, England, France, and the United States participated, while delegates from other countries were prevented from coming by the failure of getting passport visas from their Governments. At the opening session it passed a resolution conveying a message to the Chinese people, in which it said:

"It is with joy and pleasure that the Pan-Pacific Trades Union Conference notes the fact that the young trade-union movement in China is playing such a prominent rôle in the Chinese Revolution and that the trade unions of Shanghai have always fought in the front ranks of the Revolution.

"In sending fraternal greetings to the National Revolutionary Government, to the Workers' and Peasants' organizations, to the Revolutionary Army and to all the toilers of city and country, the Pan-Pacific Trades Union Conference promises in the name of all the trade union organizations it represents that the revolutionary workers of Soviet Russia, Japan, England, France, America, Java, and of the whole world will leave nothing undone to help the Chinese people in their great though difficult struggle for national and social liberation.

"The toiling masses of China have already made numerous sacrifices in the gigantic struggle that is going on. Many loyal fighters fell at the hands of bloody assassins, but the cause to which these heroes have sacrificed their lives is not and cannot be lost. The Chinese Revolution is living, is growing, and is gaining ground, and will carry off the final victory."

In stating the support that the Chinese Revolution has received from international labour organizations, one should by no means forget the sympathy and understanding that the same cause has received at the hands of a constantly growing body of public opinion in the various countries, in the United States and in Europe, both in and out of the Government. It is true that among the Government circles the opinion favouring the cause of Chinese Nationalism is still too small to be counted, but nevertheless, in discussing the opinion of the Governments, even in those countries supposedly to be most opposed to the aspirations of a strong and united China under a Kuomintang, as in the British Government and in the Japanese Government, it is always well to remember that the opinion favouring Chinese Nationalism still exists, although muffled for the time being at least by the men in authority. But in no section of any country has there crystallized such a body of powerful opinion as expressed by the labour organizations of the respective countries. The existence of a body of public opinion, voiced and backed by the solidly organized machinery

of the labour unions, is a very powerful factor in promoting the amicable settlement of questions between China and foreign countries.

There remains a word on the practical result of the peasant movement uuder the Kuomintang. The essential feature of the movement lies in the organization of the "peasant union" in every village and district. A peasant union in the village corresponds in a way to the labour union in the city. It represents the poor farmers and the farm labourers. The possession of land is not necessarily a disqualification to membership in one of the peasant unions, but the big landlords and those who possess land exceeding a certain limit are excluded from membership. Thus the regulations governing the organization of peasant unions issued by the Central Executive Committee in 1924 provided in the first article that:

> "Within the competence of these regulations the farmer means the self-cultivator, the partly self-cultivator, the tenants, the farm labourers and the handicraft worker in the village, and those engaged in manual work in the village."

The third article provided that the following people are, *ipso facto*, excluded from membership in the peasant union. They are:

1. Those who possess more than one hundred mows of land.
2. The loan sharks in the villages.
3. The religious professionals both of Chinese and foreign sects.
4. Those under the influence of foreign capitalism.
5. Those addicted to opium and gambling.

The peasant union is thus an organization for the benefit of the poor farmers and those who possess a very moderate amount of land and the labourers of the village. It is an instrument in the hands of the poor farmers against those who occupy positions of special privileges in the country, particularly the landlords and the gentry class. From time immemorial

the influence of the landlords and the gentry class has been very great in the country. They not only controlled the economic life of the farmers by the high rate of rent demanded for the use of the land from the tenants and by the exorbitant rate of interest charged on mortgages—the landlord is often a loan shark at the same time—but they also monopolized the political and administrative activities of the locality. Against these people the poor farmers had no means of redress, and they remained in a state of economic and social subjugation. This is so patent a fact in the rural life of China that any Government under any party that wishes to improve the rural conditions fundamentally is bound to take measures to remedy it. The peasant union as organized under the Kuomintang is in a way the centre of self-government in the village and meets a timely demand of the poor farmers. In each village, in each rural district, and in each province there are the corresponding peasant unions, which together form a unified system, to be controlled and directed by the National Federation of the Peasant Unions.

The scope of the functions of the peasant union is very wide. It includes practically all the activities in which the farmer is interested, with the political aspect especially emphasized. Article 56 of the regulations for the organization of the peasant union provided that it shall have the following specific functions:

1. To preach the peasant policy as contained in the Three Principles of Dr. Sun and to undertake the reconstruction in the village according to these principles.
2. To preach the economic inter-relationship between the farmers on the one hand and the labourers and the merchants on the other, and to devise ways and means of mutual help between them.
3. To promote co-operative enterprises in the village.
4. To undertake other local activities, such as education, improvement in farming, and the prohibition of opium and gambling, and so on.

In the case of necessity the peasant union may also organize its own armed guard to protect the interests of the farmers.

The arming of the peasants is in some places a practical necessity, as the landlords and the gentry class usually can rely for protection on the soldiers of the Government. In the province of Hunan, where the work of the organization of the peasants was more extensively carried out than in any other place, the influence of the peasant union was especially powerful. In many cases the land of the landlords was seized and their property taken, not indeed by a mob for the purpose of looting, as the enemy of the peasant movement would have one believe, but turned to public purposes under the administration of the peasant union. In the course of pushing on the work of peasant union many excesses were committed which alarmed people, and finally the military authorities took things into their own hands and started a wholesale suppression of their activities and the execution of the leaders. It is easy to understand why the excesses were committed and why the military should particularly hate the peasant unions. The movement is young and excesses are unavoidable; but the military are essentially opposed to it even if it had committed no excesses. The union is in many places not properly organized and controlled, and many undesirable elements got into it and committed these excesses for their own selfish purposes.

The exact statistics of the peasant movement are difficult to obtain. The movement is practically nation-wide. In the provinces that have come under the rule of the Kuomintang for any considerable time the movement has reached a high degree of development. This is especially true of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh. In the north, in Inner Mongolia, in the province of Chili, the work was in secret. The movement was said to have started in Kwangtung in the year 1924 and in the province of Hunan in the last part of 1925. Considering the extreme youth of the movement, the result was something that exceeded expectations. The Peasant Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang published the following statistics in October 1926:

Provinces.	Membership in Peasant Unions.
Kwangtung	665,441
Hunan	138,150
Honan	270,000
Others	Not quoted

That was in October 1926, when the Kuomintang forces first reached Wu-Han. Afterwards the movement went on by leaps and bounds, and in the province of Hunan alone it was reported that by the spring of 1927 the membership of the peasant unions of that province reached the thirty-million mark, which was much exaggerated, but a more moderate figure was not entirely improbable in view of the intensity with which the work of the peasant movement was pushed on there. In the case of the peasant movement, as in other cases of rapid expansion, correct statistics are not obtainable, and figures vary from moment to moment; and in this case it is further complicated by the fact that since the spring of this year in lower Yangtsze, and since the end of May in central Yangtsze, a period of reaction has set in where the peasant movement has been suppressed by the military authorities on a wholesale scale, so that it is impossible to find out what is the exact status of the number of peasant unions and their membership in the country. But the important thing now regarding the peasant movement as a whole is not the number of members in the peasant unions. It centres on another problem, the question of the agrarian revolution.

By agrarian revolution is meant the forcible seizure of land from the big landlords who do not cultivate it and distributing it to those who till but do not have the land. Justice must be done to those who advocate this policy at present that the land belonging to the tillers will not be molested. The Chinese Communists advocate the immediate execution of this policy at present, difficult as it is. The insurmountable difficulty lies here as elsewhere in the lack of adequate and reliable statistics, so that both those who favour and those who oppose the measure do not possess the necessary data on the problem and

fight literally in the darkness. But it is recognized on both sides of the question that there are in China no landlords of the Russian type before the Revolution of 1917, and that it is further recognized that there is a great number of the middle-sized owners of land who possess a moderate amount of land but not to the point of big landlords. As to this class of middle-sized self-owning farmers, opinion on the two sides differs on the percentage, the one contending that as much as 50 per cent. of the entire peasant population of the country belongs to this class, while the other side affirmed with as much or as little accurateness that it cannot amount to more than 30 per cent. The Kuomintang favours the project of providing every self-tilling farmer with land, as Dr. Sun himself said that the ultimate solution of the rural problem must provide the farmer with land, but this is to be done through the action of the Government when the national power has been conquered. The question of the agrarian revolution is one that is still hanging in the balance. But one thing is sure. The economic conditions of the peasants have been going from bad to worse with each year that was spent in the civil war, and already large numbers of farmers are to-day migrating to Manchuria from the north-eastern provinces. The economic conditions of the Chinese peasantry is one of the most threatening things that any political party must face in the immediate future. Whether agrarian revolution or no, if the condition of continuous deterioration is allowed to proceed, and as it proceeds it goes on with greater velocity every year, a point will very soon be reached when the peasants of the country will rise in arms. Perhaps the point has already been reached in many provinces to-day, as in Honan, where the peasant "Red Spears" society has been very active, and as in the provinces of the lower Yangtsze, where the peasants are reported to be in very bad mood. For the peasants of China to-day are gradually awakening to their own conditions and to their political power and to their place in the Chinese Revolution.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRESENT STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PARTY

For a whole year, since the starting of the northern expedition late last summer, the development of the Chinese Revolution has kept the world bewildered. Then suddenly the movement seemed to have stopped and received a check in the spring of this year. Like the flow and the ebb of the tide, the Chinese Nationalist Movement is to all appearances receding and the fury seems to have already spent its strength. Many people are speculating that perhaps the thing is definitely down-and-out once for all, since over the whole country there is not the least sign that is likely to disturb the peace of mind for a long time to come. The Chinese Revolution, like a volcano, went suddenly into eruption, and overnight the eruption stopped, and now it seemed that life in the neighbourhood of this volcano went back to its normalcy. The thing started so suddenly that it took the breath out of one's mouth, and as suddenly it seemed to have disappeared. What are the forces that brought about its rapid development and then its premature breakdown? The present chapter is an attempt to sketch very briefly the chief events that have taken place in the Kuomintang and in the Nationalist Government during the year so as to furnish in a measure the necessary ground for the understanding of these forces.

The casual observers of the Chinese situation have a ready answer for it. They say that the Chinese Nationalist Movement, as it found expression in the gigantic struggle of the past year, is a thing that was artificially stimulated both from within the country and from abroad. They say that within the country there was a group of madmen who styled themselves the leaders of the Revolution, but who are really irre-

sponsible both morally and intellectually. In addition there was the group of Chinese Communists. These two groups of men, with the assistance of the help of Russia, have together brought about the unnatural phenomenon that was called the Nationalist Movement of last year, and that it was especially the work of machination and manipulation on the part of Russia through the instrumentality of the Chinese Communists. To prove the correctness of their assertion they pointed out the condition of the country at the present time. They say, Look at the present condition. What a world of difference between now and January, when the Communists were in the ascendency! Since the Russians have been driven out of the country, bag and baggage, and since the Communists were either driven away, killed, or chased into hiding, the country has presented the usual appearance of quietness, and everything seems to have returned to the normal conditions. There was no longer strikes, and labour has given them much less trouble than before. There are no demonstrations and no labour holidays. The old days have come back, thanks to those who have got rid of the Communists. To their mind, what can be more certain than that the whole show was the work of Communist propaganda, since with their disappearance everything was set aright? They say that the Kuomintang was, of course, all right, and the only thing was the Communists. Kill the Communists, and get the Kuomintang on its feet again, and efface the Communist blot from the good reputation of the Kuomintang. That was the opinion held not only among the Chinese but also among the foreign elements in Wu-Han during the early months of this year when everything was attributed to the Communists. Once get rid of the Communists, then the root of all trouble in China would be eradicated.

These people are essentially the ones that have everything to lose from the Revolution and nothing to gain. They are the big merchants of the country, who have experienced

trouble at the hands of labour, the owners of factories, the foreign merchants, the international bankers, who noticed the increasing unruliness of the Chinese labourers to an extent which they had never noticed in their life in China before. They say that the Chinese people are essentially a peace-loving race and that they do not like violence. All the nonsense was the work of propaganda. The Chinese farmer would like to be left alone to do his daily work without disturbance, and all this revolutionary talk was therefore artificial. An echo went around the country that the country must have peace and that the Chinese must put their house in order. This type of opinion was voiced by those foreigners who have resided in China for a long time and by the unanalytical and the unobserving writers of the foreign Press and by a group of foreign "advisers" of the militarists who sometimes drew princely salaries from several generals who were actually at war with one another. Certainly the Chinese people love peace and hate violence, no less so than any other people. Certainly all revolutions are violent, but not all violences are revolutions. As a matter of fact, the country is suffering daily from violence at the hands of the militarists and their friends, the imperialists. It is suffering from the protracted violence of the continued civil war that has bled the country for so many years. Every time that a militarist was about to be overthrown, an imperialist Power came along and helped him to get up again. One may ask, where is the proof? To cite only one instance, where the circumstantial proof ought to be more convincing than volumes of written testimonies. At the end of last year the finances of Manchuria were so bad that its paper-money was worth next to nothing, and the regime of Chang Tso-lin was about to fall at any moment from this financial cause alone. But who supported him to carry on all these months and to carry out his war operations? Let one answer this question for himself.

The fundamental question to ask is, Do the Chinese masses

want revolution? and not, Do the classes who have profited by the older order of society want it? Of course, these classes of vested interests do not want revolution, and wish to put it out altogether if they can. If the masses do not want revolution, then the men and women who devoted themselves to the revolutionary movement must either be mad or idiotic, and they are too many to be mad or idiotic at the same time. If they want the Revolution, then an entirely different meaning should be attached to the present situation in China. To answer this fundamental question one must turn to the fundamental factors of the country that generated the revolutionary movement and made it the irresistible current that swept the country last year and will soon sweep the country again with greater force. The fundamental factors of the country at the present time are feudalism, militarism, and imperialism, that kept it down under their combined yoke. These are the things that the Revolution wanted to destroy. Dr. Sun said in his will that he devoted forty years to revolution, and its purpose was to seek the freedom and equality of the country. Compare the condition of the country to-day with the condition a year ago before the northern expedition was started. Was there anything that would differentiate the present from the past? On all the major issues there is not the least difference that one can see. Feudalism and militarism reign supreme to-day as they did a year or two ago. The economic conditions of the people, the political and the social conditions remained as they were before, but they have become worse every year with every additional year of violence caused by the civil wars waged by the militarists on one another and on the people. Internationally the position of China was as bad as usual. When the party split occurred in April of this year, the imperialist Powers laughed in their sleeves and congratulated themselves on the new lease of life to their regime of special privileges in China. Imperialism in China to-day is more powerful than before, for the only power that

can check and destroy it in China, the revolutionary movement, received a check. In the present conditions of China, the only difference from a year ago was that in place of the old militarists there have arisen a new set of militarists. The Revolution was prematurely broken, but it has not achieved its purpose. And revolutionary movements are dangerous for the fact that once they are generated there is no power on earth to prevent them from reaching the final and ultimate objective. There is nothing like it in the world, except the onrush of a great river. The mighty currents of the Yangtsze River of revolutionary China cannot be checked by human force. It may receive temporary rebuffs and set-backs, but it cannot be stopped. For those who think that it may be destroyed, they are sleeping on a dormant but living volcano.

The well-meaning people who wish to see peace and quiet established in China should direct their attention to the basic factors of Chinese society and see that they are removed, instead of fixing their attention on the wrong objects, communism or the influence of Soviet Russia. When China will have removed feudalism, militarism, and imperialism from its body politic, then peace and quiet will come naturally. It is only after the meaning of those basic factors of the Chinese Revolution is fully grasped that one can understand the train of events that have led the revolutionary movement to the great central plains of China last year and the beginning of this year, as well as the sudden apparent breakdown of this movement. Otherwise the whole movement would be a shifting of personalities, the substitution of one set of men in power in place of another. One is naturally surprised at the rapidity with which the shifting of men took place in China, and the thing appears to be a permanent riddle to them. It is like trying to understand real life by going only to the cinema, to grasp the unreal and the elusive and the shadowy, but forgetting the real and the living. It is futile. Look through the

men and see what are the forces and the factors that are behind them, then the situation will become clear.

With the starting-point definitely fixed, it is possible to measure the events that have transpired during the past year, and see what are the forces that have worked for the rising and the development of the Nationalist Movement from a single province in the south and brought it for the first time to the great central valley of the Yangtsze. It is also possible to see what are the forces that have been generated during this process of expansion that finally brought it to a halt before it reached Peking. The period to be examined runs from June 1926, when the northern expedition started from Canton, to August 1927, when the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han definitely rebelled against the party. In this brief period of one year great events have been crowded, and the forces were surging in different directions at different periods of the year, so that it is possible to divide the year into three periods according to the forces that were dominant at each period and found expression in the chief events of that period. The first period runs from June to December 1926; the second period runs from December 1926 to April 1927; and the third period runs from April to August 1927.

The First Period, June to December 1926.—The northern expedition started from Canton in June. It was not the first attempt on the part of the Kuomintang against the northern militarists. Previous attempts under Dr. Sun were unsuccessful, but since the unification of Kwangtung under the power of the Kuomintang in 1925, preparations, military as well as financial, were made with the object in view. The northern militarists have always dreamed of conquering the home of revolution by force of arms, but they had not been successful. Sometimes the northern militarists bribed the generals in Kwangtung in an attempt to bring it under their sway, and this in part explained the long reign of chaos in that province previous to the rise of the power of the Kuomintang. The

campaign first carried the revolutionary forces to the province of Hunan, where the forces of Wu Pei-fu, one of the arch-militarists of the north, and who a few years ago was dictating the affairs of the country, were met and defeated. His better-equipped, better-financed, and numerically superior army was not a match for the revolutionary forces. At that time the stronghold of Wu Pei-fu was Hankow, the great transportation centre of the country, where he drew some of his sinews of war. It had then never dawned on the mind of anyone that the little "invasion," as it was called, of the forces of the south could ever reach Hankow. It had not been done before. But Wu Pei-fu's soldiers were defeated in one battle after another. In September the Revolutionary Army had reached Hankow and laid seige to the historical city of Wuchang, which it did not take until the beginning of October. It is not necessary to go into the details of the military campaign, but it suffices to say that it was not an easy matter for the Revolutionary Army to have achieved its first objective in so short a period. Some very bloody battles were fought in the course of the campaign, both in the province of Hunan as well as in the province of Hupeh. But the northern troops and the people in general did not know that the army from the south was entirely different from the usual army that fought in the civil wars of the country. It was a party army, with definite objects and definite purposes. The army as a whole had received political instructions and the teachings of the principles of the party. It went into the battle with the intention of sacrificing for the cause that it was fighting for. It was not the mercenary type so common in China. It was led by officers who were for the most part trained in the Political and Military Academy that was established in Canton by Dr. Sun. It was a new kind of army. So its lack of good equipment and of heavy artillery which it either did not have or was too heavy to be carried for so long a distance on mountainous roads, was more than balanced by the excellence of its *morale*.

Of the conditions of this new army which appeared on the battlefield for the first time, a foreign correspondent wrote later in the stage of the campaign when the Revolutionary Army had passed Hankow:

"The Cantonese expeditionary force is so efficient that it makes all the northern organizations look like rabble. Discipline is perfect, control of all officers under a unified command is excellent, and checks upon them ingenious, and when they go into a fight they mean business and carry out their operations with clockwork precision. They have demonstrated to what a pitiful degree the northern armies have been demoralized during the past years. The Cantonese force, with the addition of Tang Sen-Chi's men, did not originally exceed 60,000 men. Losses have been heavy, good-sized garrisons have been left in charge of all the big cities, Wuchang has been invested, an expeditionary force has gone up the Kin-Han Railway, another down the Yangtsze, another from Changsha to Pingskiang and probably eastward from the vicinity of Yochow to intercept Sun Chuan-fang's attempt to reach the Hukwang Railway and cut the communications. The biggest of these forces cannot possibly exceed 20,000 men, yet everywhere they either hold their own or register overwhelming victories against odds. Chin Yun-ao abandoned Wushenkwan, the strongest position on the Kin-Han Railway, which he held with a force of 30,000 men, before the advance of six battalions of little barefooted Cantonese soldiers."

But it was not the military achievement, brilliant as it was, that was the most notable event of this period from the party's standpoint. What appeared to be the outstanding event was the enormous amount of party activities that were pushed in all directions wherever the army of the party was victorious. The membership of the party increased enormously, and the number of districts organized under the Kuomintang went up to unprecedent figures. As soon as the army cleared a district of the enemy, the party organization was set up and the affairs of that place were put under the direction of the party. Propaganda of the principles of the party went on on a gigantic scale, carried by a vast army of party workers who followed the army or were specially sent out by the party. The cry was to reach the masses. It was a sincere and honest attempt to preach the doctrines to the workers of the town

and to the peasants of the country. So everywhere the Revolutionary Army was welcomed by the people of the districts, and in the villages and in the hamlets the farmers furnished information to the army leading to victories. In addition to the organization of the branches of the party, the organization of the labour unions and of the farmer's unions went on with feverish speed. In the great centre of Wu-Han as well as in the other cities the labourers were organized into a great number of unions, from the wharf coolies to house servants, from factory hands to ricsha coolies. Everybody in the labour world belonged to some sort of union, which was again affiliated with some larger union, so that labour was organized in a systematic way. In the country in the provinces under the Nationalist authority, especially in the province of Hunan, the organization of the peasants was going on with a speed that was only paralleled by the organization of labour in the city. The poor farmers were told the principles of the party and were helped to form a union in that district. Of course, the landlords were excluded from the peasant unions. These district peasant unions were then co-ordinated in the provincial peasant union and then in the All-China Peasant Union, which was paralleled on the labour side by the provincial labour unions and the All-China Federation of Labour. District and provincial labour and peasant meetings and conferences were held, and the whole field under the Nationalist authority was seething with the activities of labour, of the peasants, and of the party. Mention must be made of the formation of the women's unions, in the districts in the provinces, and for the whole of the country, for the purpose of drawing the other half of the people of China into the work of the Revolution. The purpose of the women's movement under the Kuomintang was, broadly speaking, to free the women of China from the traditional yoke of political, economical, and social disabilities. The work was very successful, and large numbers of young women came out of their families to work for the party.

In those days demonstrations and parades were of frequent occurrence. They were nearly always political in nature. At these demonstrations representatives and party workers would speak to the people. In all organizations there was the propaganda section, which sent out men and women regularly into the streets to preach the principles of the party and to tell them the problems of the day. School children and little boys were seen haranguing the crowd from the side-walk. The people were supplied with information not only through these meetings and demonstrations, but a vast quantity of written material was published by all the organizations. The books of Dr. Sun were sold cheaply, and their circulation went up enormously. Political posters appeared daily on the streets, depicting the struggle of the masses with militarism and with imperialism. These posters have the advantage of catching the imagination of the people more quickly than other publications, if they were properly worded and properly illustrated. Even in the remotest villages there were posters of one kind or another. In those days no one could stand against the power of the poster, which can make or destroy a man overnight.

In this way the whole people were stirred up and were participating in the work of the Revolution in one way or another. It was essentially a mass movement. It was in the midst of this rising tide of the mass movement that the Nationalist Government arrived from Canton at Hankow on December 9, 1926, and made it the capital of the Government of the Kuomintang. It was renamed Wu-Han, combining the cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang.

The Second Period, December 1926 *to April* 1927.—The establishment of the capital of the Kuomintang and of the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han was in every way an historical event. It meant not only the advent of the power of the Kuomintang from the far south to the centre of the country, but internationally Wu-Han became the symbol

of the ideal and power of the party. The prestige of the Kuomintang among the nations was never so high as at that time. Numerous correspondents from the great papers the world over came to the new capital of the Nationalist Government, there to see for themselves what was actually taking place. Representatives of foreign Governments also arrived to get the views of the Nationalist Government. Wu-Han in those days was not only the capital of the Kuomintang, but throughout the world it represented an idea. It was the living symbol of the political forces that were working throughout Nationalist China.

In this period the military victory and the expansion of the party continued and went on with even greater rapidity. In the military affairs of this period the party registered a decisive victory against Sun Chuan-fang, who, as another strong supporter of the northern militarist regime, was then controlling the lower provinces of the Yangtsze to Shanghai. His main army was crushed after a long campaign in the province of Kiangsi. The Nationalist Army suffered heavy losses in this campaign, but it pushed its way towards Nanking and Shanghai irresistibly along several routes, capturing both places towards the end of March. Another militarist in the person of Sun Chuan-fang was eliminated in the short period of eight months after the northern expedition started from Canton. All the territories within the confines of the Yangtsze Valley and southward to the Kwangtung coast were now under the control of the Kuomintang.

The development of the campaign from Wu-Han in an eastward direction towards Shanghai, instead of northward towards Peking along the Peking and Hankow Railway, was a serious mistake from the political point of view. What military advantages that were derived from this change were certainly not clear and were not comparable to the loss on the political side. The eastern stretch of the Yangtsze, with Shanghai as its great metropolis, is the seat and the cradle of

the financial and the commercial interests of the country. More important still, they were the places where the foreign financial interests were concentrated. Shanghai is essentially the focus of all the imperialist commercial and financial interests of the whole of China, as the so-called Diplomatic Corps at Peking is their political embodiment. In the first place, the contamination of a political movement with the financial interests, which are essentially hostile to it, at that moment was a dangerous thing. People cited the example of the early death of the Taiping Movement as a warning, where the movement, having captured Nanking, squatted in that place instead of pushing towards Peking, and that proved fatal for the whole movement. Whether this example was to the point or not, it is true as exemplified by the facts that are transpiring to-day, with the Nanking Government conspiring and compromising with the financial interests of Shanghai, that once a revolutionary movement is started it either succeeds in a straight and forward march, or it fails by halting at some place in the middle. The Chinese Revolution is brought into contact with the vested interests before it is ready to take care of itself against the danger of being itself devoured by them. That is what has exactly taken place in Shanghai to-day, where the bankers and the bigger merchants, taking advantage of the financial stringencies of the Nanking Government, are using all pressures to bear on the Government to curtail labour activities and to hamper the development of labour in general. Any Government except the morally strong will succumb under those circumstances. It may even have the decency to resent the tyranny of the financial interests, but it submits unconsciously.

Secondly, the arrival of the Nationalist power at Shanghai means the establishment of contact, and therefore a point of possible conflict, with the imperialist Powers at a time when the Kuomintang Government had its hands full. The Kuomintang power was strong, but it had not yet conquered power

throughout the whole of the country. At that time the Nationalist Government was in its strongest position, but it was also true that it was in a very vulnerable position, being surrounded on all sides by its enemies, by the surviving northern militarists, and the imperialist Powers. Any armed conflict with the imperialist Powers would be madness on the part of the Kuomintang, therefore the Nationalist Movement must try as far as possible to avoid any such thing. The events that were brought about by the large concentration of British troops in Shanghai, and the bombardment of Nanking on March 24th by the British and the American gunboats, proved that such a conflict was more than a possibility. Both of these dangers—contamination and compromise with the Chinese financial and commercial interests and the conflict with the imperialist Powers—can be avoided by marching the army northward towards Peking. When the national power will have been attained, the question of Shanghai or any other question can be solved easily. It is the belief of many that the plan of the party was for a continuous drive towards the north, and that the change of plan had been effected by the military authorities in defiance of party authority. It is true that the military must have a wide latitude in the decision of the plan of campaign. However, when a general plan of campaign has been decided not only from the military point of view, but because of some weightier political considerations, the overriding of the party authority by the military authority is a thing of great importance to the existence of the party. This fact was amply borne out by subsequent events, as everybody knows.

In the meantime the Government continued to be strong, and the power of the Kuomintang continued to increase both nationally and internationally. It was a Government leading the mass movement and supported by it. In those days it was the revolutionary masses that gave the strength to the Government. The mass movement, like a rising sea,

tended to sweep everything in its way. A Government supported by the masses organized and directed in a gigantic political movement cannot fail to be strong. So, internationally, the prestige of the Kuomintang was high, and it reached a position never attained or dreamed of by any Chinese Government since the contact with Powers a hundred years ago. It was at this time that an event of great consequence happened in the international relationships of China with the Powers. It was the incident of the ex-British concession at Hankow. The affair had gained such notoriety in the world, and so much had been said of the foul practice of the Kuomintang in instigating a mob to take the concession by force, that it is scarcely worth while to go into details here. However, certain basic facts may be pointed out. Concretely it was a case of interference with the mass movement on the part of the British naval authorities, whose sailors attempted to scatter a group of students engaged in propaganda work by bayoneting them. The masses attempted to storm the concession, which was guarded by the British warships at the place. It was only through the proper handling of the case by the Nationalist Government that a worse disaster was avoided, and the thing later culminated in the retrocession of the concession by the British Government by the signing of an agreement between Mr. Chen Yu-jen, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, and Mr. O'Malley, the British representative. Any imputation that it was engineered on the part of the Nationalist authorities by utilizing the mob is entirely without foundation. The signing of the Chen-O'Malley Agreement on February 19, 1927, was a landmark in the international relationship of China with the Powers, and it incidentally demonstrated that all outstanding questions between them were capable of being solved through negotiation and discussion.

But it was just at the height of the prestige of the Kuomintang that things were beginning to develop within the party. Disagreements within the party were already heard, and

underneath the external development of the party forces were working within which ultimately wrecked the power that was achieved. The disagreement was between the military authority and party authority within the party itself. The military was headed by the then Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, and supported by his men, and particularly by a group of the elements of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang, who had by this time worked their way to the side of the military authorities of the Kuomintang. The outside expression of this struggle between the two sides was the establishment, in fact, of two Governments, one at Wu-Han, under the direction of the party, and the other at Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, under the influence of the block of the military and the Right-Wing elements. In Nanchang was the head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and around his head-quarters gathered all the reactionary elements of the party, which aimed to wrest the power from the Left Wing, which was then in control of the Kuomintang and the Government at Wu-Han. Incidentally there went up the cry for the return of Wang Ching-wei, who was then considered one of the important leaders of the Left Wing, and who was forced to leave the country a year ago after the affair of March 20th. Wang did return in the middle of April, just before the final split of the party. Of the grounds of disputes between the military and the party authorities there were plenty. Of these there were two which occupied the greater part of the time, and then there was the more difficult question on the co-operation of the Chinese Communist Party. The first question that was raised at this time was the one of removing the capital from the newly established quarters of Wu-Han to the inaccessible Nanchang, the head-quarters of the military. The military authorities alleged many reasons for the proposed change of capital, military as well as others. But it was evident that from every point of view Wu-Han was preferable as a capital to Nanchang. The question was not looked upon seriously except from the fact that it seemed that the

military authorities were taking the Kuomintang and its governmental apparatus as their own secretariat. The thing, of course, never went into effect, and the outsiders scarcely knew of its existence.

The second question at issue between Nanchang and Wu-Han concerned the legality of the Joint Council of the members of the Central Executive Committee and of the Nationalist Government, which were then the highest authorities in the party and in the Government at Wu-Han. At that time the Government had just been removed from Canton, and a part of the members of the Central Executive Committee had not yet arrived to make up the necessary quorum. Yet the tense situation both in the internal as well as the international affairs made it absolutely necessary to have some organization to take the place of the Central Executive Committee immediately. So the Joint Council of the members of the Central Executive Committee and of the Nationalist Government was improvised to meet the situation. It was a revolutionary necessity in view of the situation then prevailing. The Joint Council was also accepted by Nanchang, and no objection whatever was raised for a long time. It was during one of the days of the later time that Nanchang began to question the constitutionality of the Joint Council, and military authorities began to criticize it. A heated discussion between Nanchang and Wu-Han resulted in the further deepening of the already bad feeling between the two. It was then evident that things would be brought to a head at any time. The military authorities were at that time doing everything calculated to dispute the authority of the party and the Government. They collected the local taxes without reference to the Ministry of Finance; they made civil appointments and the more important appointments to the military commands without asking the Nationalist Government; they even sent an independent mission to one of the foreign countries without consulting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To all purposes

and intents Nanchang was a Government independent of the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han.

The most important question at issue was the alleged influence of the Communists at the Nationalist Government in Wu-Han. Probably the question of the removal of the Government from Wu-Han to Nanchang was dominated by this fear. But this question of the co-operation with the Communists was one over which only the National Congress, and during its adjournment only the Central Executive Committee, had the authority to decide, and not the military commanders. To this question and all that was involved in the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party a special chapter has been devoted, and it is not necessary to repeat the details here. The question raised point-blank was clear to everybody. It was a struggle between the military authority and the party authority within the Kuomintang. It was apparent that the Kuomintang was about to undergo one of the severest struggles in the history of the party. It was an issue in which the future of the whole Nationalist Movement was involved. The forces had already gone too far to have retrieved the disaster which happened later.

As Nanchang was insisting on the immediate breaking of the co-operation with the Communists and the reversal of a fundamental policy without going through the legal process, and it had the control of the army, it was evident that a split of the party was inevitable. The compliance of the Kuomintang under those conditions of armed threat would amount to the finishing of the party altogether. A last attempt to save the party was made by the calling of the third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, which met in the middle of March. It summarized the position of the party and the purpose of the session in the following significant words:

"This session shall determine whether the individual is to belong to the party or the party to the individual. It is a question whether

the minority is to submit to the majority or the majority to the minority. It will decide whether the military force is to rule the party or the party is to rule its military force. It will also decide whether we will have a system of individual dictatorship or a system of democratic centralization. In short, the question involves not only the fate of our party but also the destiny of the country."

The plenary session of the Central Executive Committee passed important resolutions on the unification of the policies of the Government, on the financial policy as well as on the foreign policy, and on the question of co-operation with the Communists. All of these resolutions have the underlying purpose of upholding the authority of the party against the encroachment of the military apparatus of the party. They were in the nature of reaffirmation of the position of the party at this critical moment. In the meantime the military clique of the party had occupied Shanghai and Nanking and felt themselves strong enough to defy the party itself. They continued to ignore the orders of the Kuomintang, and at last they decided to carry out an open rebellion by the establishment of a separate Government at Nanking towards the later part of April 1927. The split of the Kuomintang was then a fact. The issue that Nanking had chosen was the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang. From that time Nanking began the systematic slaughtering of the Communists under the title of the purification of the party.

When the news of the split of the party reached the outside, one could see that an unmistakable undertone of rejoicing went through the elements that were opposed to the expansion of the Kuomintang, for they knew that the united front of the revolutionary forces of the country was broken. The breaking up of the party at the most critical moment, when the northern expedition was on the half-way, was a thing for which history will fix the responsibility on those persons who were intent on the destruction of the Nationalist Movement. Looking back on those days from now, it is perfectly clear that, aside from the personal responsibilities of the mili-

tary authorities, the thing was a concurrence of forces on both sides which made the split unavoidable. The responsibility of the elements of the Right Wing of the party, who had urged the military authorities to rebel, was clear and needs no further elucidation ; but what was not clear was the responsibility of certain members of the Central Executive Committee and of the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han in handling the critical situation of the party. This statement seemed extraordinary in view of the straightness of the issue involved—that is, party authority against military authority in the party. It must not be taken to mean that, had they adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the military men, the catastrophe would have been avoided. Far from it. In upholding the authority of the party, everyone adopted the right attitude in a great crisis. But the conduct and the behaviour of certain members of the Central Executive Committee and of the Nationalist Government at this period was irresponsible and unstatesmanlike.

At that time there was a certain group of men on the Central Executive Committee and of the Nationalist Government who followed the lead of the Communists. These members were sometimes more radical than the Communists and tried to curry favour with them. They forgot that they were occupying important positions of trust and responsibility, and that the destiny of the Nationalist Movement at that time was in their hands. Of course, the Communists of the Government sometimes produced measures in line with their doctrines, and it was for the members of the Kuomintang to stand on their own position and to contribute measures to balance these tendencies of the Communists. But the uncritical and irresponsible minds of these members of the Government went not only with the Communists, but often farther than the Communists. They also made the capital blunder of trying to utilize the power of another military man to overthrow the military power that was now threatening the party. For

this they have to pay the penalty later on, for in degenerating themselves to the position of using one military man against another they very soon found that they were jumping from the frying-pan into the fire.

At that moment there was one man that was rapidly rising to power in the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han. That man was Tang Sen-chi, who in the campaign last year was fighting for the Nationalist Army in the capacity of the Director of Operations at the front. A year ago he was but one of the field commanders of an army corps, but now, at the moment when the party was threatened from Nanking, Tang saw that his chance had arrived. He sided with the forces that were opposed to Nanking. He was looked upon, therefore, as the defender of the party, and the men in the Government were trying to utilize him. His influence increased greatly, and was increasing every day during all the time that the state of war existed between Wu-Han and Nanking. His army was the backbone of the military forces at the disposal of the Nationalist Government. Formerly a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek, military aspirations and political ambitions prompted him to go on with irresistible force to attain that position when he would one day outstrip his former chief. This is the familiar version of the rivalry of the militarists for personal power and prestige. Unfortunately the thing had to be repeated in the camp of the Kuomintang. In those days no one of those irresponsible members of the Government, who were bent on the increase of the power of Tang Sen-chi, could see that in playing with this rising military star they were playing with fire. To-day things have fully justified the fears of a group of far-sighted men of the Government who could see at that time that in the end Tang Sen-chi would turn against the party. The Communists also paid for their part in augmenting the power and the influence of this general, for to-day Tang Sen-chi was killing the Communists wherever he could lay his hands on them.

The Third Period, April to August 1927.—In this period forces and events have moved so far that nothing human can change their results. Like the finale of a drama, this period will be short, swift, and decisive. The period was essentially uneventful. There was nothing new that would attract the attention of the world, except the military squabbles, the fightings, and the usual phenomenon of an ordinary militarist struggle. It is true that the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han remained true to the principles and the policies of Dr. Sun for a time; but here also the subversive forces were hard at work which culminated in the great betrayal of that Government at the end of this period. To speak briefly, this period was marked by the unsuccessful military campaign of the Nanking Government against the northern militarists, the loss of the prestige of the Kuomintang abroad, and then the great betrayal of the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han.

In every field of action the Government of Nanking suffered humiliation and defeat. It had hoped that it might be able to continue the fight against the northern troops and to reach Peking along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. For a time there were victories and defeats, until the army under the Nanking Government actually reached Shantung, where the advance was definitely stopped. Japanese troops were landed in Shantung to protect the interests of Japan over the protest of the Chinese. The tide of the northward advance was definitely turned, and from there the troops of the Nanking Government beat a hasty retreat until the middle of August, when the northern guns were again bombarding the city of Nanking. Since then the military forces of the Nanking Government had practically disintegrated as a fighting unit, for the different generals were beginning to show their own jealousies and to fight among themselves. But in no other field was the humiliation of Nanking more clearly shown than in the field of diplomacy. It had hoped that by overthrowing the Communists it would certainly get a more favourable treatment by the Powers—

in fact, some of the Powers had openly suggested in one way or another that if the Kuomintang could throw off its co-operation with Soviet Russia and with the Communists, then everything in the way of the revision of the treaties would be open to it. Nanking found that the Powers were not so childish as it had thought. The Powers simply sat tight, doing nothing. Then Nanking tried to start a strike against the Japanese on account of the presence of Japanese troops in Shantung. But the Japanese Government threatened action, and it had to back down. It attempted to increase the taxes on imports by changing the tariff on a certain date. The Powers frowned, and again the Nanking Government had to come down. The imperialist Powers knew well enough that the power of the Nationalist Movement was broken for the time being at any rate, and why should they give up their special privileges if they did not have to? However, the Nanking Government did something the cruelty and the barbarity of which has not known a parallel in the history of China. That was the killing of the Communists under its authority. Students and labour leaders were arrested and killed on a wholesale scale. There was created a reign of terror by the persecution of one section of the revolutionary force of the country.

At that time the Nationalist Government at Wu-Han was still loyal to the principles and to the policies of the Kuomintang. It was still co-operating with the Communists, although the rest of the country was persecuting them. It demonstrated still to a remarkable degree the power and the stability of a Government loyal to principles by two events of considerable importance. The first was the successful campaign in Honan against the Fengtien army of Chang Tso-lin; the second was the repulsing of the insurrection against the Government. These were about the only things in which the Nationalist Government could claim any merit. In the month of May the Nationalist Government started to attain the second objective of the northern expedition by reaching Chengchow,

the great railway junction in the centre of Honan. In this it had to fight the best troops of Fengtien under overwhelming odds in the matter of equipment and in numbers, but it won by the loyalty of the troops who went into the battle to die for the party. In every action of any importance nearly two-thirds of those who participated were killed. The severity of the campaign, and the heroism displayed by the troops will always be remembered in the history of the party. While the troops were engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the army of Chang Tso-lin, reactionary forces began to close down on the Government. Some of these reactionary troops actually reached within striking distance of the capital of the Nationalist Government, but they were beaten back one by one, not by the regular troops, but by the students of the Political and Military Academy, who had hardly finished their training. These students were later disbanded for being loyal to party principles, when the Government turned reactionary. These two events, occurring almost at the same time, demonstrated the remarkable strength of the Government, which was then still loyal to the party. Any Government that survived these severe tests was entitled to exist. The Nationalist Government in those days was operating under very trying conditions, financially as well as otherwise, but it was then still a dignified Government under the Kuomintang.

But unfortunately the power of the military men under Tang Sen-chi was rising; and by the time of June and July his influence began to dominate the Government. This is the second time within half a year that the party was threatened by the military forces. Whether it was this or that general, the objective fact was that the power of the party seemed to be under the perpetual danger of the military forces, a fact that must be fundamentally remedied in the future of the party. Again, in the case of the one as in the case of the other, the problem was the co-operation with the Communists. The military forces under Tang Sen-chi had already begun

a struggle with the Communists in the province of Hunan since the end of May, and they were killing them everywhere in that province. Whatever may be said of the facts of the case, the fact was that the Government was supporting the point of view of Tang Sen-chi against the Communists in that province. The seriousness of the situation was rather minimized by the members of the Government at that time. From the struggle between the military men and the Communists in Hunan it was an easy step for the trouble to spread to Hupeh and to Wu-Han, the seat of the Government. There were certain members of the Government who were then wavering in their attitude, and they have not carefully studied the facts and the situation. The struggle with the Communists became more bitter every day, and the troops belonged to the Government. Then there began a series of laws aiming at the regulation of the activities of the Communists and to purify the local branches of the party and the labour and peasant unions. A wholesale reorganization was started, and Communists were eliminated from many places. From reorganization of the labour and peasant unions to the forcible occupation of their quarters by the soldiers was an easy step. Then the All-China Labour Federation at Hankow was closed. Then martial law was declared against the Communists. Under martial law everything was possible, and everybody was liable to be killed as Communists. The Government had decided to throw overboard the policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party. The Nationalist Government at Wu-Han had definitely rebelled against the party.

In all these months in this period, from April to August 1927, while the military men were making preparations for the funeral of party authority and party government, the majority of the leaders of the party and of the Government seemed to be in a state of intellectual and moral coma, hardly knowing that a great disaster was pending. Some of them had scented that something was wrong, but they did not know what. A

few, but mighty few, of them had realized the nature and the extent of the danger, but they were too few and too powerless to do anything effective to save a situation that had already become by that time irretrievable. But there was one person who saw clearly that the Revolution was being side-tracked, and that the danger was not of a temporary kind, but was one that threatened the very foundation of the Revolution. That was Madame Sun Yat-sen, the widow of Dr. Sun, who was the founder of the Kuomintang and the father of the Chinese Republic and of the Chinese Nationalist Movement. As the living representative of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, she occupies a unique position in the Chinese Revolution that cannot be attained by any other member of the party. Since his death, no one knows more than she does the vital purpose of the Nationalist Movement and the revolutionary urge and palpitation of the vast masses of China. When she saw that the leaders of the party were wavering and unsteady, she used all her efforts to warn them of the danger towards which they were heading. But they would not listen to her. Finally, finding that further advice would be of no avail, and prompted by the hope that a more drastic step might bring them out of their torpor, she called their attention in a public statement issued in July 1927. This statement was a call to the rank-and-file of the party and to the masses of the country that they must face the real issue of the day, which she described in the following words:

"To-day there is much talk of policy. Dr. Sun defined three policies which he decided were the only means by which his Three Principles could be carried out. But to-day it is being said that policies must be changed to fit the needs of the time. There is some truth in this statement. But change of policy should never be carried to the point where it becomes a reversal, so that a revolutionary party ceases to be revolutionary and becomes merely an organ, operating under the banner of revolution, but actually working in support of the very social structure which the party was founded to alter.

"At the moment we face critical issues. . . . Drastic solutions are suggested. It is because I feel that the carrying out of some of these

suggested solutions would destroy the strength of the party and delay the success of the Revolution that I must speak. These solutions seem to me a part of a policy which would alienate and suppress the classes upon which our strength largely depends and for which the Revolution must be fought. Such a policy, I feel, is doomed to failure."

Amid the confusion and bewilderment of the leaders of the party her statement came as a clear voice from the wilderness, calling the strayed and the wayward back to the right path. Had they listened then to this voice, the sorry spectacle that obtains to-day in China would have been avoided. To her, as to all the true members of the party, the question at that time was no longer a choice between this and that policy, but was one of "revolution or reaction," as she said so touchingly:

"Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If the leaders of the party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers, and the party is no longer a revolutionary party but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist. It will have ceased to be a living force working for the future welfare of the Chinese people, and will have become a machine, the agent of oppression, a parasite fattening on the present enslaving system!"

That was the true state of affairs towards the end of this period, from April to August 1927, at Wu-Han. Her statement, which was circulated throughout China and the world, will serve as the rallying-point for the masses of China and for the true members of the Kuomintang in the future struggle of revolution in China. In all such cases where the leaders of a great movement have betrayed their mission the only way out is to turn to the masses. The river may be polluted, but the fountain of the stream is always pure. So she said in this historical statement:

"But although there are members of the party who are straying from the path Dr. Sun charted for the revolution of China, millions of people in China who have already come under the banners of the party will continue on this path to the final goal. This means that I shall not keep faith alone. I am certain that all true members of the Kuomintang will take this revolutionary path."

CHAPTER IX

THE FUTURE OUTLOOK OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

It is true that the northern expedition is dead, but it is not true that the Revolution itself is exhausted, as some people have supposed. The real revolutionists in China to-day no longer wail over the dead corpse of the northern expedition, which for a time had promised so much and had so nearly brought the Revolution to complete success. The northern expedition is a great event in the history of the Chinese Nationalist Movement, and was itself a gigantic experiment that, looking back at it to-day, one cannot help drawing certain conclusions and warnings for the future. It started auspiciously in the late summer of 1926 and ended in a fiasco in the spring of 1927; but it had succeeded far enough for certain objective lessons to be drawn from it.

Before proceeding to analyse the causes of the premature failure of the Nationalist Movement this spring, there are certain warnings to give. The first warning is that the military phase of the northern expedition must not be over-emphasized. The expedition was itself a manifestation of the Chinese Nationalist Movement, and it had two aspects, the political and the military. It was a carefully planned project, not only in the military but in the political sense as well. The reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 was the beginning of this grand preparation for the launching of the expedition. The improved methods in party organization and in party technique were a part of this preparation. After the reorganization, all that the Kuomintang administration in Canton did had this great object in view. Because it was a carefully planned project, it is the more necessary to know wherein the plan

failed. It is true that the military victories had been swift and overwhelming, but they were not the basic causes for the measurable success that the Nationalist Movement achieved. The military phase was certainly not the cause for the failure of this spring, for before the split of the party in the middle of April the Revolutionary Army was victorious everywhere it went—in fact, the Revolutionary Army met no effective resistance anywhere as long as it was maintained by a revolutionary purpose. But on the day of the party split that purpose was gone, and the army as a revolutionary entity disintegrated. Although to-day there are certain sections of that army which still remain and are still flying the banners of the Kuomintang, that *morale* that came only with the revolutionary spirit was completely lost. The Chinese Nationalist Movement was not defeated in the field of battle, as its army never met any serious reverses. That is the tragic feature about it. The cause of its failure was therefore internal and not external.

In trying to understand the phenomenon of the rapid rise of the Chinese Nationalist Movement last year, and its as rapid decline this year, there is a second warning to make —that is, one must not attach too much importance to the individual personalities that rose and fell with meteoric suddenness in the course of this movement. It is true that the action, or inaction, of certain individuals at a certain critical moment may have far-reaching consequences in the events that follow, but, looking at any historical period as a whole the social and economic factors stand out more convincingly than the individuals as the prime movers of the events. One does not have to be a thorough-going believer in the materialist school to-day to see that the day has passed when history was supposed to be the records of the exploits of the kings and the heroes. Nowadays for every phase of history and for every period there are men who attempt to interpret it from the social and economic factors. Applying this spirit to the

study of the situation in China, one may not arrive at a result satisfactory to himself, but one is out of the danger of the futile attempt of subjective reasoning. This is certainly not a palliation of the historical responsibility of individuals in the events of the time, but is rather a shifting of the point of emphasis from the habitual outlook on the individual to a more rational outlook on the basic factors of society in China.

If one asks what are the causes for the failure of the Chinese Nationalist Movement this spring, it cannot be answered with one breath, for there are many reasons. But we know that certain reasons are not directly responsible and therefore can be eliminated. We know that it was not due to military reverses. We also know that it was not due to the effectiveness of the intervention from the imperialist Powers, although they had contemplated doing so and nearly succeeded in bringing about a common positive policy at the time of the Nanking incident at the end of March. Menacing as it was, foreign intervention had not come to the point of open and actual conflict with the Chinese Nationalist Movement due to the care of the Nationalist Government to avoid such an eventuality, and it was also counterbalanced in a measure by the great body of world opinion favourable to Chinese Nationalism. Leaving aside the causes that were local, transitory, and less important, it seems quite clear from the actual events of the time that the fundamental reason for the breakdown of the Chinese Nationalist Movement was the destruction of the united front of all the revolutionary forces of the country which had hitherto been united under the Kuomintang for carrying on the Chinese Revolution. This belief was emphasized and confirmed more and more as the events after the party split began to testify to its correctness. Specifically the Chinese Nationalist Movement had to face two enemies, militarism and imperialism. Internally it had to struggle against the militarists, who kept the country under their heels by the

force of arms and split the country into a number of petty States constantly at war against one another. Whatever be the reasons for the militarist phenomenon in the social fabrics of China, it is clear that it must be removed before any social and economic reconstruction is possible. Externally the Chinese Nationalist Movement had to contend against that system of political and economic domination of China by the foreign Powers. The instrumentality through which China was reduced to the "sub-colonial" status, as Dr. Sun called it, was the series of the unequal treaties. It is "sub-colonial" because, unlike India and Korea, China has to serve the wishes of many masters at the same time. It is difficult to say which of these two enemies of China is the stronger, militarism or imperialism. A few words may be devoted to each to show their chief characteristics.

Militarism is not military power as one finds in the Fascist regime in Italy or its imitation in half a dozen European countries. In countries where military rule obtains there is at least some semblance of rule or government and there is some shadow of peace, and order, and unity of the country. Even in Italy to-day, where the power of government is in the hands of the military dictatorship, there is witnessed a system of government which won the sympathy of some democratic people for its ability to carry on and get things done. But militarism in China is in essence a negation of all government and of all rule. The distinct feature is the conspicuous absence of any ability on the part of any of the militarists to carry on the usual functions of government. In China to-day, from north to south and from east to west, one finds chaos and disorder and petty generals engaged in fighting. That is militarism. Anyone who can assemble a few thousand soldiers and occupy some place is at once a militarist, and under each big militarist there is always a group of small militarists, who in time supplant their chiefs and step into their shoes. This is a condition which cannot find a parallel

in other countries. It is true that at one time or another in the history of other republics there was always a period in which the military and the civil authorities competed for ascendency, and in which the civil authority usually subdued the military in the end, but in China this problem cannot be solved so easily to-day, because civil authority has yet to be constituted. Civil authority must represent some class or classes combined. In China this authority, as organized by some predominating classes, either bourgeois or proletarian, and capable of representing them and exerting itself, is a thing that has to be created. This is a feature in the present situation that is worthy of paying particular attention to. Take some country, England or America, for instance. It is a recognized fact that the industrial revolution brought about a class of commercial and industrial elements to positions of power in the body politic, and that the Government is largely in their hands. Public opinion before the rise of labour was predominately their opinion. They showed their ability in government as well as in industry and commerce. But that is not the case in China. The whole country is mediæval in its economic structure except here and there in the commercial ports, which are but a drop in the ocean. It is true that in the commercial ports there is a small class of rising commercial interests, but as yet they are too small and too weak. Besides, in the commercial and industrial life of the country the foreigner plays an overwhelming part. In the vast interior of the country mediæval economic forces are daily under fire from the new forces of the age, and find themselves unable to offer effective resistance. One may say that the bourgeois class in China is still in the formative stage, and is not yet matured enough to offer to society any conspicuous ability to conduct the government or to resist imperialism and militarism. Militarism preyed on the newly rising bourgeois class as mercilessly as on any other class of society, for it destroys commerce and industry by blocking the trade routes and by levying exorbitant and arbitrary taxes.

In the same way the power of the small merchant class is too weak to offer any effective resistance to militarism.

The labour class in China is also too weak to resist militarism. Labour in China may be divided into two classes, the smaller class of the class-conscious and politically awakened industrial labourers of the city and the vast majority of the handicraft workers of the country as a whole. It is true that the industrial labourers are rising in power, but they are as yet unable to conquer militarism single-handed. Besides, by its natural antagonism towards the newly rising bourgeois class it sometimes finds itself opposed to the united front of the bourgeois and the militarists. If the power of industrial labour is too weak, it will be found that the power of the unorganized handicraft workers is still weaker face to face with militarism. The same thing is true of the peasant class of China, who continuously groaned under the yoke of the militarists and whose days are never free from the requisitions, the taxes, and the forced labour of the militarists. What is more, the militarists, in destroying commerce, destroys also the market for their produce, and by engaging in constant battles on their fields prevents them from tilling their soil. The farmers in all countries are notoriously known for their inability to assert themselves politically, and the peasants in China under the present circumstances are no match for the power of militarism.

Militarism in its essence is a product of economic mediævalism in China. In the vast area of China, except in certain regions along the lower Yangtsze, the productive power of a mediæval agricultural system is so meagre that the margin of life and starvation is very narrow. The population of the provinces of China is so dense and the productive power so small that at any time there is a large number of people who find it difficult to obtain even a meagre subsistence. To these people some kind of employment, or any kind of employment, is better than starvation, so they hire themselves to the mili-

tarists to become soldiers. In China a soldier gets about sixteen shillings a month, if he is lucky enough to get it. It covers his food and expenses and supports his family. If he is out of luck, he is many months not paid, and is kept alive on rice by the militarists. So it is easy to recruit soldiers, for there is always a large number of people who are ready to be hired in this capacity by the militarists. Compare this condition with the United States; the situation of militarism in China will be very clear. In the United States industrial wages and agricultural production are high and opportunities for other kinds of living are many, so that it is often difficult to enlist people in the army or navy in time of peace. In recruiting for the United States Navy the advertised conditions for service are made so attractive as to include military training, cruise, plus an education; yet the recruiting is often difficult, because people find other avenues of life more lucrative than becoming a sailor or a soldier. Under those circumstances it is impossible for militarism to arise, for the reason that there will not be soldiers to fight for the military adventurers. The majority of the soldiers of the militarists of China come from the peasants, who find it difficult to obtain a livelihood in the country. The presence of bandits in many provinces is due to the same cause. At any rate, there is practically no difference between militarism and banditry. The question of militarism is therefore fundamentally one of the pressure of population on the existing means of subsistence.

As regards State power, which is now in the hands of the militarists, one will see that it is the natural consequence of such a state of affairs. Formerly the State power was in the hands of the king when he was strong. His was the ruling power controlling the organized power of the State for himself and for his own class. But with the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911 there is no organized power in any class in Chinese society strong enough to constitute a single State power. Neither the bourgeois, nor the proletarian class, nor the various

classes between them, have either singly or combined been able to succeed in creating a single State power. Which of these classes, or what combination of any of these classes, will be able to create this State power is the major political problem of China to-day; for to-day both the bourgeois and the proletarian classes are too weak. In the weakness of these classes, militarism survived. If any doubt is still entertained regarding this condition of things, look at Chinese history. It is a patent fact in the history of China that whenever a dynasty disintegrated there followed a period of civil war in which the military generals fought against one another in their attempt to obtain the crown and found a new dynasty. That was militarism in Chinese history. What takes place to-day is only another edition of this phase of Chinese history. The difference is that to-day, due to the change of conditions both at home and abroad, the strongest militarist will have to think thrice before he dares to openly declare his monarchical aspirations. It was only a few years ago that one of them, in the person of Yuan Shih-kai, nearly succeeded in making himself an Emperor. But in Chinese history the period of chaos and civil war following the disintegration of a dynasty, short or long as the case might be, was put to an end by the eventual emergence on the political horizon of a man strong enough to conquer the rest and by the establishment of a new dynasty. In that case a new State power was constituted to replace the old that had just disintegrated. In China to-day the old State power had already disintegrated, a part of which had fallen into the hands of the militarists and a part into the hands of the imperialist Powers. To reconstitute the State power in the form of some dynasty is out of the question, therefore the answer must be found in some form of democracy. Now any form of modern democratic government presupposes the existence of some class or classes—bourgeois or proletarian—who are strong enough, singly or combined, to make it a going concern before

that single State power would emerge. But the bourgeois class in China to-day, in its intelligence, its equipment, both mental and material, and in its political ability, is in the nascent stage and too weak to create single-handed a single State power and bring about the liquidation of militarism in China. The same remark is true of the proletarian elements of the country. They cannot by themselves constitute State power. Therefore militarism, like a social disease in the Chinese body politic, waxed strong. Whether one is of the bourgeois type of outlook or of the proletarian type, the weakness of either of these two classes to create single-handed a State power is a fact that is generally recognized as a true description of the situation. The problem whether the proletarian elements may be guided to further develop its power is another question. It may be developed to the point where it will be able to form some kind of dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that case militarism will vanish because the State power is constituted; but that will take some time, and besides, in the present conditions it is a hypothetical case.

If neither the bourgeois nor the proletarian class unaided is strong enough to crush militarism, they are neither of them a sufficient power to deal with imperialism. But the imperialist Powers are wiser than they. In the history of their dealing with China, the imperialist Powers always insisted on what is commonly called a common policy. The fiction that wolves hunt in packs is literally true of the imperialist tactics in China. It is true that this common policy sometimes breaks down, due to their own competing interests, but it is always restored. Count Hayashi, who more than any other of the Japanese diplomats brought about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, summarized in his secret memoirs this cardinal tactic of the imperialist Powers in the following words:

"Events in history have repeatedly proved that if only the Powers combine against China, they can dictate any terms to her; but if they

act inharmoniously and independently, then they will be sadly outwitted by that country. Repeated experiences of such nature ought to have taught the Powers bitter lessons."

Again he said:

"The way to deal with China is for the Powers to insist on what they want and to go on insisting until they get it. . . . There are only these alternatives before the Powers: they must either bring their combined forces to bear on China to get what they want, or else to leave her alone, until, like an awakened lion, she is ready to spring on her prey, in which case she will be powerful enough to threaten the acquired interests of all the Powers."

Looking at what happened in the international situation in the spring of this year at Wu-Han, one must admit that Count Hayashi's words are truly prophetic, for at that time all the classes in China were united under the Kuomintang, while the Powers following a series of events during the past two years, were not. That was the first time in the recent history of China where she had learned to beat the Powers at their own game, and very nearly succeeded in beating them. The result of this unity of the Powers is the creation even in time of peace and at all times of a state of permanent intervention through all the ramifications of China's political and economic life. Space is lacking here to go into the details of the operation of the unequal treaties, but it suffices to say that China, supposedly an independent nation, cannot raise her major taxes without asking the Powers first; she must deposit the proceeds of these taxes in the way the Powers want; she must administer her judicial system subject to certain restrictions by the Powers. But what is more, the imperialist Powers subsidized the militarists with money and arms to keep up the civil war, yet all the time they raise the cry that China must set her own house in order before there is any conference to talk about the unequal treaties. In China to-day militarism and imperialism walk hand in hand, and perpetuate the existing state of things.

The position of the Kuomintang in the face of these facts, both at home and abroad, is very clear. If there is to-day in

China no single class strong enough to combat militarism and imperialism single-handed, and if each of these classes has to face a united front of the militarists and the imperialists and to wait to be devoured in turn, the irresistible logic is that all the classes in China, whether bourgeois or proletarian, should combine themselves and form a united front between them to fight the united enemy. Experience has shown that only a united front of all the revolutionary forces in China will be strong enough to fight militarism and imperialism. That united front was achieved in fact as well as in name by Dr. Sun with the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924. The gradual infiltration of the proletarian elements into the ranks of the Kuomintang during its life-history, and the gradual broadening of its basis to make it rest more and more on the masses of peasants and labourers, resulted finally in the creation of that mighty political power which characterized the northern expedition of last year and this year, and brought the Revolution to the threshold of success. That is certainly no accident, and that was possible only when all the revolutionary forces were united. If there is any doubt as to wherein the Kuomintang derived that mighty force, one might gather it from the statistics published by the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the party in October 1926, in which it was shown what classes were comprised in the strength of the party:

Professions.	*Percentage.*
Labour	29
Peasants	7·5
Students	10·5
Merchants	4·3
Soldiers	23
Liberal professions ..	25·7
	100

This brief table explains itself, except that it may be mentioned that the students as a whole are in sympathy with

the peasants and the labourers, and that the soldiers are largely from the peasant and the labouring classes. The percentage of the elements of the masses must also have risen considerably in the spring of this year, when the labour and the peasant movements were at the high point of development. It is sufficient to prove that the Kuomintang, in constructing the united front of all the revolutionary forces of the country, had its foundation solidly established among the masses of the country.

Whatever may result from the military situation, the expedition has demonstrated the correctness of the policy of the Kuomintang in constituting the national united front representing all the classes. At the end of last year and in the beginning of this year the Kuomintang was a power both at home and abroad. That was a fact that was recognized by both friend and foe. The Kuomintang was not only able to reach from Canton to Wu-Han, but internationally the prestige of China reached a point never reached before. That was possible because all the revolutionary forces of the country were united. But when the party split occurred in the middle of April, the national united front was destroyed and the whole movement collapsed. The party split brought about a new situation, in which the revolutionary forces left the enemy alone and began to fight among themselves. Under those circumstances the corpse of the movement was indeed retained, but its spirit was gone.

To-day the Right Wing of the Kuomintang blamed in one voice the Communists for the breaking of the Kuomintang; but that is only a shifting of the responsibility from the place where it belongs to the place where it does not belong. It is true that individual instances of excesses by Communists have been committed, but there is yet no proof that the Chinese Communist Party as a whole planned to carry out an immediate *coup d'état* against the Kuomintang and therefore constituted a more imminent danger than the militarists and the

imperialists. The real reason for the split of the party is the formation of a block of the military authorities with the Right Wing within the party in order to wrest the power from the Left Wing. The fact that everywhere it was the military authorities that were responsible for the persecution of the Communists, in the north as well as the south, is a conclusive proof that only the militarists are afraid of the Communists. The militarists are afraid of the masses, and therefore they had to destroy that party of the proletariat. But unfortunately that will not destroy communism in China. The only real prevention for the spread of communism in China is the successful reconstruction of the country according to the principles of the Kuomintang under the leadership of its Left Wing, for the Right Wing is no longer revolutionary. The present regime that is now functioning at Nanking is an unstable Government. It has bourgeois habits, but it does not possess the usual bourgeois ability in government. Its only reliance is the army. But, as experience has time and again proved, the army without a purpose is the least reliable thing in the world. The minimum test of any stable regime is its ability to keep harmony and obedience among its own fighting forces. But the regime at Nanking, working under the name of the Kuomintang and flying its banners, is continuously threatened by fighting among its own generals. The leadership of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang is bankrupt, because it comes from the nascent bourgeois class that in ability and in equipment is not equal to the work of revolution in China.

The future of the Chinese Nationalist Movement lies in the hands of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. Its number may be small at present, and its voices are now suppressed, but it enjoys the support of the masses of the people, especially the peasants and the labourers. Any movement in China to-day that does not count on the active support of these people, who form in number the majority of the entire population

of China, and who in political consciousness are daily awakening, is doomed to failure. It is only the Left Wing of the Kuomintang that will be able to reconstitute that united front of all the revolutionary forces of the country and provide the indispensable condition for the success of the Chinese Revolution. It may take some time for the elements of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang to rally round some nucleus and gather strength, but very soon the voice of the Chinese Nationalist Movement will be heard again, for a revolutionary movement can never be stopped until it reaches its ultimate goal.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DR. SUN'S WILL

"I have devoted forty years to the work of Nationalist Revolution, the aim of which is to secure the freedom and independence of China. After forty years of experience I am profoundly convinced that in order to reach this aim we must wake up the masses of the country and unite with those races of the world who treat us on an equality, and struggle together.

"At present the revolution is not yet completed. All my comrades must continue to exert their efforts according to the General Principles of Reconstruction, the Outline of Reconstruction, the Three Principles of the People written by me, and the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, until this aim is realized. The calling of the People's Congress and the abolition of the unequal treaties that I have advocated recently must be realized within the shortest possible time. This is what I wished to call your attention to."

APPENDIX B

DR. SUN'S OUTLINE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CHINA

1. The Nationalist Government shall reconstruct the Republic of China according to the revolutionary Three Principles and the five-power Constitution.

2. The people's livelihood is of prime importance in the reconstruction. Therefore in the four fundamental requirements of the people—namely food, clothing, housing, and communication—the Government should co-operate with the people: to co-operate in the development of agriculture so that the people may have plenty of food; to co-operate in the development of the textile industry so that they may have plenty of clothing; to build houses on a large scale so that the people may be comfortably housed; to build and repair roads and canals to facilitate their travelling.

3. The second in importance is the popular sovereignty. Therefore the Government should instruct and direct the people in their political intelligence and ability, so that they may exercise the powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum.

4. The third in importance is the principle of racial unity. Therefore the Government should help the weaker and smaller races so that they may have the ability of self-determination and self-government. The Government should resist the foreign invasion and encroachment. At the same time steps should be taken to revise the treaties with the Powers so that China's position of international equality and national independence may be restored.

5. The order of reconstruction shall be divided into three periods, the period of military government, the period of training in government, and the period of constitutional government.

6. In the period of military government all systems are under the control of the military Government. The Government shall on the one hand use force to liquidate all the obstacles in the country, and on the other to preach the principles to the people, to instruct them and speed up the unification of the country.

7. When order in a province is completely restored, the period of military government comes to an end and the period of training in government begins.

8. In the period of training in government, the Government shall send properly trained and certified officers, after examination, to the districts to help the people in the preparation for self-government.

The minimum degree of this preparation shall be that a census of the population of the district shall have been completed, the land of the district surveyed, the militia of the district constituted, and the roads in the whole district constructed. The people who have had training in the exercise of the four powers and who have discharged the duties of a citizen and also are determined to put into practice the revolutionary principles, may elect the magistrate of the district to conduct the administration of that district, and to elect the district council to make laws for that district. In that case it will have constituted a completely self-governing district.

9. In a completely self-governing district the people have the power of direct election, direct recall, direct initiative, and direct referendum.

10. When a district begins its self-government, it must make a complete survey of the value of the privately owned land in that district. The procedure is that the landowner shall declare the value himself; the local government has the right to levy tax based on that declaration with the option of buying the land according to the declared value. After this declaration if there is any increment in the value of the land due to the political and social improvements, such increments shall accrue to the people of the whole district and not to the private owners.

11. Tax on land, increment of value on land, production of public land, proceeds from forestry and river, profits from mines and water-power all belong to the local government, to be used for conducting the affairs of the people of the district, for the youth, the old-aged, charity, assistance in case of calamity, medicine, and all kinds of public necessities.

12. Those natural resources of a district and the industrial and commercial undertakings on large scales which are beyond its financial ability to develop and conduct, and must have outside capital for their administration, shall be carried on with the assistance of the central government. The profits shall be divided on a fifty-fifty basis between the central and the local governments.

13. Regarding the sharing of the expenses of the central government, the local governments must remit a certain percentage of their annual receipts to the central government. This percentage shall be fixed every year by the people's representatives. It shall not be lower than 10 per cent. nor higher than 50 per cent.

14. When the self-government in a district is established, it may elect one representative to form a council with representatives from other districts to share in the affairs of the central government.

15. All candidates for office, and all officers whether of the central or of the local government, must be examined by the central government and properly certified as qualified.

16. When all the districts in a province have self-government, the period of constitutional government begins. The people's representatives elect the provincial governor, who shall supervise the self-government of that province; but in the affairs of that province pertaining to the nation he shall be under the direction of the central government.

17. During this period, the division of power between the central and the provincial governments shall follow the line of equilibrium. Those affairs that have the nature of uniformity for the whole nation shall belong to the central government. Those that are particular to a locality and need particular attention shall belong to the local government. The division shall neither over-emphasize centralization nor decentralization.

18. The district shall be the unit of local self-government. The province shall serve as connection between the central government and the district.

19. In the period of constitutional government there shall be established five departments to try to put into practice the government by the five-power system. The order is the following : the executive department, the legislative department, the judicial department, the department of examination, and the department of supervision or impeachment.

20. In the executive department there shall be established provisionally the following ministries: interior, foreign affairs, army, finance, agriculture and mines, labour and commerce, education, communications.

21. Before the promulgation of the constitution, all the heads of the departments are appointed and removed by the president and subject to his direction.

22. The draft of the constitution shall be discussed by the legislative department and it shall be based on the Outline of Reconstruction and on the results of the periods of training in government and of constitutional government. The draft shall be preached to the people from time to time, so that when the time arrives it might be adopted and put into practice.

23. When there is a majority of provinces in the country which have reached the stage of self-government—that is, when in each the self-government is completed—there shall be called a People's Congress to decide the constitution and promulgate it.

24. When the constitution is promulgated, the political power of the central government shall rest with the People's Congress; that is to say that the People's Congress shall have the powers of election, recall, in regard to the officials of the central government, and that it shall have the powers of initiative and referendum in regard to the laws of the central government.

25. When the constitution is promulgated, the constitutional government is established. The people of the whole country shall then carry out a general election according to the constitution. The Nationalist Government shall be dissolved three months after the completion of the general election, and the power transferred to the government elected by the people. Then the reconstruction will have been completed.

APPENDIX C

DECLARATION OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUOMINTANG, 1924

I

The Present Condition of China

The Chinese Revolution had its inception after the Chino-Japanese War, was brought to a head in 1900, and achieved its success in 1911, by which the Monarchical Government was eventually overthrown. But a revolution cannot arise all of a sudden. Since the occupation of China by the Manchus there reigned in the hearts of the Chinese race the feeling of injustice for a long time. After the country was thrown open to international commerce, foreign imperialism came like an angry tide. Armed plundering and economic pressure reduced the country to a semi-colonial status, and caused her to lose her independence. The Manchu Government not only possessed no ability to repulse foreign invasion, but also persisted in an increasing degree in the policy of subjugating the "slaves" at home, thereby courting favour with the foreign Powers. Under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, the comrades of our party have realized that unless the Manchu Government was overthrown there would be no hope for the reconstruction of China. Therefore they rose valiantly to be the vanguard of the people and proceeded with great rapidity until 1911, when the task of downing with the Manchu Government was at last achieved. But it is clear that the aim of the Revolution was not confined to the overthrow of the Manchus but in the fact that with their overthrow we shall be able to undertake the work of reconstruction. According to the circumstances then obtaining we ought to be able : in the racial aspect to proceed from the dictatorship of one race to the union of the several races based on equality; in the political aspect, to proceed from the system of dictatorship to the system of popular sovereignty; and in the economic aspect, to proceed from handicraft production to capitalistic production. Proceeding in this way it cannot fail to change the semi-colonial China into an independent China, standing proudly in the world.

But the realities of that time were indeed contrary to our expectations. Although it was said that the Revolution had succeeded, what the revolutionary Government was able to effectively express was only the principle of racial emancipation. And in what a short time it was compelled by the circumstances to compromise with the

reactionary class of absolutism! Such compromise is indirectly a concession to imperialism, and was the basic reason of the first defeat of the Revolution. The representative of the reactionary class of absolutism at that time was Yuan Shih-kai. The power that he possessed was not strong. But the fact that the revolutionary comrades were not able to beat him was due to their earnest desire to avoid a prolongation of the civil war in the country as well as to the lack of a party that possessed organization and discipline and understood its own mission and aims. Were such a party in existence, it would be able to defeat the plot of Yuan Shih-kai and achieve success. The leaders of the northern militarists were always conspiring with the imperialists, and all the reactionary classes of absolutism, such as the militarists and the politicians, depended upon them for their livelihood. Since to them the revolutionary comrades had consigned the political power, it was small wonder that defeat was the outcome.

The death of Yuan Shih-kai did not change the fortune of the Revolution—in fact, it went from one defeat to another. The result was that the militarists of the country were able to play the executioners and the people the victims. Any political reconstruction based on the principle of popular sovereignty was out of the question. Furthermore, the fact that the militarists were not able to live independently drove them to establish connections with the imperialists one and all. Even the so-called Government of the Republic was under the thumb of the militarists, and they utilized it to court favour with the imperialists so as to strengthen their own positions. The imperialists in their turn utilized them, furnishing them with loans to fill their war chests so that the civil war is prolonged, and the imperialists were able to fish in the troubled water and carve out the country's vital interests into spheres of influence. From this point of view, it is clear that the internal warfare of China is conferring advantages on the imperialists. The imperialists in their conflicts of interests again sought the support of the militarists, to kill the people for their own interests. In addition the chaotic condition of the country acted as a check on the development of the internal industries of the country, giving the foreign goods added opportunities to reign supreme in the market. So the Chinese industries cannot even compete with foreign capitalists on the home market. The cruelty of such a catastrophe was that not only will our political life but also our economic life will be exterminated. Glancing around the country, it will be seen that the middle class, after the repeated reverses of the Revolution, is suffering increasing hardship. The small merchants are becoming bankrupt; the small handicraft workers are losing their work, degenerating into vagrants and bandits; and then farmers, unable to till their own land, are selling out at cheap prices, as the cost of living is becoming dearer and the taxes

are becoming heavier. Such conditions of desolation are found on every hand. What can be said of such conditions except that they are signs of desperation?

From this point of view, the condition of the country since the Revolution of 1911 had not only not progressed, but, on the contrary, it has retrogressed. The reign of arbitrary power of the militarists and the invasions of the imperialists are getting worse every day, causing her to sink deeper into the hell of a semi-colonial status. This condition is what makes the people of the whole country indignant and the thinking men of the country restless until a way out is found.

What is, then, the way out? Regarding this, every party in the country and every man, and even foreign residents, entertained different opinions. They may be grouped in the following categories, with our criticism attached.

First, there is the constitutional school of opinion. According to this group of men, the trouble of China is in the lack of law. If the country can be united under a constitution, then the chaotic condition will be remedied. The trouble with this school is that they forget that the effectiveness of a constitution is conditioned on the support of the people. Without such a support, a constitution on black and white only will not be able to guarantee the sovereignty of the people against the attacks of the militarists. We had indeed the Provisional Constitution since the first year of the Republic, but even then the remnants of absolutism and the militarists and the politicians usurped power and were able to institute a reign of crime. So long as these people are in existence, there will be no use for the constitution. In that case the constitution is but waste paper, and what good will it do to the sovereignty of the people? One has not forgotten that Tsao Quan was able to bribe himself into power only under the shadow of a constitution; but what he did was entirely contrary to the constitution. Therefore the prerequisite question of the establishment of a constitution was whether the people were able to guard it. There is no use to put the cart before the horse. What is more, if the people are not organized, the presence of a constitution will not mean that they will be able to use it; and in such a case, even if there is no militarist to attack it, it will remain a dead letter only. So the fault with this school is that they only know that a constitution is what is wanted without thinking what is the means of supporting and putting it into practice. This school is therefore without the organization, the means, and the courage to fight for a constitution. In conclusion, it is certain that the establishment of a constitution will not come until the overthrow of the power of the militarists and the imperialists.

Secondly, there is the federal school of opinion. According to this

school, the chaotic phenomenon of the country is due to the over-centralization of power in the hands of the central government, and therefore it must divide the power among the provincial governments. When local self-government is established, the central government will be powerless to do wrong. This school forgets that the power of Peking to-day is not conferred by the people under any law, but is snatched by the big militarists. The big militarists used their armed power to capture the central government, and in turn utilized it to expand their armed power. The suggestion of this school amounts to this much, that the power of the small militarists of the provinces shall be utilized to curtail the power of the central government, leaving the big militarists in control of it to perpetrate crimes. Where is the logic in this reasoning? The inevitable result will be that the small militarists will be enabled to establish their governments in the provinces side by side with the big militarists, each for his own benefit, and the country will thus be in a partitioned state. It is, in fact, absence of any order and government. It is true that real self-government is the highest good and answers the demands and the spirit of our people. But such real self-government cannot be achieved until the country as a whole has achieved its independence. Now, China as a whole has not secured its independence, and it would be impossible to secure first the independence of any of its parts. Therefore the struggle for self-government cannot proceed independently from the struggle of the movement of national independence. Only within a free China can there be free provinces. The political, economic, and social problems within a province are only soluble within the scope of the whole country. Therefore the realization of real self-government of the provinces will only be possible after the success of the interests of the revolution of the whole country. We recommend this analysis to the consideration of the whole country.

Thirdly, there is the school of peace conferences. The country has suffered long from the civil war, and suggestions of holding peace conferences came as a natural result. These suggestions are not confined to the Chinese, but there are foreigners also. If we can achieve peace in this way, nothing can be better. But the trouble is that these suggestions defeat their own purposes. Let us see why. The civil war is created directly by the competing militarists. In seeking their own interests these militarists stand in absolute opposition to one another, and there was no ground for any compromise. Even if there were, it would not amount to more than the compromise between the interests of the militarists, and it had nothing to do with the interests of the people. It would be a union of the militarists and not the union of the country, and what good will it bring to the people? The result of such peace conferences will in no way be

different from the results of the peace conferences of Europe, where the peace of the small nations is sacrificed to the competing interests of the big Powers. The fact that China was not able to get unity was due to the interests of these Powers. If one knows the impossibility of peace, but entertains the illusion that the parties to this struggle will seek a sort of equilibrium and avoid conflict, thereby securing a temporary truce, it would be entirely a dream. The reason is that in fact there is no power to prevent one militarist attacking another; and since all militarists possess mercenary troops, the inevitable result is plundering and war. It is, of course, easier to plunder other provinces than to plunder one's own province.

Fourthly, there is the school of a government by the merchant class. The originator of this opinion viewed the trouble as arising from the militarists and politicians, and therefore the capitalists ought to rise to take their place. But if militarists and politicians incurred the hate of the people, due to the fact that they do not represent the people, we must ask in the first place, can the merchants represent the interests of the masses of the people? In the second place we must know that the militarist government incurred the increasing hatred of the people because it depended on the protection of the foreign Powers. The merchant government will also be under the protection of the foreign Powers, and in that case it is nothing different from the militarist government. Although one cannot be opposed to a merchant government as such, our demand is that the masses of the people will organize the government themselves, to represent the interests of the whole people, and not confined to those of the merchant class. And that government must be one which is independent and does not seek the help of others. It must depend on the will of the whole of the masses of the people.

A brief survey of the above currents of thought has shown that some of them proceeded from a sincere desire to save the country, but result only in chimeras, while others are the results of malicious criticism lacking in all sincerity.

The Kuomintang is always of the opinion that the only way out for China is to realize the Three Principles through the Nationalist Revolution. Reviewing the present situation of China, we are the more confirmed in our view that the Nationalist Revolution cannot be delayed. We therefore submit to the people of the whole country a detailed presentation of the principles and the political platform of the Kuomintang.

II

The Principles of the Kuomintang

The principles of the Kuomintang are no other than the Three Principles founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The political platform is

based on these principles, and we are convinced that there is no other way of saving the country. Every step of the Nationalist Revolution is guided by these fundamental principles. The determination with which the reorganization of the party was carried out also recognized the importance of paying special attention to the organization and the discipline of the party. It was in order that each member of the party would be enabled to devote his or her ability to carry on the struggle until the principles were realized. The speech of Dr. Sun on November 25th of last year and his speeches in the reorganization conference on the present conditions of China and on the problems of reorganization were very explicit on this point. We shall give a *résumé* of his remarks to serve as an earnest attempt to elucidate his Three Principles, for it is only after the meaning of these principles is grasped that one is able to find ways and means for the remedying of the present conditions with any real basis.

(*a*) THE PRINCIPLE OF RACIAL UNITY.—There are two aspects to the principle of racial unity in the Kuomintang, namely the Chinese nation seeks self-emancipation; and all the races within the territory of China stand on the basis of equality.

The First Aspect.—The principle of racial unity of the Kuomintang seeks to make the Chinese nation independent and free in the world. Before 1911 the Manchu race was the governing race, and the imperialists were also encircling the country. The movement of this principle at that time aimed at the tyranny of the Manchus as well as the division of China by the Powers. After 1911 the tyranny of the Manchus was overthrown by the nationalist movement, but the encircling of the Powers remained intact. The policy of the division of China was changed into that of international control. In other words, the policy of armed invasion gave way to economic oppression; but the result would be the same in that both would lead to the loss of independence by China. The militarists were conspiring with the imperialists and the capitalist class was also waiting to divide the advantage with them. Therefore the condition of China, politically as well as economically, went from bad to worse. The members of the Kuomintang under these circumstances cannot give up their struggle in order to achieve the emancipation of the Chinese race. In this work what they depend on for their support is the masses of the country, namely the intellectual class, the peasants, the labourers and the merchants. For this principle of racial unity has a significance to every class of the country in that it repulses for them all the invasion of the imperialists. For the industrial class, the home industries will be permanently under the mercy of the foreign economic oppression if there is no principle of racial unity. Without this principle, the lives of the labourers would be endangered by

the militarists and the capitalists, both Chinese and foreign, that depend on the imperialists for protection. Therefore for the great masses of the people, the principle of racial unity has no other significance than the repulsion of imperialism. It is only after the blows of the nationalist movement have weakened the force of imperialism that the people will be able to develop their organization, and, strengthening them, to continue the struggle. This is what the Kuomintang can prove from the facts. In order to prove that the principle of racial unity is a sound principle for combating imperialism, we ought to strive to assist the organization of the masses of the country so as to develop the power of the people; for it is only after the Kuomintang and the people have formed a real union that we can expect to achieve the real freedom and independence of the country.

The Second Aspect.—We have stated above that before 1911 only the Manchu race dictated from above. After the complete overthrow of the Manchu rule in 1911, it seemed that the races in the country ought to secure a union on the basis of equality, as that was precisely what was desired by the Kuomintang under the principle of racial unity. But unfortunately the government of China was in the hands of the militarists, who were the remains of the system of autocracy, and the imperialist influence of the old days had a new lease of life. The races within the country are therefore plunged into a condition of insecurity. The minority races of the country sometimes entertained doubts regarding the sincerity of the policy of the Kuomintang. In order to realize completely the principle of racial unity, the Kuomintang from now on must try to secure the understanding of these races, and explain that their common interest is in the success of the nationalist revolutionary movement. The Kuomintang is to-day paying concentrated attention to propaganda, and ought to proceed to form organized connection with these races in the process of development of the revolutionary forces of the country as well as to seek concrete measures for the solution of the problems of these races. The Kuomintang solemnly declares that it recognizes the right of self-determination of all the races within the country; and that after the success of the revolution against the militarists and the imperialists, a freely united Republic of China, based on the free union of the races, will be established.

(*b*) The Principle of Popular Sovereignty.—This principle of the Kuomintang envisages a system of direct popular authority in addition to that of indirect popular authority; that is to say, the people will not only have the power of election, but also those of initiative, referendum and recall. The process of wielding these powers will be set forth in the constitution based on the five-power division of the constitutional authority as formulated by Dr. Sun

Yat-sen, namely those of the legislative, the executive, the judicial, the examination, the impeachment or the control. This new system is, on the one hand, to supplement the shortcomings of the modern system of representative government, and on the other to rectify the evils of a purely elective system. The so-called modern system of popular government is often the monopoly of the property class, to be used as an instrument of oppression on the masses. But the principle of popular sovereignty of the Kuomintang is for all the masses and is not to be possessed by the few. For it is the people of the Republic that will be allowed to enjoy the popular sovereignty, and the party shall see to it that this power does not fall into the hands of those who are opposed to the Republic, to be used as an instrument against it. Specifically it is only those individuals and those organizations that are really loyal to anti-imperialism that will enjoy all the rights and freedom. Those who betray the country and the people, be they individuals or organizations, will be debarred from these rights and freedom.

(*c*) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD.—This principle of the Kuomintang contains two fundamental aspects. The first is the equalization of land, and the second is the control of capital. Inasmuch as the greatest cause of the inequality of economic organization lies in the fact that the right of land is controlled by the few, the Kuomintang proposes that the State shall prescribe the law of land, the law for the utilization of land, the law of the taxation of land, the law for the taxation of the value of land. Private landowners shall declare its value to the Government, which shall tax it according to the value so declared with the option of buying it at that price in case of necessity. This is the essence of the equalization of land. Private industries, whether of the Chinese or of the foreign nationals, which are either of a monopolistic nature or are beyond the capacity of private individuals to develop, such as banking, railways, and navigation, shall be undertaken by the State, so that private-owned capital shall not control the economic life of the people. This is the essence of the control of capital. These two things will provide a good foundation for the principle of the people's livelihood. But a word must be added for the peasants. China is an agricultural country, and the peasants are the class that have suffered most. The Kuomintang stands for the policy that those peasants that have no land and consequently have fallen into the status of mere tenants should be given land by the State for their cultivation. The State shall also undertake the work of irrigation and of opening up the waste land so as to increase the power of production of land. Those of the peasants that have no capital and are compelled to borrow at high rates of interest and are in debt for life should be supplied by the State with credit by the establishment of rural banks. Only

then will the peasants be able to enjoy the happiness of life. In addition, we must say a word to the labourers. The livelihood of the labourers of China has no guarantee at all. The policy of the Kuomintang is that the State shall find remedies for the unemployed. And what is more necessary is the establishment of the labour law to improve the livelihood of the labourers. Other measures which affect the support of the aged, the bringing up of the young, the succour of the sick and the disabled, and the spreading of education, and which are of a complementary nature, shall be pushed till they are realized. All these are within the compass of the principle of the people's livelihood.

In China to-day, from north to south, from the commercial ports to the villages and the inaccessible hamlets, poor peasants and overworked labourers are to be found everywhere. The positions which these two classes occupy, and the sufferings which they experience, are in general so similar, and their aspirations for liberation are so pressing, that in both of them is found the powerful will to revolt against imperialism. Therefore it goes without saying that the success of the Nationalist Revolution depends upon the participation of the peasants and the labourers of the whole country. The position of the Kuomintang is, on the one hand, to help the development of the peasants and of the labourers with all its strength, to help their economic development without hindrance, so that the effective power of the Nationalist Revolution may be increased; and on the other to make unremitting efforts to secure the participation of the peasants and the labourers in the Kuomintang, so as to speed up the advance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. For the Kuomintang is now engaged in the struggle against imperialism and militarism—that is, against the classes opposed to the interests of the peasants and of the labourers, and to secure their emancipation. In short, it is a struggle for the peasants and the labourers, and it is one in which the peasants and the labourers struggle for themselves.

Such is the real meaning of the Three Principles of the Kuomintang. Since the reorganization, the party aims to use strict discipline to establish its foundation of organization. It aims at using all proper methods for the education and the training of its members, so that they will be people who have the ability to preach its principles, to move the people, and politically to organize the revolution. At the same time the party will use all its efforts to carry out propaganda among all the people of the country so that they may participate in the revolutionary movement, obtain the political power, and conquer the people's enemy. After the political power is obtained and the government is established, the party must be the central organ of control of the political power, so that all the counter-revolutionary movements within the country will be suppressed, the plot

of the imperialists to oppose the success of the interests of the people will be frustrated, and all the obstacles to the principles of the Kuomintang will be swept away. For only an organized party and one with authority will serve as the foundation of the revolutionary masses, because only it can render loyally this duty to the people of the whole country.

III

The Political Platform of the Kuomintang

In our attempts to realize the principles of the party we are convinced of the distance of the journey and of the stupendous task that it cannot be achieved in one day. But the condition of the country is so critical that some immediate remedy is imperative. Therefore we are always bearing in mind that the putting into effect of certain principal political measures will constitute a first step towards this direction. In the following we shall enumerate the concrete measures as our political platform. Those in the country who recognize that the interests of the nation are above those of the individuals or of an organization will examine and execute these measures :

A.—Foreign Policy

1. All unequal treaties, such as foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, foreign control of customs, and all categories of political power exercised by foreigners in China and prejudicial to her sovereignty should be cancelled, and new treaties based on the principle of equality and mutual respect for the sovereign rights of both parties should be negotiated to take their places.

2. Those of the Powers which voluntarily renounce all special privileges and voluntarily abrogate the treaties which infringe on the sovereign rights of China shall be considered as the most favoured nations.

3. Those treaties between China and the Powers which endanger the interests of China should be revised. The principle to be observed in such revisions is that they shall not injure the sovereign rights of either of the parties.

4. The foreign loans of China shall be guaranteed and paid within the limit that such payments shall not cause political and industrial damages to the country.

5. Foreign loans contracted by irresponsible governments in China, such as the Peking *régimé* founded on bribery and usurpation, are used, not to promote the welfare of the people, but to maintain the existence of the militarists to further their policy of bribery and stealing. The people of China shall not hold themselves responsible for the repayment of such debts.

6. A conference of the professional organizations like the Bankers' Association and the Chambers of Commerce, and of the social organizations like the educational organizations, of all the provinces, shall be called to devise ways and means for the repayment of foreign loans, in order to free China from the semi-colonial status arising from the bondage of debts.

B.—Internal Policy

1. The principle of equilibrium shall be observed in the division of powers between the central and the local governments. Those affairs that have the nature of uniformity for the whole nation shall be allotted to the central government. Those that are particular to a locality and need particular attention shall be allotted to the local government. The division shall neither over-emphasize centralization nor decentralization.

2. The district is to be definitely the unit of local self-government. In a self-governing district the people have the power of directly electing and recalling the officers, as also the power of direct initiative and referendum on the laws.

3. Taxes on land, increment of value on land, proceeds from forestry and river, profits from mines and water-power all belong to the local government, to be used for conducting the affairs of the people of the district, for the youth, the aged, charity, assistance in case of calamity, medicine, and all kinds of public necessities.

Those natural resources of a district and the industrial and commercial undertakings on large scales which are beyond its financial ability to develop and conduct shall be carried on with the assistance of the central government. The proceeds from such undertakings shall be divided equally between the central and the local governments.

Regarding the sharing of the expenses of the central government, the district governments shall remit to it a certain percentage of their annual receipts. Its minimum shall not be below 10 per cent. and its maximum shall not exceed 50 per cent.

4. To put into effect the system of universal suffrage, and to abolish the system of class suffrage based on property qualification.

5. To institute a system of examination for public officials to supply the deficiency of the election system.

6. It shall be definitely prescribed by law that the people have the absolute freedom of association, of speech, of publication, of domicile, and of belief.

7. The present system of recruiting for the army shall be changed into the system of conscription. At the same time attention must be directed to improve the economic conditions of the lower ranks of the officers and the soldiers and to improve their legal positions. Agricultural education and professional education shall be intro-

duced in the army. The qualifications of the officers shall be strictly prescribed, and the methods of appointment and removal shall be improved.

8. The legal limit of the tax on land shall be strictly fixed. All extra charges over and above the limit, as the "likin," etc., shall be abolished.

9. To establish the census; to improve the land under cultivation; to equalize the production and the consumption of food so that there will be equal sufficiency for all.

10. To improve the organization of the villages and the livelihood of the peasants.

11. To establish a labour code; to improve the conditions of living of the labourers; to protect labour organizations and to help their development.

12. The principle of equality between the two sexes shall be recognized legally, economically, educationally and socially. Assistance should be given to the development of the rights of women.

13 Energetic efforts should be made for universal education, and every effort should be made to develop education based on the interests of the children. The educational system should be revised, and educational expenditure should be increased and its independence guaranteed.

14. The Government shall establish the law of land, the law for the utilization of land, the law for the taxation of land, and the law for the taxation of the value of land. The owners of private land shall declare its value to the Government; the Government shall levy tax on the declared value, and in case of necessity may purchase it at the price so declared.

15. Enterprises of monopolistic nature, as well as those beyond the ability of private individuals, as railways and navigation, etc., shall be managed and conducted by the State.

APPENDIX D

MADAME SUN YAT-SEN'S STATEMENT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION

ISSUED IN JULY 1927 AT WU-HAN

I feel that it is necessary at this time to explain, as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, that we have reached a point where definition is necessary and where some members of the party executive are so defining the principles and policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen that they seem to me to do violence to Dr. Sun's ideas and ideals. Feeling thus, I must dissociate myself from active participation in the carrying out of these new policies of the party.

To-day we face a crisis and we must probe searchingly into fundamental questions for fundamental answers. We must answer the questions of the nature of revolution in general, of the Chinese Revolution in particular, whether it is to be a mere political or a social revolution, and what changes are involved.

In the last analysis, all revolutions must be social revolutions, based upon fundamental changes in society ; otherwise it is not a revolution, but merely a change of government.

To guide us in the Chinese Revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies. It is the Third Principle, that of the livelihood of the people, that is at stake at the present time—the principle that answers the questions of fundamental social changes in China.

This Third Principle was felt by Dr. Sun to be basic in our Revolution. In this principle we find his analysis of social values and the place of the labouring and peasant classes defined. These classes become the basis of our strength in our struggle to overthrow imperialism, cancel the unequal treaties that enslave us, and effectively unify the country. These are the new pillars for the building up of a new free China. Without their support, the Kuomintang, as a revolutionary party, becomes weak, chaotic and illogical in its social platform; without their support, political issues are vague. If we adopt any policy that weakens these supports, we shake the very foundation of our party, betray the masses and are falsely loyal to our leader.

To-day there is much talk of policy. Dr. Sun defined three policies, which he decided were the only means by which his Three Principles could be carried out. But to-day it is being said that policies must be changed to fit the needs of the time. There is some truth in this state-

ment, but change of policy should never be carried to a point where it becomes a reversal, so that a revolutionary party ceases to be revolutionary and becomes merely an organ, operating under the banner of revolution but actually working in support of the very social structure which the party was founded to alter.

At the moment we face critical issues. Theoretical and practical differences have arisen between various elements of the party. Drastic solutions are suggested. It is because I feel that the carrying out of some of these suggested solutions would destroy the strength of the party and delay the success of the Revolution that I must speak. These solutions seem to me a part of a policy which would alienate and suppress the classes upon which our strength largely depends and for which the Revolution must be fought. Such a policy, I feel, is doomed to failure.

This is time for honesty and courage. There have been mistakes, but the fact that some of us are unwilling to face is that we are at least as responsible for many of these mistakes as those whom we would now hold completely at fault. If we look back honestly at the past months in Wu-Han, examine our words and decisions unflinchingly, we cannot evade this responsibility. Speeches, statements are recorded in the history of the party. But now we would shirk the responsibility, shift it to other shoulders.

Yes, there have been mistakes. But we must face the fact that they are not only others' mistakes; they are our own as well. We have helped to make them; we must correct them. Moreover, for revolutionary mistakes revolutionary solutions must be found. We must not betray the people. We have built up in them a great hope. They have placed in us a great faith. To that faith we owe our final allegiance.

Dr. Sun came from the people. He has told me a great deal about his early days. He came from the peasantry. His father was a farmer and the people of his district were farmers.

Dr. Sun was poor. Not until he was fifteen years old did he have shoes for his feet, and he lived in a hilly region where it is not easy to be a barefoot boy. His family, until he and his brother were grown, lived almost from hand to mouth, in a hut. As a child he ate the cheapest food—not rice, for rice was too dear; his main nourishment was sweet potatoes.

Many times Dr. Sun has told me that it was in those days, as a poor son of a poor peasant family, that he became a revolutionary. He was determined that the lot of the Chinese peasant should not continue to be so wretched, that little boys in China should have shoes to wear and rice to eat. For this ideal he gave forty years of his life.

Yet to-day the lot of the Chinese peasant is even more wretched than in those days when Dr. Sun was driven by his great sense of

human wrongs into a life of revolution. And to-day men, who profess to follow his banner, talk of classes and think in terms of a "revolution" that would virtually disregard the sufferings of those millions of poverty-stricken peasants of China.

To-day also we hear condemnation of the peasant and labour movement as a recent, alien product. This is false. Twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of a revolution that would change the status of the Chinese peasant. In his early twenties he wrote to Li Hung-chang, petitioning for social and economic reforms. In 1911 he wrote an article on the agrarian question in China, printed in Geneva, in *The Socialist*, in which he said that the basis of social and economic transformations in China is an agrarian revolution. All his life this was one of the great goals he had in mind. Everything he planned he saw as means to the betterment of the life of the Chinese masses. In 1915, when we were in Japan, he urged Liao Chung-kai to study more deeply into the peasant and labour problems.

It is only in the past few years, after four decades of struggle, that these plans for a revolution of the people have begun to bear fruit. I remember clearly the first All Kwangtung Peasants' Conference in Canton, in July 1924. Then for the first time we saw the people of China, who must be her new strength, coming to participate in the Revolution. From all the districts of Kwangtung the peasants came, many of them walking miles and miles, barefooted, to Canton. They were ragged, tattered. Some carried baskets and poles. I remember I was deeply moved.

Dr. Sun was moved also. When he reached home he said to me, "This is the beginning of the success of the revolution," and he told me again the part the oppressed people of China must play in their own salvation.

All these years his purpose was clear. But to-day we talk of recent foreign influence. Was Sun Yat-sen—the leader who was voicing the agrarian revolution for China when Russia was still under the heel of the Czar—was he the tool of foreign scheming?

Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If leaders of the party do not carry them out consistently then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers, and the party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist. It will have ceased to be a living force working for the future welfare of the Chinese people, and will have become a machine, the agent of oppression, a parasite fattening on the present enslaving system!

We face a serious crisis. But it is more of a crisis for us as individuals than for China as a country. Whether the present Kuomintang at this moment rises to the height of its ideals and courageously finds a revolutionary corrective for its mistakes, or whether it slumps into

the shamefulness of reaction and compromise, the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen will conquer in the end. Revolution in China is inevitable.

At the moment I feel that we are turning aside from Dr. Sun's policy of leading and strengthening the people; therefore I must withdraw until wiser policies prevail.

There is no despair in my heart for the Revolution. My disheartenment is only for the path into which some of those who had been leading the Revolution have strayed.

But although there are members of the party who are straying from the path Dr. Sun charted for the Revolution of China, millions of people in China who have already come under the banners of the party will continue on this path to the final goal. This means that I shall not keep faith alone. I am certain that all true members of the Kuomintang will take this revolutionary path.

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